SSNIT: Beyond the Wobbling Cash Cow --- The Pensioner Deserves Answers

The article “SSNIT: The Wobbling Cash Cow,” published on ModernGhana on October 13, 2026, raises fundamental questions about the management of Ghana's social security system. Its concerns about political influence, questionable investment decisions, weak worker participation and the disappointing circumstances of many pensioners deserve serious national attention.

However, the debate must not end with the assertion that SSNIT is a cash cow that has been mishandled. We must examine the evidence, distinguish between historical failures and current performance, identify the institutional weaknesses that need correcting, and, above all, ask whether the system is delivering the retirement security that workers were promised.

After all, the money administered by the Social Security and National Insurance Trust is not a political party's property. It is not a personal inheritance for board members, management or government appointees. It represents a national social security commitment financed by workers' contributions and employers' obligations.

The ultimate test of SSNIT's performance must therefore be whether it can protect those resources and provide pensioners with a dependable income in retirement.

A Pension Fund Is Not an Ordinary Business

SSNIT is an institutional investor, but its responsibilities go beyond those of an ordinary commercial enterprise. A private investor may decide to accept considerable risks in pursuit of high returns. A pension fund, however, must balance returns against the security, liquidity and long-term sustainability of the funds entrusted to it. Its investment decisions must take account of the fact that people depend on those funds for their livelihoods after leaving active employment. SSNIT itself identifies yield, safety, liquidity, diversification, capital preservation and overall investment returns among the principles guiding its investment activities. These are appropriate principles. The real question is whether they are consistently reflected in investment decisions and their outcomes.

The National Pensions Act, 2008 (Act 766) provides the statutory framework for the administration of the scheme and the responsibilities of its governing institutions.

The challenge is not simply to have rules on paper. It is to ensure that the rules are observed, that investment decisions are properly scrutinized and that failures have consequences where negligence or misconduct is established.

The Evidence of Investment Losses Cannot Be Ignored

Ghana has previously confronted disturbing findings concerning SSNIT investments. In 2021, the Ghana Centre for Democratic Development discussed Auditor-General's findings concerning approximately US$11.79 million in losses associated with the liquidation of three investments. SSNIT responded that the investments were legacy commitments and that recovery efforts had been undertaken. These findings do not establish that every SSNIT investment has failed, nor do they prove that every loss resulted from corruption. Investment involves risks, and some ventures can fail despite reasonable due diligence. Nevertheless, workers and pensioners are entitled to know what happened to their money.

Which investments were approved, by whom, and on what basis? Were feasibility studies and independent valuations conducted? Were the risks properly assessed? What did management do when the investments began to underperform? How much money was ultimately recovered, and what remains outstanding? Where investigations establish negligence, misconduct or conflicts of interest, appropriate sanctions should follow. Where decisions were reasonable but commercial circumstances changed, the public deserves that explanation too. What must not happen is for unsuccessful investments to disappear into institutional history while the people whose contributions financed them are left without satisfactory answers.

The Hotel Investments: Lessons That Must Not Be Lost

SSNIT's hotel investments provide another useful case study. In June 2024, SSNIT reported that five of the six hotels involved in a proposed divestment had not paid dividends over the preceding five years. It also reported that, apart from Labadi Beach Hotel, the hotels could not adequately finance their maintenance and other significant capital expenditure requirements. According to SSNIT, payments including shareholder loans to La Palm, Elmina and Busua amounted to GH¢233.8 million. Labadi Beach Hotel, meanwhile, had paid approximately GH¢48.1 million in dividends over five years.

The government subsequently explained the decision to divest a 60% stake in the hotel portfolio as part of a strategy to stop further depletion of resources and introduce private participation. These figures, available in SSNIT's published account, raise legitimate questions about the commercial performance of the portfolio. The important issue is not whether SSNIT should own hotels as a matter of principle. It is whether the investments were commercially justified, whether the original assumptions were sound and whether warning signs were acted upon promptly.

