Between Law and Politics: The African Union’s Suspension of Sudan Revisited

The transitional period following the fall Omar al-Bashir’s government, as it clearly defined the powers of the Sovereignty Council as the head of state and the civilian Prime Minister as head of the executive branch. However, subsequent developments — most notably the rebellion of the Deputy Chairman of the Sovereignty Council and his declaration of war against the state, along with the joining of two other Council members to the rebellion — created a complex political and constitutional reality in the country. This prompted the government, according to its official position, to amend the document in order to ensure the continuity of state institutions amid war and armed insurrection.

It is therefore important to recall that this same document formed the basis upon which the African Union lifted Sudan’s suspension in 2019, after it had considered what occurred at the time an unconstitutional change of government (the overthrow of the democratically elected government of Omar al-Bashir). Suspension was only lifted following the establishment of a civilian–military transitional arrangement stipulated in the document and the appointment of a civilian Prime Minister under its provisions. Thus, the existence of a consensual constitutional transitional framework became the benchmark for restoring continental legitimacy.

There should be no mistake, from a constitutional standpoint, the document — as amended — remains to this day the governing framework in Sudan, and it is the same framework previously recognized by the African Union. Under its provisions, Ambassador Dr. Kamil Idris was recently appointed Prime Minister. The United Nations has recognized him as head of the executive authority and allowed him to address its organs and participate in its proceedings as the official representative of the Sudanese state.

That raises a central question: if the civilian head of the executive branch is recognized by the world’s largest international organization, what prevents Sudan from occupying its seat in the regional organization? Why does the suspension persist despite the existence of an amended transitional constitutional framework and an internationally recognized civilian Prime Minister?

Legally, the African Union relies on Article 30 of its Constitutive Act, which stipulates the suspension of governments that come to power through unconstitutional means. It also draws on the 2000 Lomé Declaration and the 2007 African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance in defining “unconstitutional change,” including explicit military coups or the removal of an elected government without constitutional basis.

Yet, practical application of this standard reveals variation across African precedents. In Mali (2020 and 2021), membership was suspended following a military coup that ousted an elected president, and timelines were imposed for transition. Despite a second coup during the transitional period itself, the Union dealt with the authorities as a de facto transitional reality to be regulated through electoral deadlines rather than excluding the state indefinitely.

In Guinea (2021), membership was suspended after the overthrow of President Alpha Condé, yet the Peace and Security Council later focused on negotiating a transitional period and electoral timetable, treating the transitional authority as an existing actor on the ground.

Similarly, in Niger (2023), membership was suspended after the coup against President Mohamed Bazoum, accompanied by strong regional pressure. However, discussions centered on mechanisms and duration of transition, not on denying the existence of an effective executive authority or preventing it from representing the state in other international forums.

The case of Chad was timely raised by Sudan’s Foreign Minister, Ambassador Mohi Eldin Salim, in his historic address on February 12, 2026, before the Peace and Security Council of the African Union in Addis Ababa, as an example of perceived double standards.

General Mohammed Idriss Deby assumed power with military backing following the death of his father, without a fully constitutional process or a clear democratic roadmap at the outset. Nevertheless, Chad’s membership was not suspended, while Mali’s had been suspended weeks earlier following its military coup. Critics argue that such discrepancies cannot be separated from considerations of interests, balances, and regional and international pressures.

It has been argued that the decision not to suspend Chad was driven by international concerns over potential control of the country by terrorist or rebel groups. However, this argument does not hold when considering that Mali continued to face similar threats, the fact that prompted the United Nations to spent approximately $1.2 billion on peacekeeping efforts there.

Unmistakably, divergent responses to military coups are not limited to the African Union. France, for instance, strongly opposed the coup in Mali but quickly endorsed the transitional authority in Chad. Interests, alongside regional and international balances and pressures, appear to be decisive factors.

These precedents demonstrate that the criterion of “unconstitutional change” has not always been applied through a rigid textual reading. Rather, it has often been shaped by considerations of gradualism, recognition of existing transitional authorities, and efforts to reintegrate states within agreed political timelines. This raises a pressing question: why is there insistence on disregarding this flexible application in the Sudanese case?

In Sudan’s current situation, it is crucial to note that the Constitutional Document was not abolished but amended, and that the appointment of a new civilian Prime Minister, was made under the same framework and predicate, previously recognized by the African Union.

The United Nations has recognized and enabled Amb. Idriss to represent Sudan officially. Effectively, from the perspective of public international law, recognition of governments often rests on the criterion of effectiveness and continuity of the state, rather than a detailed political assessment of internal conflict dynamics.

The roots of the debate trace back to the measures of 25 October 2021, which the government described as “corrective steps” necessitated by sharp divisions between civilian and military partners and fears of descent into chaos. At the time, Sovereignty Council Chairman General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan declared a state of emergency, dissolved the Sovereignty Council and the Council of Ministers, and froze certain provisions of the Constitutional Document.

However, Al-Burhan affirmed likewise, his commitment both to the Constitutional Document and to the Juba Peace Agreement, pledging to complete transitional institutions, including forming a legislative council and appointing a technocratic government instead of a quota-based system.

According to this perspective, the measures were presented as a recalibration of the transitional path rather than a rupture from it — a continued commitment to the overall framework of transition in a modified form, with a redefinition of the military component’s role.

Regardless of agreement or disagreement with this interpretation, critics of the suspension argue that this position was not given sufficient opportunity to be tested through the African Union’s usual mechanisms, deepening perceptions of selectivity in handling the Sudanese crisis. In fact, the African Union did not even bother to send a fact-finding mission to Sudan, as is customary in similar cases.

As a matter of fact, the vast majority of the Sudanese people do believe today that the decision to suspend Sudan's membership in the African Union following the events of October 25, 2021, was not isolated from the context of balances and pressures exerted and still being exerted by regional and international powers to impose a certain political elites that has increasingly proven to be an isolated grouping, with a limited popular constituency.

The credibility of those corrective measures was arguably further reinforced when Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok returned to office, before less than one month; under a political agreement on 21 November 2021, which provided for the formation of a technocratic government and continuation of the transitional process, before later resigning under mounting internal and external pressures. Regional and international dynamics contributed to complicating the landscape, rendering the question of legitimacy a matter of political contestation beyond purely legal considerations.

Accordingly, the debate extends beyond the legitimacy of a particular individual or government. It tests the consistency of the African normative system in applying its standards: does it operate on a unified legal principle, or on a flexible political approach influenced by balances of power?

In the Sudanese context, the question surpasses the issue of membership in a regional organization and becomes part of a broader discussion about defining legitimacy amid state fragility and open war.

Thus, the matter represents a dual test: a test for Sudan in its ability to complete a genuine civilian transition under highly complex circumstances — a process it has already and successfully initiated by appointing a Prime Minister who according has formed a fully functioning civilian cabinet — and, in parallel, a test for the African Union regarding the consistency and flexibility of applying its standards in a manner that promotes stability rather than deepening polarization.