Russia-Africa Summit: The Search for Resources, Influence and War Resilience

Russia's renewed engagement with Africa should be understood against the backdrop of a war in Ukraine that has become a test of Moscow's economic, military and political endurance. Since the invasion of Ukraine, Russia has faced extensive Western sanctions, restrictions on trade and finance, and increasing pressure on the sources of revenue that sustain its war effort. In this environment, Africa has acquired a significance that extends beyond traditional diplomacy. The continent offers Moscow political partnerships, alternative markets, military cooperation and, critically, access to valuable natural resources and potential revenue streams that can help Russia withstand external pressure.

This helps explain the evolution of the Russia-Africa summits. The first summit, held in Sochi in 2019, was largely presented as an effort to rebuild and institutionalise Russia's relationship with Africa, with trade, investment, security and political cooperation at the centre of the agenda. By the time of the second summit in St Petersburg in 2023, however, the geopolitical context had changed dramatically. Russia was already deep into its war in Ukraine and under extensive Western sanctions. The summit therefore served not only to deepen economic and political relations but also to demonstrate that Moscow remained capable of maintaining significant partnerships outside the Western bloc.

The third summit schedule on 28-29 October 2026, comes at an even more consequential moment. Russia is seeking to demonstrate that its relationship with Africa has survived the prolonged Ukraine war and remains capable of producing strategic benefits. The question for African governments should increasingly be whether the relationship is producing comparable benefits for them. Moscow's partnership with Africa cannot be assessed only through diplomatic declarations, military agreements or high-level summits. It should also be judged by what African states receive in return and by what Russia gains from the relationship.

One of the most important areas to examine is natural resources. Russia's interest in Africa is not simply about obtaining diplomatic support. Access to gold and other strategic commodities can provide alternative sources of revenue at a time when Moscow is seeking to reduce the impact of Western sanctions. Gold is particularly important because it can be traded through opaque networks and converted into revenue outside conventional financial channels. The U.S. Treasury has previously linked Wagner-associated gold operations in Africa to the financing of the group's activities, including its operations in Ukraine. This does not mean that every Russian engagement with an African resource-producing state is designed to finance the Ukraine war. It does, however, demonstrate why African resources can have strategic value for a Russia seeking to sustain its power and resilience under sanctions. The same logic extends beyond gold. Russia has increasingly shown interest in energy and critical raw materials, while its security partnerships in countries such as Mali and the Central African Republic have created relationships in which military and political cooperation can intersect with economic and resource interests. The emerging model therefore deserves closer scrutiny, Russia provides security assistance and political backing, while gaining influence, commercial opportunities and potentially privileged access to resources.

Mali provides one of the clearest case studies. Russia's military presence in the country began with the arrival of Wagner personnel in 2021 and subsequently evolved into the Africa Corps structure. Moscow has presented this relationship as an alternative to Western security partnerships and as evidence of Russia's willingness to assist African states in defending their sovereignty. Yet the relationship also raises a fundamental question: what does Russia receive in return for its military and political support?

That question becomes particularly important when the wider context of the Ukraine war is considered. If Russia can secure access to gold and other strategic resources, strengthen relationships with resource-rich governments and establish alternative economic channels, those relationships can help Moscow mitigate the effects of sanctions and sustain its broader strategic capacity. The relationship should therefore not be viewed solely through the narrow lens of counterterrorism. It is also part of a wider contest over resources, influence and economic resilience.

The economic figures contained in the summit case study reinforce the need to ask what kind of partnership Moscow is actually building. At the 2019 Sochi summit, Vladimir Putin announced a target of increasing Russia-Africa trade to $40 billion. According to Russian data cited in the document, trade stood at $27.7 billion in 2025, while Russia accounted for less than 1 percent of foreign direct investment in Africa. These figures do not prove that Russia's Africa strategy has failed, nor do they capture every form of strategic value that Moscow derives from the continent. If Russia's conventional economic footprint remains relatively modest, why is Moscow investing so heavily in strategic relationships with African states? One answer is that the value of Africa to Russia cannot be measured by trade and investment alone. Political influence, military access, diplomatic support, alternative markets and access to natural resources can all have strategic value. For a country fighting a prolonged war under sanctions, these forms of influence can become as important as conventional economic indicators.

This is why the third Russia-Africa Summit should be examined as more than another diplomatic gathering. Moscow wants to use the summit to demonstrate that its partnership with Africa remains strong despite the Ukraine war. The circumstances surrounding the meeting expose the tension at the heart of that claim. African officials are being asked to travel to Moscow while Ukrainian drone attacks have repeatedly disrupted air traffic around the Russian capital. On September 20 an attack involving more than 450 drones caused fresh disruption in the Moscow region, while Air Tanzania temporarily suspended its Moscow route following a risk assessment. The irony is difficult to ignore. Russia presents itself as a security partner for Africa, yet some African officials must consider their own security when travelling to the Russian capital. More importantly, African governments must now assess whether the strategic benefits of their relationship with Moscow justify the risks and costs associated with it.

For Ghana, this calculation is particularly important. The security consequences of Russia's growing involvement in the Sahel cannot be separated from Ghana's own national and regional security interests. A source close to the Ghanaian delegation cited in the summit document questions whether the relationship is genuinely "win-win" and points directly to the deteriorating security situation in the Sahel and its spillover towards Ghana's northern borders. This should concern African governments is Russia's engagement with Africa primarily delivering security and development benefits to African states, or is Africa increasingly becoming an important source of the political influence, strategic resources and economic resilience that Moscow needs to sustain its own geopolitical ambitions?

The answer is unlikely to be simple. Russia's relationship with Africa serves multiple purposes, and resource access is only one component of a broader strategy. But the Ukraine war has changed the calculation. What may once have been presented principally as an effort to expand trade, investment and diplomatic relations now also has to be viewed through the lens of Russia's need to preserve strategic autonomy, withstand sanctions and maintain the capacity to wage a prolonged war.

The third Russia-Africa Summit therefore represents a test not simply of whether African leaders will continue to engage Moscow, but of whether Russia can convince them that this engagement is genuinely reciprocal. For African states, the critical question is no longer whether Russia wants a deeper relationship with Africa. It clearly does. The more important question is what Moscow needs from Africa, what Africa receives in return, and whether the balance between the two is becoming increasingly unequal.

Joseph McCarthy is an analyst and researcher specialising in governance, security and political transitions in the Sahel. He writes on geopolitics, development and African diplomacy. [email protected]