The European Commission and the European Parliament on Serbia: Why do their assessments differ?

Two documents, often conflated, are of particular significance in Serbia’s EU accession process: the European Commission’s Serbia Report[2] and the European Parliament resolution on the Commission’s report on Serbia.[3] While both address the same integration process, they differ in their institutional character, methodology, political weight and purpose. It is precisely these differences that explain why their assessments, conclusions and tone may diverge considerably in certain areas.

However, to fully grasp Serbia’s EU accession process, one must look beyond the European Commission and the European Parliament and consider the roles of the Council of the European Union and the European Council. In simple terms, their respective mandates can be outlined as follows:

• European Commission – provides expert assessment of progress, monitors reforms and prepares recommendations;
• European Parliament – performs political evaluation, democratic oversight and articulates political stances;
• Council of the European Union – handles intergovernmental decision-making on key aspects of the accession process, representing Member States;
• European Council – defines the broader strategic and political trajectory of the European Union’s enlargement policy.

This distribution of responsibilities demonstrates that the European Commission’s report and the European Parliament’s resolution are not competing or mutually exclusive assessments, but distinct institutional perspectives on the same process. Their relationship can only be correctly understood within the EU’s broader institutional framework, where expert evaluation, political oversight and intergovernmental decision-making fulfil different yet interconnected functions.

European Commission – expert and political-legal assessment of progress

The European Commission is the European Union’s executive institution and plays a central role in the expert monitoring of the enlargement process, evaluating the progress of candidate countries, preparing annual reports and formulating recommendations to inform further decisions by the Member States. Its annual report on Serbia provides a structured, methodologically standardised assessment of the country’s progress towards meeting the criteria for EU membership. It covers the political criteria, the rule of law, democracy, fundamental rights, foreign policy and political relations, along with the 35 negotiating chapters grouped into six clusters under the revised enlargement methodology. The annual report is therefore broader and more comprehensive in scope and cannot be reduced to a simple aggregate rating of individual negotiating chapters.

Among other areas, the European Commission assesses the extent to which national legislation is aligned with the EU acquis (acquis communautaire), the functioning of institutions, judicial reform, the fight against corruption, economic preparedness, public administration reform, the protection of human rights and alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The European Commission also seeks to balance critical assessment of progress with encouragement for further reforms. Its reports offer a structured, methodologically grounded evaluation of reform and legal progress while also addressing the political criteria. These assessments provide Member States with an essential foundation when deciding on the next steps in the accession process.

European Parliament – political evaluation

While the Commission evaluates political criteria within a standardised methodology, Parliament provides a broader political interpretation of the quality of democratic and reform processes through its political oversight function. Its role involves political scrutiny of the enlargement process and the articulation of the political stance of the directly elected representatives of EU citizens. The standing rapporteur for Serbia, Tonino Picula, prepares the report and a motion for a resolution, which, once adopted, constitute Parliament’s official political position.

Unlike the European Commission, the European Parliament views Serbia's accession process through a broader political and geopolitical lens, placing particular emphasis on democracy, the rule of law, human rights, electoral conditions, media freedom and Serbia’s alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. This makes its approach generally more forthright and politically critical.

The European Parliament resolution adopted in July 2026 takes a markedly more critical view than the European Commission’s assessment, pointing to a significant slowdown in Serbia’s progress towards EU membership.

Why do they differ in tone?
The difference stems primarily from their distinct institutional mandates. The European Commission monitors reforms, evaluates compliance with accession criteria, prepares annual reports and makes recommendations, while decisions on key stages of the negotiations rest with the Council of the European Union and, ultimately, the Member States. The Commission therefore seeks to keep the enlargement process on track, generally expressing its findings in expert, methodologically grounded and diplomatic terms.

The European Parliament, by contrast, offers a broader political assessment of the quality of reforms and democratic transformation. Its resolutions can consequently be more critical, particularly in their appraisal of the state of democracy, the rule of law and the candidate country’s alignment with EU foreign policy.

Do the documents contradict each other?

No. They reflect distinct institutional perspectives on the same process. While the Commission also provides political assessments, Parliament offers a broader political evaluation. Consequently, the differences between them stem from their respective mandates and approaches to assessment rather than opposing views on Serbia’s European perspective.

Both documents nevertheless highlight serious challenges concerning the rule of law, judicial independence, media freedom, the fight against corruption, electoral integrity and Serbia’s alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.

What does this mean for Serbia?
Of particular significance for Serbia is the growing convergence between the Commission and Parliament in their assessment of the principal challenges. Both institutions point to slowing reforms and a lack of progress in certain areas, despite differences in tone and political emphasis.

Serbia still possesses the institutional, economic and human potential to accelerate its EU integration, but doing so requires clear political will to carry through the necessary reforms.

The European Parliament resolution does not constitute a formal decision on progress in the accession negotiations, but it carries considerable political weight. It can serve as a means of political pressure and help shape Member States’ positions on Serbia’s European path.

Political weight and limitations of European assessments of Serbia

The existence of two separate documents is not an institutional anomaly, but rather a reflection of the division of responsibilities within the European Union. In the case of Serbia, however, this often generates additional political confusion. Neither document, taken on its own, constitutes a decision on Serbia’s membership. It is therefore important to distinguish between assessments of membership readiness and decisions on advancing the negotiations. Between the Commission’s assessment and Parliament’s political position stands the political and intergovernmental dimension represented by the Council of the European Union. The European Commission evaluates a candidate country’s ability to adopt and implement the EU acquis, while the European Parliament, through its political and oversight role, offers a broader assessment of democratic development, the rule of law and alignment with fundamental European values.

