Assessing the First 100 Days of Museveni's 7th Term in Office

H.E. President Yoweri Museveni

August 25, 2026 marked exactly 100 days since H.E. President Yoweri Museveni was sworn in for a seventh term, pledging that it would be completely different in terms of commitment to service — one that would deprive his team of sleep. This analysis evaluates performance so far:

1. Priority Areas: Nothing has fundamentally changed. The same priorities as in previous terms are reflected in the national budget: debt servicing, security, and infrastructure — producing no new jobs. This implies sustained unemployment levels, fostering increased criminality, with one recent fatal incident resulting in the instant murder of four kindergarten toddlers.

2. Corruption: The vice remains at its peak due to questionable approaches, including the current one pursued by both Local Government Ministers. Senior Minister Balaam Barugahara sits with Hon. Michael Mawanda on the Central Executive Committee of the Patriotic League of Uganda (PLU), a political pressure group led by the President's son, Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba, who recently declared his intention to run for President in 2031. Yet Hon. Mawanda has a pending corruption case in the Anti-Corruption Court for allegedly misappropriating Shs 3.8 billion of Cooperatives Funds. Balaam and his team lack the will to interdict Mawanda from his roles as a PLU leader, as they do with suspected district officials. This demonstrates the weakness in their bid to confront corruption at all levels, including at its base in Kampala at the national policy-making level, where it is most pronounced.

3. Court Cases: The few corruption-related arrests made so far, without any substantial recovery of funds, are not impressive. They are no different from old stories such as Kazinda, Bakoko Bakoru, and the Mabati scandal. Moreover, the cost of implementing the current campaign is enormous, to the extent that the lead facilitator has had to donate a public address system (PAS) for free to cut costs — otherwise it would be unsustainable.

4. Limited Facilitation: This effort was not appropriated for in the sectoral parliamentary allocations. It therefore relies on limited ministerial facilitation. The question is: once this facilitation is exhausted, will the campaign also stop? Will the vice have ended? This highlights how unsustainable the approach is.

5. Viable Solution: Opposition groups such as FDC, PFF, JEEMA, DP and others have expressed doubt about the effectiveness of the campaign, describing it as a mere political gimmick intended to give PLU leaders like Mawanda enhanced national visibility at public rallies organized by Balaam. The opposition suggests that the best approach is to fully facilitate and empower the constitutional ombudsman — the Inspectorate of Government (IGG) — particularly to sensitize citizens about the _Whistleblowers Protection Act, 2010_, which directly involves all citizens in the fight against corruption, as required under Article 17(1)(i) of the Constitution. In this model, even when Local Government Ministers visit a district and leave, citizens remain on the ground to watch over corrupt tendencies, because it takes more than one person for corruption to occur. You cannot arrest one individual in an entire district and then boast of effectively fighting corruption. The network remains intact.

6. Transition Movements: The only major visible movements are those pointing to a power transition, reflected in recent appointments from Legislature leadership and Cabinet to RDCs at district level and security operatives at parish level — officials who are also active in PLU but are using public resources for private political promotion.