As the Syrian Mosaic Crumbles

Syria, a country that many outside observers believed would weather the unrest and political upheaval of the Arab Spring, erupted in violence on March 15th, 2011. What initially started out as a call for political and economic reform quickly morphed into an armed uprising against President Bashar al-Assad. Today much of Syria resembles a war zone; few areas have been left unscathed by the ensuing violence as the government continues with a brutal security crackdown. For its part, the media has covered the events of the Syrian uprising in great detail and frequency; despite this, there has been a tendency (especially in the American media) to characterize the forces involved in the conflict as either pro- or anti-Assad. However, this is an oversimplification. Syria is a diverse country, its people belong to many different ethnic groups and religions, all of which had their own reasons for becoming involved in the current conflict. This generalization also downplays the sectarian tones of the conflict, which are increasingly becoming apparent.

Perhaps the most overt form of sectarianism in the Syrian uprising is that between the Alawite minority and the Sunni-Arab majority. The Alawites, a branch of Shia Islam, are a minority population in Syria comprising about 11-12% of country's population. Most Alawites live in Syria's rugged coastal region (which for a short time served as the semi-autonomous Alawite State under the French mandate of Syria) and are concentrated in the coastal cities of Latakia and Tartous. Under Ottoman rule (which persisted until 1920), the Alawite community faced discrimination and abuse on part of the Sunni majority, which saw the minority sect as heretical and attempted to forcibly convert Alawites to Sunni Islam. Independence did not see a notable improvement for most Alawites. However, the situation changed in 1970 when Hafez al-Assad, an Alawite, seized power and less than a year later declared himself president of Syria, a position he would maintain until his death in 2000.

Today Syria is governed by Hafez al-Assad's son, Bashar al-Assad. Assad has continued his father's policies of granting political preference to the Alawite community; as of 2012, most of the top military and intelligence offices were held by Alawites. Alawite majority areas were also granted special economic status and Alawite politicians were generally favored over their Sunni counterparts. It should then come as little surprise that there has been strong (but not universal) anti-Alawite sentiment in the Syrian uprising. For example, it was reported that back in March 2011, when the protests first began, groups could be heard chanting, "Christians to Beirut; Alawites to the coffin". Since then anti-Alawite acts have been on the rise. In another instance, an Alawite resident of Rabia claimed that Sunni militants had attacked Alawite businesses and homes in the village; he continued saying that Alawites who venture out alone have been attacked, abducted, and in some cases killed. Similar reports have come from other villages and cities. Then there are the statements of Adnan Arour, a Sunni cleric who fled to Saudi Arabia in the 1980s, who has stated, "As for those Alawites who violate what is sacred, when the Muslims rule … we will chop you up and feed you to the dogs." Another controversial statement came from Mamoun al-Homsy, a former Syrian MP and one of the country's opposition leaders, who reportedly distributed a message in which he called on the Alawites to immediately renounce Assad; he continued, adding that if they do not do so, “Syria will become the graveyard of the Alawites.” Recently, there have also been reports that Sunni militias have been illegally detaining and, at times, arbitrarily executing Alawites throughout Syria.

All of this, plus the added uncertainty of their position in a post-Assad Syria, has seemingly reinforced Alawite support for Assad and fueled anti-Sunni sentiments. Members of Shabiha (derived from the Arabic word for "ghost"), a paramilitary organization primarily composed of Alawites, have been charged with kidnapping and killing Sunni civilians and opposition supporters. The military, parts of which are dominated by Alawites, has also been charged with engaging in anti-Sunni violence. For example, when the Syrian Navy shelled the coastal city of Latakia in early August of 2012, it primarily targeted Sunni neighborhoods. There have also been reports that members of the Alawite community are calling for the restoration of the Alawite State and that some groups may be engaged in "religious cleansing" of the area in preparation for secession.

Sunnis and Alawites are not the only groups that have had to deal with the increasingly sectarian nature of the Syrian uprising. Christians account for about 10% of Syria's population and, being a minority group, have been put in a situation not all that different from the Alawites. Christians historically faced discrimination and legal barriers under Ottoman and later Sunni-Arab rule. Under Hafez al-Assad their condition improved; Syria's 1973 constitution guaranteed Christians their religious freedom and allowed them to operate churches and schools in the country. When demonstrations against Assad first began back in 2011, it was not uncommon to see Christians intermixed with the protestors. However, as the opposition took on a more Islamist nature, Christian sentiment began to shift towards Assad. Many feared that if Assad was to fall and Islamists were to seize power (as has happened in Tunisia and Egypt) their legal status would be uncertain and the Christian community could be subjected to violence, as was the case in Egypt and Iraq. As such Syrian Christians tended to favor maintaining the Assad regime, something that many believed was related to their very survival (however, this view is not shared by all and there are many Christians within the opposition).

In response, acts of anti-Christian violence by some members of the opposition have occurred. For example, in late 2011 it was reported that after continued harassment by Sunni-Islamist militants the Christian population of Homs had dropped by nearly 90% (from 160,000 down to about 1,000). In addition, there have been numerous cases of churches and Christian owned businesses being vandalized throughout Syria. Sources from within the Syrian Orthodox Church have also made the claim that the Free Syrian Army and other elements are engaged in an "ongoing ethnic cleansing of Christians"; several massacres against Christians have also reportedly occurred.

Located in the country's northeast, Syria's Kurdish community is yet another to be affected by the sectarianism of the conflict, but unlike the other groups mentioned thus far, ethnicity rather than religion is the motivating factor. Comprising about 9-10% of Syria's total population, the Kurds of Syria conform to Sunni Islam and, as such, could be considered part of the Sunni majority. However, the Kurds are Kurdish not Arab and thus are an ethnic minority (the largest) in Syria. Kurds have historically faced discrimination; however, unlike the other minorities mentioned their condition did not improve when Hafez al-Assad came to power. In fact, from 1962 until 2011, the Syrian government refused to grant the Kurds Syrian nationality, effectively making them a stateless people. Only after protests began did Assad's government grant citizenship to the Kurds in an effort to quell potential support for the opposition. Due to this and other factors the Kurdish region has largely been exempt from the violence and chaos that has gripped much of the country.

As the Syrian uprising continued and Assad's security forces became evermore stretched, the military made the tactical decision to leave parts of the northeast in order to focus on other areas consider of greater importance. This effectively left the Kurds to their own devices and allowed the Democratic Union Party, the main Kurdish party in the region, to fill the administrative/security vacuum. As of the moment, the Kurds have de facto self-autonomy and statements from the Kurdish leadership indicate that they intend to keep their newly acquired authority in the region.

Syria as we know it is a relatively new development in the region. While it is true that Syria, as a geographic entity, has existed for many millennia (perhaps even predating the ancient Greeks), the modern nation of Syria only dates back to the 1920s when it was carved out of the remains of the decaying Ottoman Empire by the French. The French mandate encompassed roughly the modern borders of Syria; uniting many diverse and different people in one nation. Today the Syrian mosaic is crumbling and it still remains to be seen if the opposition can act as a uniting force or if it will only further the disintegration of Syria. Whatever the case, the increasingly sectarian nature of the conflict is worrisome; violence has already spilled over into Lebanon and the possibility, remote as it is, of the uprising evolving into an ethnic/religious regional conflict are troubling.