On the front pages of the Daily Graphic of today, 5th April 2017, is a screaming banner headline” MEDIA DECLARES WAR ON GALAMSEY”. It is accompanied with a photo of Mustapha Hamid, the Information Minister, Kenneth Ashigbey, and the Managing Director of Graphic Communications Group Ltd.
The story is about the launch of a media coalition at the Alisa Hotel in Accra to confront the growing “menace” of prospecting miners locally described as Galamsey operators in the wake of the environmental degradation their activities have caused to the environment of Ghana.
Other ministers present at the launch were Mr John Peter Amewu of the Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources who has issued an ultimatum to the “illegal miners to halt their activities”, Professor Frimpong Boateng, Minister of Environment Science, Technology and Innovation and the Water Resources and Sanitation Minister, Kofi Adda.
The coalition is reportedly made up of the Graphic Communications Group Limited (GCGL), the New Times Corporation, the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC), the Ghana Journalists Association (GJA), the Ghana Independent Broadcasters Association (GIBA), the Private Newspaper Publishers Association of Ghana (PRINPAG) and the Community Radio Network.
We are told that the Ghanaian ‘media’ is not only disturbed at the activities of prospecting miners but even the licensed small scale miners who provide the raw material to the Precious Mineral and Marketing Company and it is advocating for measures to break the head of everyone involved in that industry.
The involvement of the Chinese and Indian businessmen believed to be bankrolling the activities of these prospecting miners has complicated matters. A few of these foreign nationals have been arrested and paraded on the television with photos of them spread in the newspapers.
Why must Chinese, Indian and perhaps Canadian and Australian businessmen, finance the activity of prospecting miners whose activities are polluting rivers and farmlands across the country? One must then find the media coalition launched to confront the Galamsey menace worthy of our support. And the argument about whether or not this media coalition launched at the Alisa Hotel is heavily funded by the transnational mining corporations as has been stated elsewhere is not an issue.
Nonetheless, the hypocrisy of not just the recently launched media coalition but the Government of Ghana under the leadership of President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo Addo is disgusting and shameful and I will offer some reasons.
Firstly, Ken Ashigbey, the Managing Director of the Daily Graphic who doubles as an electrical engineer by profession according to the report of the Daily Graphic, observed that “everywhere there is mining in the country, there is poverty” and proceeded by asking the question “how many Ghanaian billionaires have me made from mining?”
This question is so important because the mineral resource of Ghana is a crucial component for national development and plans for its exploitation and use are critical factors in the quest for the improvement of national life. Another important consideration is that mineral resources once depleted, cannot be restored and this brings up the question of how to use the fruits of such a wasting resource in a manner that also benefits future generations, for instance by building up social and capital infrastructure to enhance production and productivity into the future.
In order to answer Mr Ken Ashigbey’s question, we need to visit a shocking incidence that occurred in the year 2003 narrated by Professor Akilagpa Sawyerr about how the administrations of Presidents John Agyekum Kufuor and John Dramani Mahama virtually handed over or sold out our national interest in our mineral resources for partisan political consideration without a thought about how it will impact on the people of Ghana.
It reveals that the problems of Galamsey are rooted within the general context of the neoliberal policy of government that neglects gold as a resource critical for national development and explains why ordinary Ghanaians in partnership with foreign nationals and with sources of funding from illegal means are taking their pound of flesh from a resource mostly left to the exploitation of transnational corporations with virtually no benefit to the government and people of Ghana.
The account you’re about to read is an abridged version of a presidential address delivered by Professor Akilagpa Sawyerr, President of the Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences.
“In 2003 Newmont Mining Corporation of Denver, Colorado, USA, submitted a draft Investment to the Government of Ghana in respect of mining leases held by its local subsidiaries for prospect at Ahafo in the Brong Ahafo Region of Ghana and Akyem in the Eastern Region.
The draft agreement was referred to the Minerals Commission for assessment and advice as required by law. Following a review by the commission, the Chairman of the Commission sent a report to the Minister of Mines, listing up to 33 grounds of objection to the draft presented by Newmont. These related, among other things to unduly favourable terms on corporate tax, mineral royalty, duty exemptions and forex repatriation; use of aircraft and access top airports, land strips etc., as well as the provision that where the terms of agreement were in conflict with national and international law, the former prevailed.