A public pension fund should not continue supporting underperforming businesses indefinitely merely because substantial money has already been invested in them. Equally, a decision to sell must be transparent. Pensioners deserve information about the valuation, sale price, competitive process and expected financial benefits. They should be able to judge whether the transaction protects their interests. Divestment may be the right decision, but it should not become a substitute for learning why the original investment failed to deliver the expected results.

Political Appointments and Professional Competence

The original article also questions the influence of political considerations in the appointment of SSNIT board members. This concern deserves attention, but the argument should be framed carefully. A government appointment does not automatically make a person incompetent, just as private-sector experience does not guarantee integrity. The more important question is whether appointments consistently prioritize the competence required to manage a pension institution.

Section 35 of Act 766 establishes the composition of SSNIT's Board of Trustees, while section 36 sets out the knowledge and understanding trustees must possess concerning pension law, investment policy and scheme administration. These provisions offer a starting point for reform. Appointments should be supported by transparent criteria covering investment management, actuarial knowledge, accounting, risk management, pension administration and corporate governance. Conflicts of interest should be declared and managed, while board members should be assessed against clear performance expectations.

Government may retain its lawful appointment powers, but those powers should not be exercised as though a pension fund were an extension of a political party. The contributions of workers must never become the price of political patronage.

Growing Assets Do Not Automatically Mean Adequate Pensions

A balanced assessment must also acknowledge evidence of improvement. The Bank of Ghana's Financial Stability Review 2025 reports that assets under management in the Basic National Social Security Scheme increased from GH¢22.35 billion in 2024 to GH¢29.07 billion in 2025. The nominal investment return reached 23.8%, while the real return was 8%. Benefits paid in 2025 amounted to GH¢7.69 billion. These are important figures. They suggest that the scheme experienced a substantial improvement in its recent financial performance.

But asset growth and investment returns do not, on their own, answer the question of pension adequacy. The financial condition of a pension fund and the living conditions of its pensioners are related, but they are not identical. A scheme may improve its investment performance while many retirees continue to receive pensions that cannot meet their essential expenses. The public therefore needs both financial and social performance indicators.

How much income is generated for each cedi invested? How much is spent on administration? What proportion of contributions is used to pay benefits? How sustainable are the scheme's future obligations? And how do pension amounts compare with the actual cost of living? These questions should be answered through regular, accessible reporting rather than occasional public relations announcements.

The Pensioner Must Be at the Centre
This is where the national discussion becomes most urgent. A person who has worked for decades should not enter retirement only to discover that the monthly pension provides little protection against poverty. Food, accommodation, transport, electricity, water and medication do not become free when a worker retires. Indeed, healthcare expenses may increase with age, while opportunities to supplement income often diminish.

In January 2026, the Ghana News Agency reported SSNIT's announcement of a 10% pension indexation for that year. The arrangement combined a fixed 6% increase with redistribution of the remaining 4%. Such redistribution can benefit pensioners receiving lower amounts. Nevertheless, the percentage increase alone cannot establish whether pensions are adequate. A pensioner receiving a small monthly payment may experience hardship even after a seemingly substantial percentage increase. Meanwhile, rising costs during the year can erode the purchasing power of the adjustment.

SSNIT and the National Pensions Regulatory Authority should therefore publish regular pension adequacy assessments, showing the distribution of monthly pensions and how those payments compare with essential household expenditure. The debate should also consider whether additional protection is needed when inflation rises sharply between annual indexation exercises. The objective must not be to promise every pensioner an unlimited increase. It must be to establish a transparent, financially responsible approach that protects the real value of retirement income as far as the scheme's resources permit.

Representation Must Mean More than Having a Seat

The original article argues that workers, through organized labour, have insufficient influence over important decisions affecting SSNIT. The composition of the Board of Trustees already provides for organized labour and the National Pensioners Association. That representation is important and should be respected. However, representation on a board does not eliminate the need for broader consultation. Workers approaching retirement, pensioners receiving small monthly payments, retirees in rural communities and people who struggle to access digital services may have concerns that are not always adequately captured in formal board discussions.

