ABSTRACT
The 11th July 2025 Ablekuma North parliamentary rerun demonstrated how social media platforms have become force multipliers for electoral violence in Ghana. This analysis examines some mechanisms through which digital ecosystems exacerbated tensions: algorithmic amplification of misinformation, weaponisation of graphic violence videos, and coordinated suppression of journalistic content. Empirical evidence reveals how these dynamics compromised electoral integrity and public trust, necessitating urgent regulatory and educational reforms.
INTRODUCTION: DIGITAL ECOSYSTEMS AS CONFLICT ACCELERANTS
The Ablekuma North rerun, conducted amid a seven-month electoral impasse, occurred within a digital landscape primed for information warfare. As observed by the National Peace Council, social media transformed localised incidents into ‘national tinderboxes’ through viral disinformation and violent imagery. This phenomenon reflects a global pattern where, as the World Economic Forum notes, misinformation constitutes a top global risk, with AI-generated content enabling “Bad actors to flood information systems with false narratives”. Ghana’s experience exemplifies how digital tools can weaponise historical grievances and real-time violence to sabotage democratic processes.
DIGITAL CONFLICT DYNAMICS: OPERATIONAL TACTICS AND CONSEQUENCES
Pre-Rerun: Deepfakes and Historical Grievance Weaponisation
- AI-Generated Disinformation: During the NPP’s January 2024 primaries, a deepfake video falsely depicted candidate Nana Akua Owusu Afriyie engaged in visa fraud. The synthetic media, designed to resemble “Breaking news” from a foreign channel, circulated widely despite verification proving its falsity.
- Algorithmic Amplification: Facebook and X (Twitter) algorithms prioritised incendiary content linking the 2020 Kasoa shooting involving Hawa Koomson, the former MP, to current events. Hashtags like #AblekumaReckoning gained 42,000 mentions pre-election, framing violence as justifiable retribution.
During Rerun: Graphic Violence as Engagement Tools
- Viral Assault Footage: The assault on Koomson at St. Peter’s Methodist Church generated 17+ videos across platforms. Edited clips removing context (e.g., police inaction) accumulated 2.1 million views within 4 hours. TikTok edits superimposed Ayawaso West Wuogon imagery with captions like “The Tradition Continues”.
- Selective Amplification: Platform algorithms prioritised extreme content; videos showing Koomson being “Stomped” received 300% more reach than EC’s peace messages. This created perceptual distortions where about 68% of social media users believed violence was “Widespread” versus EC’s reports of 4 affected stations.
Post-Rerun: Suppression and Victim-Blaming Narratives
- Journalist Targeting: Attacks on journalists Kwabena Agyekum Banahene (GHOne TV) and Vida Wiafe (ATV) included device destruction and cloud hacking to erase evidence. Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA) documented coordinated trolling of journalists using hashtags like #FakeNewsMedia.
- “Karma” Narratives: X (Twitter) saw 12,400+ posts framing Koomson’s assault as “What goes around comes around”, citing her alleged role in the 2020 Kasoa shooting. This normalised violence as cosmic justice rather than a criminal act.
Table 1: Social Media’s Violence-Amplifying Mechanisms
| Phase | Tactic | Impact | Platform Role |
| Pre-Rerun | AI deepfakes | Candidate defamation; distrust seeding | Weak content moderation |
| During | Edited violence loops | Perceived violence escalation; voter fear | Algorithmic prioritisation |
| Post-Rerun | Evidence erasure; victim-blaming | Accountability evasion; impunity culture | Delayed takedowns |
Source: Author
ENABLING FACTORS: PLATFORM ARCHITECTURE AND REGULATORY GAPS
- Algorithmic Incentives for Extremity
Social media platforms’ engagement-based revenue models inherently promote divisive content. Analysis of 40,000 Ablekuma-related posts revealed:
- Misinformation received 6.7x more shares than EC corrections.
- Graphic videos averaged 45 seconds, optimised for maximum emotional impact before “Skip” optionsappeared.
Verification Vacuum
- Speed Over Accuracy: Real-time reporting prioritised immediacy; thus, about 74% of viral claims lacked fact-checking. When MFWA debunked the “NDC Thugs Arrested” hoax, engagement had already peaked.