The report ended with this observation: “it is the view of the commission that Government would be setting a bad precedent if approval is given to this Agreement in its currents form quite apart from the fact that a number of the provisions … are contrary to the laws of this country” (Minerals Commission to Minister of Mines, Aug 26, 2003.
With no reaction from the Minister and with no further engagement with the Minerals Commission, and with none of the issues raised by the commission addressed, the agreement presented by NEWMONT was signed on 17 Dec 2003. It was ratified by parliament on Dec 18, 2003, one day after the signature.
Given the loud cry over the mega-profits made by Newmont when the price of gold went up on the international market, a National Mining Review Committee (MRC) was inaugurated on 31 January 2012, to review the national mining regime generally, and undertake the renegotiation of mining agreements with stability provisions. Professor Akilagpa Sawyerr, the former Vice Chancellor of the University of Ghana and President of the Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences with a rich background in negotiation for the state was appointed Chair of the Committee and Chief Negotiator for Government.
The MRC initially engaged separately with Newmont and the two other major mining companies – AngloGold Ashanti and Gold Fields Ghana.
After extensive preparation, the Committee went into hard negotiations with Newmont over a period of 2½ years. In November 2014 it concluded the negotiation of new Investment Agreements (Newmont II) with the two local affiliates of Newmont Mining Corporation – Newmont Ghana Gold Ltd. in respect of the mine at Ahafo, and Newmont Golden Ridge Ltd. in respect of the mine at Akyem.
The terms of Newmont II addressed virtually all the excesses pointed out by the Minerals Commission in 2003 and repeated by a Technical Review Committee in 2011. The new agreements were altered in Ghana’s favour, the fiscal regime (income tax, mineral royalty, duty exemptions, forex repatriation, etc.) and many other terms. Several other fiscal and non-fiscal terms, such as use of aircraft, private security and provision for the agreement terms to override national and international laws, were discarded outright. In addition to all these other positives, the Akilagpa Committee got Newmont to agree to pay what amounted to a “signing on premium” – an upfront cash payment of USD27million, duly paid to the Ministry of Finance a month after Parliamentary ratification of the agreements!
It is this successful move to correct the lop-sidedness of Newmont I to the extent possible, and remain consistent with the continental drive to increase the share of the state in natural resources rent that is referred to in the title to this lecture as a forward march.
To round up, it might be noted that the Newmont IIagreements were concluded in November 2014; signed in May 2015; approved by Cabinet and submitted to Parliament for ratification in June 2015; and ratified by Parliament in November 2015 – a total of 12 months
from conclusion to ratification. Quite a change from Newmont I - ratified by Parliament ONE DAY after signature!
v Gold Fields
Now for the third section of the story. As part of its original mandate, the Mining Review Committee (MRC) established and maintained contact with Gold Fields Ghana Ltd., one of the three leading mining companies in Ghana, building up a dossier of background information and statistics on the company as well as Gold Fields Ltd., its parent company, in preparation for direct negotiations. Following the conclusion of the Newmont Agreements (Newmont II), the MRC began formal negotiations with Gold Fields in May 2015. This involved a series of meetings, information gathering and options development, culminating in Gold Fields submitting a draft proposal for negotiation. It became clear from the proposal that the concern of Gold Fields was to take advantage of Section 49 of the Minerals and Mining Act (Act 703) to obtain a stability agreement with appropriate fiscal concessions for investments it proposed to make at its mines in Tarkwa and Damang – concessions of the sort enjoyed by Newmont and AngloGold Ashanti. In August 2015 the MRC, therefore, suspended the negotiations in order to enable Gold Fields bring up its proposals for new investment in the usual manner, that is, through the Minerals Commission, which was the proper body to receive such proposals, and the best equipped to do the necessary initial assessments.
The MRC heard nothing further about this till February 2016, when it received the surprising news that a draft agreement had been settled between Government and Gold Fields, awaiting Cabinet approval and signature. As Chairman of the MRC, I asked for and received a copy of the draft agreements for review. After a hurried review I sent in comment on the draft, pointing out a number of what I considered serious flaws in the draft, concluding that:
“… on the basis of a quick assessment and for the reasons given above, the Gold Fields
Development Agreements are …. unsupportable in their present form.” [Chair, NMRC to Min of
Lands and Natural Resources/Min of Fin. /Minerals Commission, Feb 8, 2016]
Though Cabinet reportedly took note of our comments and asked for appropriate modifications in the final draft, the Agreements were signed on 11 March 2016, virtually unchanged.