SSNIT and the NPRA should establish regular consultation mechanisms through which pensioner groups like the Pensioners for Reforms (P4R), Concerned SSNIT Pensioners Forum (CSPF), and the National SSNIT Pensioners Association (NPA), labour organizations and other relevant stakeholders can submit proposals, question policies and receive substantive responses. Such engagement should complement existing statutory representation, not undermine it. Pensioners should not have to wait until a decision has been made before their concerns are heard.

The Auditor-General Must Not Be a Voice in the Wilderness

Independent auditing is indispensable to public accountability. The Auditor-General's findings should lead to documented management responses, recovery efforts where money is owed, corrective measures and appropriate referrals where wrongdoing is suspected. It is not enough to publish an audit report and move on to the next controversy. For significant investment failures, the public should be informed of the recommendations made, the action taken, the amount recovered and the reasons any outstanding issues remain unresolved. Parliament's relevant committees should scrutinize these matters and follow up on implementation. The NPRA must also exercise its statutory regulatory responsibilities effectively. Its mandate includes monitoring pension administration, investigating complaints of impropriety and advising government on pension policy and the welfare of pensioners.

Regulation should be judged by results: compliance, risk management, timely corrective action and protection of members' interests. Where responsibility is shared among management, boards, regulators and government, it should be clearly established rather than allowing every institution to point elsewhere.

A Practical Reform Agenda
The debate about SSNIT should produce specific reforms.

1. SSNIT should publish an accessible annual investment scorecard showing the performance of major investments, realized losses, outstanding recoveries and the measures taken to address underperformance.
2. Board appointments should follow transparent competence criteria, supported by appropriate declarations of interest and measurable performance expectations.
3. Significant investments and divestments should be supported by documented feasibility studies, independent valuations and clear explanations of the decisions taken.
4. Audit recommendations should be tracked publicly until they are implemented or satisfactorily resolved.
5. SSNIT and the NPRA should strengthen regular engagement with pensioners and contributors, including groups representing retirees who receive low pensions.
6. Pension adequacy should become a central performance indicator. Financial sustainability matters, but it must be assessed alongside the scheme's ability to provide meaningful retirement security.
7. Finally, successive governments must recognize that pension administration requires continuity, institutional memory and professional independence. Every change of government should not become an opportunity to start afresh politically while leaving unresolved investment problems behind.

My Thoughts: Whose Money Is It?
The question raised by the description of SSNIT as a wobbling cash cow is ultimately a question of responsibility. The Trust administers a national social security scheme on behalf of workers and pensioners. Its resources must be protected with the seriousness that such a responsibility demands. We should acknowledge genuine improvements in financial performance where the evidence supports them. We should also insist that historical failures be investigated, outstanding questions answered and weaknesses corrected. The aim is not to condemn SSNIT indiscriminately, nor to defend it uncritically. It is to strengthen an institution on which millions of working Ghanaians depend for retirement security.

A pension fund should not be judged only by the size of its assets, the number of companies in which it invests or the dividends announced in a financial report. It must also be judged by the confidence it inspires, the prudence of its decisions, the accountability of its leadership and the dignity it helps secure for those who have completed their working lives.

For the worker who contributes every month, the question is simple: will the money entrusted to SSNIT provide dependable security when the time comes to retire? For the pensioner who has already retired, the question is even more immediate: can the pension received sustain a life of reasonable dignity? These are not political questions. They are questions of public duty, economic justice and social responsibility.

SSNIT must be accountable to the workers whose contributions sustain it and to the pensioners whose lives depend on it. Its ultimate success must be measured not merely in cedis accumulated, but in retirement security delivered.

FUSEINI ABDULAI BRAIMAH
+233208282575 / +233550558008
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