Court to rule on Hana Abdul-Wahab's bid to strike out charges on July 23

The High Court is expected to rule on Thursday, July 23, 2026, on an application filed by lawyers for the former Chief Executive Officer of the National Food Buffer Stock Company (NAFCO), Hana Abdul-Wahab Aludiba, seeking to have the criminal charges against him struck out.

The defence argues that the charge sheet is defective and infringes the former NAFCO boss's constitutional right to a fair trial.

During proceedings, lead counsel for the first accused, Godfred Yeboah Dame, submitted that the charges fail to comply with Article 19(2)(d) of the 1992 Constitution and Sections 109 and 112 of the Criminal and Other Offences (Procedure) Act, 1960 (Act 30), which require an accused person to be informed, in a language he understands and in sufficient detail, of the nature of the allegations against him.

Mr Dame argued that a charge sheet, being the document that invokes the court's criminal jurisdiction, must clearly state both the offences and the particulars supporting each count.

According to him, the prosecution's charge sheet does not provide enough detail to enable the accused to understand the allegations or prepare an adequate defence.

He contended that the prosecution merely repeated the names of the offences without setting out the specific acts said to constitute the crimes.

Referring to the stealing charge, Mr Dame argued that although the prosecution alleged his client stole "about GH¢50 million," it failed to identify the individual transactions, the dates on which they allegedly occurred, or how each act of stealing was committed.

He further maintained that the prosecution improperly combined multiple transactions spanning from February 2017 to February 2025 into a single count, contrary to Section 109 of Act 30, which requires separate offences to be charged separately.

“The accused is entitled to know exactly what he is standing trial for. He should not be left to embark on a fishing expedition to determine the case he has to meet,” Mr Dame submitted.

He likened the prosecution's approach to “blindfolding a boxer, tying his hands behind his back and expecting him to fight in the ring.”

The former Attorney-General also challenged the counts of defrauding by false pretences, arguing that the particulars failed to disclose the alleged false representations or establish the essential elements of the offence.

He further argued that the prosecution could not properly charge the same transactions as both stealing and defrauding by false pretences because the two offences require different legal ingredients.

According to him, stealing presupposes the absence of the owner's consent, while defrauding by false pretences involves consent obtained through deception.

Mr Dame also submitted that the charge of wilfully causing financial loss to the State did not specify the acts or means through which the alleged financial loss was caused.

Opposing the application, Deputy Attorney-General Dr Justice Srem-Sai described the defence's arguments as a misinterpretation of the law.

He argued that Article 19(2)(d) of the Constitution requires only that an accused person be informed of the nature of the offence in a language he or she understands.

Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Republic v Ernest Thompson & 4 Others, Dr Srem-Sai submitted that the constitutional requirement is met where the charge sheet provides sufficient information in ordinary language.

He rejected the contention that the prosecution must reproduce every statutory definition or legal ingredient of an offence in the charge sheet.

“The particulars of an offence are not the place for evidence,” he argued. “Their purpose is simply to provide sufficient information to the accused person.”

The Deputy Attorney-General maintained that every count clearly identified the alleged offences, the relevant period during which they were committed and the property involved, thereby giving the accused adequate notice of the case against him.

He also dismissed the defence's claim of duplicity, arguing that such an issue only arises where two or more offences are contained in a single count.

“No count on the charge sheet contains two offences,” he submitted.

On the argument that the prosecution had charged both stealing and defrauding by false pretences in relation to the same transactions, Dr Srem-Sai said the law permits prosecutors to bring alternative charges.

Relying on Section 157 of Act 30, he argued that while an accused person cannot be convicted of both offences on the same facts, the prosecution is not prevented from charging them in the alternative.

He further maintained that questions relating to the number of transactions, the specific payments involved and how the offences were allegedly committed are evidential matters to be determined during the trial rather than issues affecting the validity of the charge sheet.

“The purpose of the charge sheet is to give sufficient notice to the accused so as to know what to expect at trial,” he submitted.

In his reply, Mr Dame argued that the prosecution had relied on statutory provisions that were irrelevant to the application before the court.

He maintained that Section 202(5) of Act 30 relates to indictments and not summary proceedings, making it inapplicable in the present case.

He also argued that Section 157 concerns convictions where the evidence at trial supports an offence different from the one originally charged and does not authorise prosecutors to simultaneously charge stealing and defrauding by false pretences in respect of the same transactions.

After hearing submissions from both sides, the High Court adjourned the matter to Thursday, July 23, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. for its ruling on the application.