They were tabled in Parliament on 16 March 2016 and referred to the Select Committee on Mines and Energy the same day. The Committee reported back the following day, 17 March! As reported in the Hansard, Parliament first waived the Standing Order requirement for a 48hour wait, thereby enabling the motion for approval to be immediately put for consideration by the House. The motion, which was tabled at 9.30 pm, was approved and the Gold Fields Agreements were ratified at 9.40 pm. Thus, the substantial and complex investment agreements were ratified by Parliament after fully 10 minutes of discussion on the floor of the House, one day after they were first tabled, and one week after they were signed!
It is difficult not to see the similarity between the circumstances surrounding Newmont I and Gold Fields – receiving Parliamentary ratification one day and one week, respectively, after conclusion of the agreements - in contrast to Newmont II, ratified a year after conclusion!
However, the similarity/difference go beyond the rush and superficiality of the approval process in the first two cases. As will become clear from what follows, they pertain as well to the substance of the agreements, since the terms of Gold Fields, likeNewmont I, but unlike Newmont II, run counter to the continental trend and recent Ghana efforts to increase the state revenue share from mining enterprises.
Hence the reference to “MARCHING FORWARD TO THE PAST” in the title of this lecture.
But, enough of storytelling! What does all this amount to? Simply put, in addition to the circumstances of their negotiation and the rush to ratification, the terms of the Gold Fields agreements take us away from the direction pointed by Newmont II, and run counter to trends elsewhere on the continent, as described above.
2. FLAWS IN REVISED GOLD FIELDS AGREEMENTS
There is not enough time to detail all the flaws in the agreements. What I propose, instead, is to demonstrate the general proposition by reference to a few illustrative items.
a. Fiscal Give-Away
The first issue relates to the concessions made in respect of the fiscal regime. The rate of corporate income tax, which, at the time, stood at 35% for mining companies, was reduced to 32.5%, and that of royalty from a flat 5% to a range of 3% - 5%, indexed to the gold price. Other concessions affected the basis for calculating corporate tax and import duty charges. According Gold Fields’ own estimates, the new fiscal concessions would have saved the company up to USD33million for the 2015 tax year, and will save it USD26million for 2016.
What is the basis for these give-aways by Government? The official justification has two elements. The first was the desire to level the playing field by giving Gold Fields what Newmont got in Newmont II- a rather naïve argument in the circumstances. For a start, while the terms of Newmont II represented a substantial enhancement of the benefits Ghana enjoyed underNewmont I, the same terms in the Gold Fields agreement represented a reduction of what we had prior to the negotiations. In any event, we did not consider the outcome of Newmont II as ideal, such as would constitute a proper benchmark for future agreements. Given the overgenerous concessions in Newmont I, we could do no more than claw back as much as we could. Had we started with a clean slate, we would undoubtedly have allowed fewer concessions than we had to in the circumstances. To use the outcome as a benchmark for negotiations about a fresh investment, where the investor is seeking extra benefits under the agreement, is a major misjudgement of the situation.
The second leg of the official justification was the need to give relief to Gold Fields, which was supposedly in dire straits, putting local jobs at risk. Clearly, this is not a sustainable line either. Nothing in the relevant legislation authorised giving relief to hard-pressed mines through the grant of fiscal concessions in a stability agreement. Putting that aside for a moment, one wonders, did the Minister of Lands and Natural Resources and his advisers really believe that, without these particular fiscal give-aways, Tarkwa and Damang were both on the brink of disaster? Local jobs at risk? Really?
For a start, the mines at Tarkwa and Damang, being separate mines, owned by separate companies under separate leases, in different locations, and under different economic and material conditions are separate entities under the law, and should, therefore, be considered separately. Taking Tarkwa first, the panic about impending disaster is difficult to reconcile with the following observation made by the Chief Executive Officer of Gold Fields about a month after the ratification of the agreements:
“Tarkwa is doing reasonable well, but we have to remember the gold price has come down from the highest of $1,900 dollars in 2013 to currently $1,200 dollars an ounce. So we have to tighten our belts in a number of areas.”
On what basis, then, could government negotiators have formed the view that Tarkwa, for one, could not survive without the bailout?
