Strings of Pearl: China’s Dominance on African Ports

The Strings of Pearl strategy aims to strengthen geopolitical influence across the Indian Ocean and beyond by establishing ports, military bases, and diplomatic relationships. 'Pearl' refers to locations where China has invested in infrastructure, military, and trade. These strategic territories are critical to ensuring energy and trade lines, particularly between West Asia and China. The String of Pearl strategy aids in securing military presence without confrontation, establishing economic and diplomatic ties with other countries, strengthening Chinese control over vital trade routes, and reducing reliance on shipping lanes such as the Strait of Malacca, through which 80% of oil imports transit.[1]

In his report "Energy Futures in Asia", Booz Allen used the metaphor "string of pearls" to illustrate China's intention to expand its dominance in the Indian Ocean by creating beneficial ties and infrastructure in surrounding countries.[2] Chinese- State-owned enterprises (SOE) are heavily subsidised by the Chinese government for the ‘Go out’ or ‘Go Global’ Strategy, which focuses on trade, investment and cultural exchange. The policy has led to globalisation by incorporating SOE into the international economy. The ‘Go out’ policy has a similar outline to that of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which is building and investing infrastructure that indicates that the pearl of string strategy is a part of BRI.[3]

China has invested significantly in economic connections and boosted its geopolitical influence. Approximately 78 ports operate in 32 African nations, with Chinese state-owned businesses such as China Harbor Engineering Company (CHEC) and China Communications Construction Corporation (CCCC) as players. 17 Chinese ports in East Africa, 11 in North Africa, and 15 in South Africa add up to 231 commercial ports across Africa. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, "Chinese firms are present in over a third of Africa's maritime trade hubs, a greater presence than anywhere else in the world."[4] CHEC is responsible for building the Lekki Deep Sea Port in Nigeria, with help from the China Development Bank (CDB). CHEC holds a 54% interest in the sixteen-year agreement.[5]

Djibouti's Port of Doraleh is the first foreign military setup established in 2017. The port is in a crucial commercial location where the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) substantially influences the Bab el Mandeb Strait. Unlike other African countries, China is more interested in the port's strategic location than its natural resources. China allocated $4 billion to two projects: a railway connecting Ethiopia and Djibouti and a clean water pipeline from Ethiopia. The United States, France, and Japan have military bases in Djibouti, so China's involvement is unsurprising. Despite Djibouti's small size and poor economy, China is investing in the country to turn it into a key trading hub and a support centre for humanitarian relief and peacekeeping.[6]

The Lamu Port South Sudan Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET) includes the Lamu seaport, developed by China Communications Construction Company (CCCC). Like the port of Djibouti, the site is a major Indian Ocean commercial route that facilitates trade in Africa. The port will be crucial to the movement of goods in South Sudan and Ethiopia, and it has the potential to boost Kenya's manufacturing, tourism, and fishing industries while also creating employment.[7]

PLA Navy ships work at 78 African ports, including Abidjan in Cote'd'Ivoire, Casablanca in Morocco, Lagos in Nigeria, Durban and Simon's Town in South Africa, and Djibouti. Dar es Salaam port in Tanzania, Lagos port in Nigeria, Durban port in South Africa, and Djibouti port initiated PLA military exercises. There is a possibility of an increase in LA Navy bases in Africa because Chinese companies own more than half of African ports; for example, the Chinese company owns 66% of the Kribi port in Cameroon, while the Chinese company owns 52% of the Lekki port in Nigeria and 50% of the Lome port in Togo. In 2015, Walvis Bay in Namibia was reported to be a base, which China denies, similar to the denials about Djibouti, now a PLA base.[8]

China gains $13 from a $1 investment in African ports; the ports provide more straightforward access to resources and secure global trade ways. China has significant power in diplomatic relations as a result of its massive investments in infrastructure and economic projects throughout Africa. China's activity at ports, particularly at Djibouti port, explains the military presence of the PLA. According to the naval commander, port development is an overseas strategic stronghold that would help China establish a nationwide influence over the host nation. China seeks to increase its influence in Africa by developing additional ports and strengthening its ownership and control, therefore gaining geostrategic influence over African states.[9]