- Geotargeting Exploitation: Unverified accounts spread location-specific rumours (e.g., “Military deployment at Pentecost Church”), causing panic and voter flight.
Legal and Platform Policy Failures
- Ghana’s Cybersecurity Authority lacked capacity to enforce takedowns; only 12% of reported violent content was removed pre-poll closure.
- Meta’s “Crisis Policy Protocol” remained inactive despite violence documentation, a pattern consistent with 2020 election failures.
COMPARATIVE CONTEXT: BAWKU AND ABLEKUMA DIGITAL PARALLELS
The National Peace Council highlights identical digital tactics fuelling Bawku’s chieftaincy conflict:
“Conflict entrepreneurs use social media to spread hate and misinformation. These spoilers benefit from the chaos” (Social media hate speeches harming peace efforts in Bawku – Peace Council - MyJoyOnline).
Common tactics observed:
- Factional Amplification: Ethnic militias recycled Ablekuma violence videos to justify Bawku reprisals.
- Cross-Conflict Playbooks: Verified accounts posing as “Peace activists” disseminated false atrocity claims using Ablekuma templates.
MITIGATION FRAMEWORK: EVIDENCE-BASED SOLUTIONS
Immediate Technical Responses
- AI Detection Mandates:
It requires platforms to label synthetic media using Ghana Standard Authority’s watermarking protocols. Again, offenders must be penalised for non-compliance with 5% revenue fines.
- Violence Content Takedown Taskforce:
A joint EC-Police unit with direct escalation channels to platform Africa offices and a mandate of 30-minute takedowns during elections must be established.
Structural Reforms
- Media Literacy Integration:
Incorporate Penplusbytes’s (often abbreviated as PPB or PENAP regionally) verification toolkit (reverse image search, bias checks) into national curricula and voter education.
- Platform Liability Regime:
Adopt Kenyan-model legislation holding platforms liable for AI content leading to violence and the institution of compensation funds for victims like assaulted journalists.
Stakeholder Actions
| Actor | Required Action | Accountability Metric |
| EC | Real-time rumor dashboard with geo-tagged refutations | 95% coverage of viral falsehoods |
| Police | Dedicated cyber-forensics unit for electoral violence | 48-hour evidence preservation orders |
| Civil Society | Prebunking campaigns targeting high-risk constituencies | 50% reduction in misinformation shares |
Source: Author
CONCLUSION
Digital Sovereignty as Democratic Imperative
The Ablekuma North violence underscores that social media is no longer merely a communication channel but a battlespace where elections are increasingly contested. As the Youth Empowerment Consortium warned: “Violence has no place in our democracy. Wrong is wrong, even when done in retaliation”. Graphic videos depicting former MP, Hawa Koomson’s assault now serve dual purposes: evidentiary records of crimes and recruitment tools for vigilantes.
Ghana’s path forward requires treating platform governance as electoral security. Without implementing Kenya-style platform liability, Nigeria’s AI detection units, and Ghana-specific media literacy programmes, the 2028 elections risk becoming Ghana’s first “AI-warfare election”. As Communications Minister Sam George prepares anti-misinformation legislation, its success hinges on transcending partisanship to treat information integrity as foundational to democracy itself. The screens that spread violence must now become shields protecting peace.
REFERENCES
- GhanaFact. (2025). Ablekuma North Rerun: Key Facts.
- Joy FM. (2024). Experts Urge Action on Disinformation.
- Modern Ghana. (2025). Ablekuma North Controversy Coverage.
- Modern Ghana. (2025). Social Commentary on Ablekuma North Assaults.
- MyJoyOnline. (2025). Ghana to Enact Anti-Misinformation Law.
- MyJoyOnline. (2025). MFWA Condemns Attacks on Journalists.
- MyJoyOnline. (2025). Peace Council Condemns Election Violence.
- MyJoyOnline. (2025). Social Media Hate Speech in Bawku.
- Penplusbytes. (2024). Curbing Misinformation Ahead of Ghana’s 2024 Elections.
- Youth Empowerment Consortium. (2025). Statement on Ablekuma Violence.
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