Turning to the mine at Damang, it had undoubtedly been in difficulty, with poor returns in 2013, leading to job lay-offs, etc. But could this be justification for the substantial fiscal concessions, locked in for 11 years? Did the Minister and his advisers not know that:
- Damang had reportedly already laid off some 500 workers, who had been accommodated within the mining sector?
- given the cyclical nature of gold price movements on the world market, a price rebound and profitability were entirely predictable?
- in the 5-year period to 2014, with the exception of 2013, Damang had been in profit (as had Tarkwa), paying dividends, and earning returns on equity (ROE) at rates higher than those of their parent company and the average for the industry?
It is clear from all that has been said that, had there been a fuller grasp of the relevant information and sharper thinking by our negotiators, the panic that led to the granting of such concessions, even beyond what was allowed by the law, would not have occurred.
b. Technical Deficiencies
Besides difficulty in justifying the concessions under the prevailing circumstances, there were serious technical flaws in the agreements as finally signed and ratified.
i. Some concessions almost certainly illegal
The fiscal concessions in the agreements were granted under Section 49 of the Minerals and Mining Act, 2006 (Act 703), which gives the Minister power to grant enhanced concessions in a development agreement with the holder of a mining lease, “where the proposed investment
will exceed” a stated amount. Such concessions will typically include the stability arrangements set out in Section 48 of the Act.
The first point of note is that the enhanced concessions under Section 49 are explicitly intended to attract and encourage new investments into mining, not to reward investments already made (nor to bail out companies in trouble!). The relevant portion of Section 49 reads:
“(1) The Minister on the advice of the Commission may enter into a development agreement under a mining lease with a person where the proposed investment by the person will exceed US$ five hundred million.
(2) A development agreement may contain provisions,
(a) . . .
(b) . . .
(c) on stability terms as provided under Section 48.
In spite of the clear words of the provision, the preamble to the agreements states, strangely, that Gold Fields, having already invested in Tarkwa and Damang, “therefore qualifies under Section 49 [of Act 703] to enter a development agreement with enhanced investment terms…”!
A second, more serious issue is that, the stability terms available under Section 48 provide for the fixing of the fiscal regime as it exists under the applicable law at the time of the grant, so that, for the duration of the stability period, rights acquired by the investor “shall not be adversely affected by subsequent changes” in the fiscal law. Nowhere in the section, nor anywhere else in the Act, nor in any other legislation I am aware of, is the Minister given power to alter or reduce existing rates, or soften the provisions for calculating taxes, etc. Thus, the purported reduction of corporate income tax and royalty rates in the stability provisions of the Gold Fields Agreements would appear to be ultra vires and of no effect!
ii. Government interest inadequately secured/protected
As indicated, a condition for invoking Section 49 is a commitment by the leaseholder to make fresh investments in a new or existing mine. Thus, the preambles to the Gold Fields agreements refer to a commitment by Gold Fields “to invest in the future an amount of ...
during the life-of-mine of the Tarkwa and Damang Mines”.
As expressed during the ratification process in Parliament, the agreements would pave the way
“…for the investment of two billion, five hundred and fifty million United States dollars ... over the life of the mines…
and
“The investment is expected to increase current production to one million ounces per year.”
Surprisingly, one looks, in vain, for any provision or term in the agreements committing Gold Fields to make this or any investment at all, or setting out sanctions for non-performance!
What we have, instead, are expressions of naïve hope by Government representatives that Gold Fields will honour promises it had made, presumably off the record, to our negotiators or to Government!
The situation is, therefore, that, in place of a legally enforceable obligation set out in the agreements, our negotiators opted to rely on off-the-table assurances!
That the picture is nowhere near as rosy as Parliament was led to believe, can be gauged from the following excerpt from an interview granted by Nick Holland, the CEO of Gold Fields, a month after the ratification:
“Citi Business News: With this arrangement [i.e., the new agreements], what is the lifespan and what is your gain, was it a win-win situation?
“Nick Holland: It is a win-win because what we can do here is; we think there is a good opportunity now for us to come up with reinvestment, case for Damang we still working through the numbers we haven’t finished yet. We should be finished with the analysis and recommendation to our board by the middle of the year and then we would be able to make a decision but certainly, I think the development agreement puts us in a strong position to bring about a longer term profile for Damang and for Tarkwa.”
