Diversifying Partnerships Put To The Test: The Risk Of Strategic Dependence In Africa

For several years, African governments have spoken publicly about diversifying their foreign partnerships, seeking to reduce long-standing dependence on any single external power and to strengthen diplomatic, security and economic autonomy in the process. Yet in a growing number of countries, the practical outcome has run in the opposite direction.

Diversification rhetoric has given way to a new and narrower form of dependence, this time centered on a single partner, Russia. This is not simply the result of Moscow's own strategy of influence. It is also facilitated by leaders who prioritize the survival of their own regimes over a long-term national strategy that serves their populations.

A recurring pattern: from assistance to dependence

Despite differing national contexts, several African cases now follow a strikingly similar sequence. A security or political crisis weakens the state, whether through armed conflict, terrorist threats, institutional instability or an under-equipped national army.

A foreign power then offers rapid assistance, often presented as unconditional: military agreements, training for the armed forces, arms deliveries, protection for the ruling regime, and humanitarian or cultural initiatives designed to build a wider network of influence within civil society.

This assistance gradually becomes essential to the regime's survival, with the foreign partner guaranteeing not only the country's security but the personal security of the head of state. In return, the partner secures privileged access to strategic sectors such as mining, hydrocarbons, infrastructure and energy, along with growing influence over the country's political and diplomatic choices.

Once this dependence is established, it becomes difficult to reverse, since the political and security costs of a break grow too high to bear. The Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville and Madagascar each illustrate this same trajectory.

Central African Republic: security traded for mineral wealth

The Central African Republic stands as perhaps the clearest case of this mechanism at work. In 2018, following an exemption from the United Nations arms embargo, Russia deployed military instructors and Wagner Group personnel to support President Faustin-Archange Touadéra's government, initially framed as a security intervention.

Wagner forces have since fought directly against the Coalition of Patriots for Change, provided personal security for the presidency, and trained the Central African Armed Forces. In exchange, Wagner-affiliated companies secured substantial mining concessions, including Midas Resources, which operates the Ndassima gold mine considered the countries largest, and Diamville, active in the diamond trade.

These operations are estimated to have generated more than two billion United States dollars in revenue within a few years, making them Wagner's principal source of income in the country. Since Yevgeny Prigozhin's death in 2023, Wagner has been gradually absorbed into Africa Corps, which operates directly under Russia's Ministry of Defence, tightening Moscow's control still further.

This presence has not ended the violence: the monitoring group ACLED found that fifty-two percent of Wagner-linked operations in the country in 2022 directly targeted civilians, and the International Crisis Group's 2025 assessment attributed more than two hundred deaths and thousands of displacements to Russian mercenary activity in several localities.

Congo-Brazzaville: from military cooperation to energy dominance

In Congo-Brazzaville, the same pattern has unfolded more gradually. Moscow and Brazzaville signed a military cooperation agreement in May 2019 covering the training of Congolese Special Forces, the supply of Russian equipment and enhanced defence cooperation, followed months later at the Russia-Africa summit in Sochi by a further agreement granting Russian naval vessels access to Congolese ports.

Alongside these formal military ties, Russia has cultivated quieter channels of civil society influence. In November 2025, the Russian Orthodox Church organized a large humanitarian operation distributing ten metric tons of food to parishes across the country, part of a broader approach combining humanitarian aid, religious networks and the expansion of Russian Houses, cultural institutions that have separately faced accusations of covertly recruiting Africans to fight on Russia's behalf in Ukraine.

Economically, Russia's footprint has grown steadily more significant: the company Lukoil acquired a twenty-five percent stake in the Marine XII offshore oil license in 2019; new projects with Lukoil, the nuclear firm Rosatom and the defence exporter Rosoboronexport were announced during President Denis Sassou Nguesso's June 2024 visit to Moscow; a memorandum covering three new oil blocks followed in September 2024; and that same month an agreement was reached to build a pipeline between Pointe-Noire and Brazzaville through a joint venture in which the Russian partner holds a ninety percent stake. What began as a military partnership has evolved into a dominant Russian position across several of the country's most strategic economic sectors.

Madagascar: political influence ahead of the security card

Madagascar shows a variation on the same sequence, with Russia entering through the political arena before consolidating through military and economic agreements. An investigation as early as 2018 pointed to Russian attempts to influence the country’s presidential election through funding and promises of cooperation. Antananarivo and Moscow signed a five-year military cooperation agreement in 2022 covering weapons sales, training for Malagasy military personnel, equipment maintenance and industrial cooperation in the defence sector.

Ferrum Mining, a company linked to Wagner, acquired a majority stake in the state-owned chrome company Kraoma without a competitive bidding process, before the project stalled amid strikes and unpaid wages and the assets were sold off, while other Russian-linked entities such as Investment Corporation Madagascar have continued operating to maintain an economic foothold.

The strategy has since expanded into civil society through an agreement to open a Russian House in Antananarivo, accompanied by cultural, academic and community outreach, and through a 2024 recruitment drive for the Alabuga Start programme, which lures young African recruits toward Russia's front lines in Ukraine. Since 2025, the security lever has moved to the centre of the relationship: a Russian delegation of more than forty personnel delivered Boomerang drones, small arms, sniper rifles and anti-tank systems to Madagascar's presidential forces, followed by training programmes led by Africa Corps instructors.

With Madagascar's 2027 presidential election approaching, this deepening influence is fuelling questions about possible Russian interference in the political process.

The strategic question
Across the Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville and Madagascar, the stated goal of diversifying international partnerships has instead given way to a strategic dependence concentrated on a single external power. Once established, that dependence narrows a country's domestic and foreign policy choices at real cost to national autonomy. The lesson for African governments, including those across the West African sub region currently weighing Russian, Turkish, Gulf and Western overtures alike, is that the meaningful question is no longer which new partners to attract, but how to retain control of one's own strategic trajectory once any single partnership deepens into dependence.

Mustapha Bature Sallama.
Medical/ Science Communicator,
Private Investigator, Criminal investigation and Intelligence Analysis.

International Conflict Management and Peace Building.USIP

[email protected]
+233-555-275-880
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