In a twist of legal irony, Attorney General Godfred Yeboah Dame now finds himself championing a legal interpretation that contradicts both the clear intent of Ghana’s Constitution and his own prior stance on parliamentary defection. His actions reveal a disturbing double standard that threatens the very foundation of Ghana’s democratic system, undermining the rule of law and parliamentary integrity.
A Blatant Reversal on Parliamentary Defections
The heart of this controversy lies in Article 97 of Ghana’s Constitution. Clauses 97(1)(g) and 97(1)(h) unequivocally mandate that a Member of Parliament must vacate their seat if they leave the party under which they were elected or declare an intention to run as an independent. This language is clear, prescriptive, and immediate. It exists not to speculate on a hypothetical future parliament but to preserve the stability and integrity of the current parliamentary term, honouring the mandate voters gave to each MP.
In 2020, when Prof. Aaron Mike Oquaye, then-Speaker of Parliament, applied Article 97 to declare the Fomena MP’s seat vacant for standing as an independent, Attorney General Dame remained conspicuously silent. He offered no objections, no claims of unconstitutionality, and no opposition. His silence was a tacit endorsement that Article 97’s provisions must take effect immediately, ensuring the composition of the present parliament accurately reflects party affiliations. Yet now, in 2023, when Speaker Alban Bagbin declared four MPs’ seats vacant under the same constitutional clause, Dame abruptly claimed this action was unconstitutional. He now argues that the consequences of party defection should only apply in a future parliament, leaving the current one unchanged. The only difference this time? This interpretation serves to preserve the governing party’s slim majority.
The Dangerous Logic of “Future Parliament” Application
Dame’s argument not only contradicts his previous position but also defies common sense. By claiming that MPs who abandon their party should remain unaffected in the current term, he effectively neuters Article 97. If defection results in seat vacation only in a hypothetical future parliament, what consequence exists for the MP who switches allegiance, gains politically, and then loses their seat in the next election? Under Dame’s logic, Article 97 would become little more than a paper tiger, permitting MPs to change allegiances as they please without any consequence for the term they were elected to serve.
The implications are staggering. This legal manoeuvring introduces a loophole large enough to undermine Ghana’s democratic process, where voters’ intent can be thwarted and party loyalty abandoned without consequence. This is no mere oversight or benign reinterpretation; it is an intentional erosion of democratic stability in Parliament.
International Precedents on Immediate Consequences
Attorney General Dame’s argument also flies in the face of international democratic norms. Across parliamentary democracies, the expectation is that MPs who abandon their party must vacate their seats immediately to prevent any disruption in the elected government’s makeup. Consider:
• India’s Anti-Defection Law: Under India’s Tenth Schedule, MPs who resign from their party or declare independence are required to vacate their seats immediately to uphold the integrity of the sitting parliament.
• South Africa’s Anti-Defection Law: In South Africa, any MP who changes affiliation is immediately unseated to prevent undermining the electorate’s will.
These examples reinforce a consistent democratic principle: MPs must adhere to the mandate given by their electorate for the current term. No democratic system would entertain delaying the effect of defection to a future term, as this would strip the law of its power to protect parliamentary integrity.
Why the Supreme Court Must Refuse This Hypocrisy
For the Supreme Court to entertain such legal contortions would be to lend legitimacy to a deeply flawed, inconsistent argument that serves narrow partisan interests at the expense of Ghana’s democratic foundation. To rule in favour of the Attorney General’s argument would be to set a dangerous precedent, undermining the electorate’s intent, destabilizing parliamentary composition, and signalling that Ghana’s highest offices are willing to bend the Constitution to suit partisan needs.
The double standard here is clear: Dame’s endorsement of Article 97 in 2020, when it suited his political interests, and his rejection of the same Article now, when it threatens his party’s majority, exposes a blatant disregard for consistent legal interpretation. Such selective applications of constitutional principles threaten to erode public trust in Ghana’s judiciary and democratic institutions.
If the rule of law is to mean anything in Ghana, the Supreme Court must reject Dame’s argument as legally baseless, logically flawed, and ethically bankrupt. To do otherwise would be to allow political interests to overshadow the Constitution, transforming the highest court in the land into a tool for partisan gain.