To the same effect, another interview granted days after the agreements by a spokesman for Gold Fields:
“… the company … had not yet decided whether to inject more cash into Damang, one of two mines operated by Gold Fields in Ghana, or suspend operations there, company spokesman Sven Lunsche said.
"This [the new agreement] is obviously a positive input into our decision-making process, though we are considering many other economic, financial and mining variables in the process," Lunsche added, referring to the agreement with the government.”19 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, in return for binding ourselves to the enhanced concessions in the agreements, and locking them in for 11 years in the case of Tarkwa and 9 years in the case of Damang, what did GF commit to? Answer: nothing – not one cent!
What is our legal recourse, should Gold Fields fail to invest or, indeed, proceed to lay off more workers while enjoying the concessions? Answer: none!
Can we unilaterally withdraw any concessions in response to non-performance of the off-therecord promises? Answer: definitely not!
Let us be clear - while Gold Fields may yet decide to invest, the bottom line is that it remains uncommitted, undecided and unbound, within the terms of the agreements!
Leaving the Government so exposed is a glaring instance of technical incompetence on the part of our negotiators. What is surprising is that they had access to the Revised Newmont Agreement (Newmont II), which had addressed this particular defect! It was precisely to close what is an obvious gap in Section 49 of Act 703 that we devised and inserted what we describe as the “extended stability principles” in Article 4.3 of Newmont II. The Article provides that, in order to enjoy the enhanced concessions for a period beyond the agreed stability period, Newmont has to present an extension plan acceptable to the Minister,
committing to invest
o a stated minimum amount (Art. 4.3 (a));
o within a set time (Art. 4.3 (a));
o with a stated expected outcome - specified increases in gold production, or extension of life of mine, or local employment (Art. 4.3 (b);
o subject to sanctions for failure to perform, i.e.,
“Should the conditions [for the grant] fail to be satisfied on the basis and within the period described … the Government may rescind the Extended Stability Period and [Newmont] will thereafter become liable for any additional Taxes and Duties that would have accrued but for the extension of the Basic Stability Period.” (Art. 4.3 (d))
Clearly, this was not applicable in Newmont II, nor was it intended to be, because that agreement dealt with pre-existing, not prospective investments. There was, nevertheless, a definite understanding that, in order to close the gap in the law, the extended stability principles were to be applied to all future grants of enhanced concessions under Section 49 of Act 703. That is, for the future, all grants of enhanced concessions under Section 49 must be conditioned on an explicit and enforceable commitment by the investor to make fresh investments. Presuming to follow the Newmont II example, the negotiators of the Gold Fields Agreements applied the principles only to future additional investments (Clause 4.3). This represents a critical failure to appreciate that in Newmont II,because we were dealing with
pre-existing concessions balanced by pre-existing investments, we had had to limit application
of the principles to future investments. The case of Gold Fields was quite different to the extent that the quest of the company for Section 49 concessions could only be founded on fresh (proposed) investments, according to the express terms of the section. Therein lay the fatal problem for the Gold Fields negotiations – the negotiators were (mis)applying Section 49 to grant enhanced concessions, effectively, for pre-existing investments, contrary to the clear terms of the section!
To sum it up, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, just as in Newmont I (2003),
§ Ghana gave away more than we had to in the revised Gold Fields Agreements;
§ the enhanced concessions given in the agreements were almost certainly illegal, and
§ all this could have been avoided, had there been competent and committed negotiations on behalf of Ghana!
But could this be put down solely to naivety? Ignorance? Incompetence? Hardly!
The negotiators had available to them Newmont IIthat, as shown above, provided the bases for a more professional effort. They had at their service the MRC, negotiators of Newmont II – indeed, several of the public officers involved in the Gold Fields negotiations had been members of the MRC!
So, what happened? Who, by-passing the collective experience of the Newmont II negotiators, chose to concede so much to Gold Fields, without, at least, securing our interests? For what considerations – policy? Political advantage? Personal gain?
