Kenya wants to close refugee camps: the promise and risks of its ambitious new plan

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Kenya hosts nearly a million refugees, mainly from South Sudan and Somalia. Many of them have been living in refugee camps for decades.

Now, the country is attempting a major shift in refugee policy. The Kenyan government and the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) developed the Shirika Plan, launching it in March 2025. The policy aims to move refugees away from long-term encampment and integrate them in society.

Drawing on their research on refugee governance and migration in Kenya, Edwin Mutyenyoka and Franzisca Zanker explain the opportunities and challenges the plan presents for refugees and host communities.

What is the Shirika Plan?

The Shirika Plan seeks to shift refugee management away from a camp-based system largely overseen by the UN towards a government-led model centred on inclusion into the local economy. The plan is a by-product of Kenya's Refugee Act of 2021, which seeks to include and protect refugees better.

The plan builds on the success of two pilot models: the Kalobeyei Integrated Socio-Economic Development Plan and the Garissa Integrated Socio-Economic Plan. They showed that refugee inclusion can strengthen both refugee and host economies.

The Shirika Plan will convert camps into county-administered municipalities. There will be investment in roads, water systems, healthcare and education in places that host refugees. Developments are designed to serve refugees and host communities.

The plan is closely aligned with the UN's refugee frameworks. These encourage governments to move beyond emergency assistance and towards allowing refugees to work, use public services and contribute to local economies.

The plan's six pillars include sustainable economic development and climate action.

Implementation is expected to take place in three phases and requires an estimated US$943 million.

The first phase (2025-2028) is the transition period. It lays the foundations: putting regulatory and policy frameworks in place and turning camps into municipalities. There's an emphasis on building local capacity too.

The second phase (2029-2032) is the stabilisation period. It will evaluate the transition, and strengthen institutional capacity and financial management. This phase will also build on peaceful co-existence between refugees and host communities.

The final phase (2033-2036) – the resilience period – aims to fortify financial structures, diversify revenue and build the resilience of communities. This is to reduce dependence on external support.

Why does Kenya need such a plan?

Kenya has become a major destination for both forced and economic migrants in the region. This is due, in part, to the country's relative political and economic stability. A higher Human Development Index, vibrant secondary economy and a largely welcoming host society have created a good environment for refugees.

Kenya was home to 954,851 refugees and asylum seekers in 2025. This makes it the fifth biggest host in Africa and 13th largest in the world.

Kakuma and Dadaab refugee camps in the northern region are home to over 800,000 refugees and asylum seekers between them. They are two of the biggest shelters for forced migrants in the world.

Most of the refugees in these camps – mostly from Sudan and Somalia – have lived there for up to 30 years.

In addition, surveys by organisations such as the Mixed Migration Centre and IOM Kenya estimate that between 100,000 and 200,000 refugees – mostly not registered – live in cities like Nairobi and Mombasa.

Kenya has gone through significant challenges, however, between the Refugee Act of 2021 and the launch of the Shirika Plan in 2025. A severe economic crisis ignited fierce protests and put mounting pressure on public services. In addition, humanitarian aid cuts, both globally and in Kenya, have been swift and severe.

Rather than relying on repeated emergency appeals, the Shirika Plan aims to attract development financing, while reducing tensions between refugees and host communities through shared access to services and economic opportunities.

This reflects a broader shift towards linking emergency assistance with longer-term economic and social inclusion.

The plan also offers a chance to address protracted displacement by making camps obsolete, while enhancing local development in remote areas.

What happens next?

The next challenge is implementation. The first years of the Shirika Plan are vital to show it can actually work.

In the first phase, planned initiatives centre on expanding livelihood opportunities, strengthening local services and improving coordination between humanitarian and development actors. Financing will be critical for success.

Kenya has secured substantial international support for refugee-hosting and economic integration. This includes a Sh155 billion (US$2 billion) loan from the World Bank in 2024 that requires Kenya to integrate 400,000 refugees into the economy by 2027.

For Kenya, the plan is a complete change of policy direction, away from a focus on security concerns and threats to close refugee camps. Closure threats happened most recently in 2021 but were quashed by the high court in 2024.

The emphasis is now on inclusion, local development and burden-sharing.

Success will depend not only on funding, but on the government's ability to deliver tangible benefits for both refugees and host communities.

What are the risks?

First, the Shirika Plan relies on a system of differentiated assistance. This means support is tailored to refugees' levels of need rather than provided equally to everyone. However, misconceptions of preferential treatment risk fuelling tensions between different refugee groups.

Second, moving vulnerable refugees out of camps could create new challenges. Many have spent years with limited access to education, jobs and public services. Competing in open labour markets could be particularly challenging for refugees who have long lived under UNHCR-operated enclosures.

Third, although more than 75 public engagement forums have been held across Kenya, some refugee and host-community representatives report feeling excluded from the design of the plan and broader decision-making processes. Concerns have also been raised about public awareness, accountability and oversight mechanisms. This is a worry as public support is vital to the plan.

Fourth, funding shortfalls are a risk to the plan. Supporting programmes aimed at building capacity during the transition period require consistent financial investments.

Where does this leave the plan?

The alternative – continuing to confine nearly a million people to underfunded camps – carries far greater risks than the challenges outlined above.

As the wheels of the Shirika Plan start turning, there is a need to invest in the municipalities hosting refugees.

A gradual reduction in UNHCR's direct role should also create greater space for refugee-led organisations, whose local knowledge and community ties are useful to identify needs and support integration efforts.

Edwin Mutyenyoka receives funding from the European Union (ERC, PolMig, 101161856). Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Council. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

Franzisca Zanker receives funding from the European Union (ERC, PolMig, 101161856). Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union or the European Research Council. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.

By Edwin Mutyenyoka, Senior Researcher, Arnold Bergstraesser Institute And

Franzisca Zanker, Senior researcher, Arnold Bergstraesser Institute