The European Parliament’s political assessments should also be viewed against the broader institutional backdrop of the plurality of political interests, the activities of interest groups and lobbying networks and the existing mechanisms for the declaration of private interests and the prevention of conflicts of interest. Cases such as Qatargate[4] have further underscored the need for institutional caution, raising serious questions about transparency, possible third-country influence and the integrity of individual actors within the European Parliament. While this does not in itself call into question the legitimacy of parliamentary assessments, it does suggest that political positions within the European Parliament need to be considered in the wider institutional context of transparency, lobbying, conflicts of interest and potential influence by third parties.

Even a combined reading of the two documents does not always provide a complete picture of the actual state of Serbia’s European integration. The Commission primarily assesses institutional, legal and reform progress, whereas the European Parliament offers a political evaluation of the credibility and quality of those processes. Value-based and political assessments naturally allow considerably greater scope for differing interpretations, something that is particularly apparent in European Parliament debates on Serbia. Consequently, the assertion that the combination of these two approaches produces the most relevant measure of a country’s readiness for membership should be regarded with a certain degree of caution.

Problems arise when political assessments expressed by individual Members of the European Parliament are portrayed as definitive institutional conclusions of the European Union or as formal decisions on progress in the accession negotiations. This risks blurring the distinction between political evaluation and formal assessment of progress in the negotiating process, while also overlooking the reform progress Serbia has already achieved. The negotiating process, by its very nature, involves continuous evaluation, dialogue and the possibility of changes in positions. Prematurely presenting political judgements as final can therefore prove counterproductive and undermine the credibility and momentum of the process itself.

Vučić between the European path and geopolitical balancing – Serbia enters a phase of strategic reassessment

Statements by Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić suggest that Serbia is adjusting its foreign policy to new geopolitical realities, rather than making a definitive pivot towards the European Union. IFIMES describes this approach as strategic redundancy[5] – diversifying partners and security options while reaffirming EU membership as the country’s strategic goal. Serbia is not abandoning its European course, but seeks to preserve strategic redundancy by simultaneously maintaining relations with the EU, Russia, China and other partners.

Vučić’s statement that Serbia will press ahead towards the EU “even stronger and faster”, particularly in the wake of his meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, sends an important political signal. Nevertheless, the ultimate test of Serbia’s European commitment will lie not in declarations, but in tangible reforms concerning the rule of law, democracy, the electoral process, institutional independence, media freedom, relations with Kosovo and alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy.

Vučić’s assertion that EU accession is based not solely on “merit” but also on politics serves both as a critique of Brussels and a message to domestic audiences. While Serbia looks to the EU for a clearer and more credible membership perspective, the EU expects Belgrade to deliver not only economic progress but also adherence to the Union’s political, institutional and value-based standards.

Belgrade’s outreach to Ukraine should be seen as an attempt to broaden Serbia’s diplomatic room for manoeuvre and demonstrate that the country is neither a Russian ally nor inclined to sever ties with Moscow. Tying the Kosovo and Ukraine issues together through the principle of territorial integrity forms part of Serbia’s effort to frame its foreign policy as a consistent application of international law. However, the different historical, legal and international political circumstances surrounding the two cases make any straightforward equation between them untenable.

Serbia strives to preserve its relations with the EU, Russia, China, India, Turkey and the Gulf states, thereby widening the scope for its own strategic autonomy. However, as global confrontation deepens, this political balancing act will become increasingly difficult to sustain.

Meanwhile, the EU also bears a share of responsibility for the slowdown in Serbia's European integration, particularly because of the insufficiently clear and credible dynamics of the accession process and the mixed political signals surrounding the prospects for enlargement.

IFIMES sees Vučić’s latest statements as an adjustment to Serbia’s balancing policy rather than a departure from it. Serbia is drawing closer to the EU while at the same time seeking to preserve its strategic ties with Russia and China. The meeting with Zelenskyy opens a new avenue for diplomatic engagement with Kyiv and European partners, but does not yet constitute a definitive geopolitical realignment.

The central question, therefore, is not Serbia’s professed desire to join the EU, but whether it is prepared to accept the political and strategic consequences of that choice. Its relations with Russia and Ukraine, the Kosovo issue, the rule of law, democratic standards and alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy will be crucial indicators of whether Serbia is entering a new phase of European integration or simply a new phase of political balancing.

Zelenskyy in Belgrade as a test of Serbia’s European orientation

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s visit to Belgrade represents an important political signal and could herald a new stage in Serbia’s relations with the European Union. If Serbia follows this move with concrete steps towards alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, including its stance on Russia, the rule of law, democratisation and the normalisation of relations with Kosovo, the EU should respond by accelerating the accession process. This should primarily involve opening new clusters and chapters, backed by clearly defined reform criteria and measurable commitments.

The EU, however, should not reward isolated political gestures, but a sustainable and verifiable strategic shift by Serbia. Zelenskyy’s visit may indicate change, but on its own it cannot be taken as evidence of a strategic pivot. For Serbia, this would be the moment to turn its declared European aspirations into concrete political decisions. For the EU, accelerating the negotiations would offer an opportunity to reduce the scope for Russian influence through deeper European engagement and anchor Serbia more firmly within Europe’s geopolitical space.

The substance of Serbia’s European path can no longer be assessed solely through formal progress in the accession negotiations. The key question is whether Belgrade will translate its stated commitment to European integration into measurable reform and foreign policy decisions, while at the same time the EU must demonstrate its readiness to reward sustained reform progress in tangible terms.