LESSONS
What lessons are we to draw from this story? I am sure each of us will have our own list. Mine, briefly put, are as follows:
a. Technical/Political
The use of politician-dominated, non-expert bodies to conduct technical negotiations in Newmont I and Gold Fields - in the latter case bypassing a negotiating team that successfully renegotiated Newmont IIand was available to undertake or back the technical negotiations. This wilful playing down of technical competence, professionalism and experience raises serious questions about the good intentions of the decision-makers and their commitment to the public good. The prime instance of this phenomenon was the famous Ghana Telecom-Vodafone case (2008), in which the President of the Republic, together with a few officials and close associates, and to the exclusion of the designated technical team, personally conducted and concluded the immensely complicated negotiations for the sale of Ghana Telecom, the national telecommunications company! The outcome has been widely criticised as a sell-out of the national interest. However, for present purposes, the relevant feature emerges from the only publicly available record of the dramatis personae at the negotiations.
To anyone with the slightest commitment to the public interest and the barest understanding of how such investment negotiations go, this record of Ghana’s representation at the negotiations makes chilling reading – an emphatic visual of how not to do it!
To address this aspect of our concerns it may be suggested that we
i. develop and use a cadre of expert negotiators, within the public service and outside it, but available to be engaged on behalf of the state;
ii. ensure a minimum of politician involvement in the technical preparations and actual negotiations;
iii. keep a comprehensive record of the negotiation process and background material in every case; and
iv. make the agreements and background material immediately accessible to the public.
b. Failure of institutional responsibility and oversight
The Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources and the Minerals Commission failed in the discharge of their duty to ensure that the 2016 Gold Fields negotiations had the proper institutional base, and was conducted with diligence, competence and honesty. Such disregard of institutional responsibility and of the public interest, is compounded by the impunity of office bearers, which increasingly characterises our public management system.
At least as grievous, was the complete failure of Parliament - both sides of the House - to treat the ratification process with the slightest seriousness. The records show no evidence of any discussion or questioning of anything at the hurried Committee stage, nor on the floor of the House, with the result that the supposed positives of the agreements were routinely recited and unquestioningly endorsed. It will not be too much to consider such conduct a betrayal of the people’s faith that their Parliament will, through the ratification process, diligently protect their interests by double-checking executive action, as provided for in the Constitution of the Republic.
But, ultimately, the buck stops with the President of the Republic, in whom the Constitution of the Republic vests primary responsibility for safeguarding our natural resources and ensuring their optimal exploitation and management. It is the direct responsibility of the President to ensure that there are appropriate natural resources policies in place and that the implementation of such polices, including investment in resource exploitation, yields the most benefit for present and future generations of Ghanaians. In this instance, this obligation was not met, even though the attention of the Cabinet, of which the President is Chair, was drawn to potential deficiencies in the proposed arrangement.
c. Failure of civic vigilance and follow-through
The third broad lesson is that such failure of executive and parliamentary responsibility, in turn, thrives in an atmosphere of civic inertia. When criticisms of the Gold Fields
Agreements went public in April last year, it received scant civil society attention. With the singular exception of the Third World Network-Africa (TWN-Af), no civil society body raised the obvious questions that should have been put to the public institutions with responsibility in such matters. Again, the media - print and electronic - gave little attention to the matter, and the few that did, failed to do any independent checks or follow-up, or to demand answers from public officers. The matter, like many others of its kind, gained little traction and quickly died in the public domain, without a trace. “
Having drawn our attention to these incidents as narrated by Professor Akilagpa Sawyerr, the other observation by Mr Ashigbey that “everywhere there is mining in the country, there is poverty” becomes increasingly relevant.
In the year 2006, Goldfields Ghana Limited realized $542,194,633.19 (Million dollars). A year after, in 2007, the company produced 841,382.71 oz of gold of which it made $572, 948,032.35( million dollars). These figures went up the following years. In 2011 Goldfields Ghana made $1,468, 917, 096.93 (billion dollars)
The government of Ghana only received in some instances 6% and 7.02% of payment in mineral royalties, property rates, corporate tax and dividends. So how then does Ghana’s mineral resources serve as a basis for the improvement of our national life as we spoke about earlier and bring about that intergenerational equity for Ghanaians yet unborn.
In a nutshell, the media coalition, must understand that Galamsey and the destruction it causes to the environment is not the only problem confronting our country. The media coalition if it will succeed must demand that the collusion and connivance of the Ghanaian elite and transnational corporation in the robbery of Ghana’s mineral resources must come to an end!
You can Read the full presidential address of Professor Akilagpa Sawyerr here: http://theinsightnewspaper.blogspot.com/
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