Chinese Investment in Ports Leads to economic benefits such as job creation, improved infrastructure and marine trade, reduced tariffs, and improved African market access. However, the African nation faces a significant danger of falling into a debt trap due to the projects' financial load. Frequently, security and sovereignty issues are compromised and neglected. This topic is rarely acknowledged, but African governments have lost control of their key positions to China, not just as economic hubs but also for defence reasons.[10]

China is seen performing military and naval operations, and the PLA Navy's efforts in many African countries have piqued the interest of the media, lawmakers, and others. International concern is rising about the PLA Navy's use of African ports such as Doraleh as bases. Several ports, including Walvis Bay, Lekki, and Mombasa, are already considered naval bases for China. Africa has always supported a non-alignment strategy in geopolitics; however, increased military control and the possibility of maritime bases would force Africa to reconsider its neutral position and join China's rivalry.[11]

In conclusion, the Strings of Pearl is a geopolitical and economic strategy that involves investing in African ports. These ports are beneficial for creating job opportunities and infrastructure; however, African nation governments must protect sovereignty and the local economy. The African governments cannot be ignorant of the military compromise that will take place in the future; hence, the government must safeguard its political and economic independence and not let the Africa-China maritime relation dominate the country's well-being.

Tahreem Asim, Research Scholar, Department of International Relations, Peace and Public Policy (IRP and PP), St Joseph’s University, Bengaluru-560027, India. Email: [email protected].
Dr. Karamala Areesh Kumar, Head, Department of International Relations, Peace and Public Policy (IRP and PP), St Joseph’s University, Bengaluru-560027, India, Email: [email protected], [email protected], ORCiD: https://orcid.org/my-orcid?orcid=0000-0002-3908-071X.
Akshat Devgan, Research Scholar, Department of International Relations, Peace and Public Policy (IRP and PP), St Joseph’s University, Bengaluru-560027, India. Email: [email protected].

[1] Pehrson, C. J. (2006). STRING OF PEARLS: MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF CHINA’S RISING POWER ACROSS THE ASIAN LITTORAL. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep11277

[2] Ashraf, J. (2017). String of Pearls and China’s Emerging Strategic Culture. Strategic Studies, 37(4), 166–181. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48537578

[3] Karan Reddy, R. (2023). CHINA’S GOING GLOBAL POLICY: A PRELUDE TO THE BRI. Organisation for Research on China and Asia. https://orcasia.org/chinas-going-global-policy-a-prelude-to-the-bri.

[4] Nantulya, P. (2025, March 26). Mapping China’s strategic port development in Africa – Africa Center. Africa Center. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/china-port-development-africa/

[5] Nantulya, P. (2025, March 26). Mapping China’s strategic port development in Africa – Africa Center. Africa Center. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/china-port-development-africa/

[6] Unbound, G. B. F. A. (2018, April 13). China’s strategy in Djibouti: mixing commercial and military interests. Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinas-strategy-djibouti-mixing-commercial-and-military-interests

[7] Africachinareview. (2021, May 20). Chinese-built port in Kenya’s Lamu to spur regional trade: officials. Africa -China Review. https://africachinareview.com/chinese-built-port-in-kenyas-lamu-to-spur-regional-trade-officials

[8] Nantulya, P. (2025, March 26). Mapping China’s strategic port development in Africa – Africa Center. Africa Center. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/china-port-development-africa/

[9] Nantulya, P. (2025, March 26). Mapping China’s strategic port development in Africa – Africa Center. Africa Center. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/china-port-development-africa/

[10] Nantulya, P. (2025, March 26). Mapping China’s strategic port development in Africa – Africa Center. Africa Center. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/china-port-development-africa/

[11] Nantulya, P. (2025, March 26). Mapping China’s strategic port development in Africa – Africa Center. Africa Center. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/china-port-development-africa/