Gen Muhoozi: What His Monarchial Rise Means to the Kingdoms of Buganda, Bunyoro and Toro

On March 20, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni appointed his son Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugabaas Uganda’s army Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), the highest position in the army with full powers of command, control and administration. The development signifies a crucial step in the officer’s career, a move widely perceived to be preparing him for the presidency in Uganda and positioning him for other crucial regional ambitions of his father, pursued since the 1960s when he first youthly engaged in ‘salvation’ struggles.

By assuming full military powers of command and control (C2), Gen Muhoozi has gained maximum authority and direction over all units of the Ugandan military including the intelligence agencies. This entails him to restructure the army into his own vision in order to exercise maximum influence over officers and men as he pursues to accomplish the mission by his father to unify the region (under the old African Chwezi dynasty philosophy) that is today encapsulated within the broad East African Community (EAC) bloc. The new role includes a responsibility to protect and consolidate the liberation achievements so far gained at the political, security and economic levels under the banner of FRONASA—Front for National Salvation Army, an outfit started in 1960s with membership spanning across regional countries in Eastern DRC, Rwanda, northern Tanzania, eastern Kenya and south South Sudan. The reformed political wing of this was launched with pomp and glamour on February 7, 2024 under the name: Patriotic League of Uganda (PLU), cunningly postured as a pressure group. However, PLU emerged from the MK (Muhoozi Kainerugaba) movement that was clearly traversing the country in efforts to politically market Gen Muhoozi’s presidential ambitions. The entire project now combining both military and political wings has been fully green-lighted at the highest levels.

A Bleak Future for Existing Traditional Institutions

The appointment of Gen Muhoozi as overall army chief in Uganda was conjointly done with a reshuffle in the Ugandan cabinet of ministers. A number of Muhoozi’s allies in his political pressure group, the PLU were integrated in the cabinet and also in the army. To save them from the humiliation of saluting a hitherto young officer in terms of service and experience, a number of army officers were redeployed in civilian roles and foreign service dockets as attaches. These include former army chief Gen Wilson Mbasu Mbadi deployed as Minister of State for Trade, Industry and Cooperatives. Among Muhoozi’s political aides appointed as ministers are Balaam Barugahare (State Minister for Children and Youth Affairs) and Lillian Aber (State Minister for Refugees) as well as Phiona Nyamutoro (State Minister for Mineral development).

Going by his father’s experience that started his career by forming a private military and political wing, Muhoozi is being placed to steer this trajectory with a perception that he is inheriting private family estates. The current Uganda Peoples Defense Forces (UPDF) is a by-product of the guerrilla war outfit, the National Resistance Army (NRA) that brought this incumbent government into power 38 years ago, which is a by-product of the FRONASA. With this in mind, it is Muhoozi’s uncle (Rtd) Gen Salim Saleh, real name Caleb Akandwanaho (ranked highly in Fronasa, NRA and UPDF) that assumed the traditional ritual of presiding over the official and ceremonial transfer of army instruments to the heir-apparent Gen Muhoozi. This is despite the availability of actively serving officers who would conventionally perform this responsibility. Historically, Fronasa is pursuing a regional agenda in form of a continuing ‘salvation’ war that seeks to restore the old Chwezi (Kitara) dynasty that was obliterated by the Biito dynasty of Bunyoro from which Buganda, Ankole and Toro kingdoms emerged in the 14^thcentury, about 700 years ago. To this end, all reforms—regular and irregular, conscious and unconscious to implementers have been aligned in the social, economic and security sectors. At the social level, for example, the education sector has undergone several changes including the review of subjects and languages taught or to be taught at primary and secondary levels. The study of history has been revised to start from 1,000 years ago. The essence is to fully capture the Chwezi history and justify ancestral ownership of the lands that today host the traditional institutions of Buganda, Bunyoro and Toro kingdoms. The kingdom of Ankole was not among those restored in the 1990s when the rest reclaimed their status after a 25-year lull that was condemned against them by the first Milton Obote republican administration of mid 1960s. Ankole therefore became the first recaptured kingdom by the remerging Chwezi dynasty. Hence, the ongoing land grabbing and the free-give aways, canopied in foreign-investor incentives is actually happening within the broad strategy of reclaiming the original Chwezi estates that include fertile lands, forest and wetland reserves, water bodies and mineral resources. In all these areas, the military (fronasa elements) have virtually taken over full control and management, hence liberated zones. Thus, appointments like lately of Prof Gilbert Bukenya as presidential advisor on environment are simply public hoodwink gimmicks and can cause no reverse impact whatsoever.

Effects of Swahili Language
In other social transformations, the Swahili language is being officially promoted to become the lingua franca and the language of instruction in schools. This way, while addressing public gatherings, Gen Muhoozi would rather use this language or English than struggle like his father has with local dialects of Luganda, Lusoga, Luo and Runyakitara in general. To him, the future language associated with political authority and economic power is Swahili. Everyone seeking progress at all levels will have to adopt this language willingly or unwillingly. This is how the ‘Ekitibwa kya Buganda kyaava dda’ will erode into permanent oblivion. In its place will re-emerge the dignity of Cwhezi norms and values. Else, what sense does it make singing ‘Ekitibwa’ in Swahili language? Where is the ‘kitibwa’ without land, without economic clout, without political authority and under a totally controlled and limited traditional functionary? For the existing traditional institutions to retain a pinch of significance, the reigning kings and their Katikkiros must (persuasively) demonstrate total cooperation and submission to the emerging new order else princes who fully comply will be helped to takeover—as long as the process cautiously avoids triggering public excitement. This, in brief, is but a tip of the broader implications of the Gen Muhoozi monarchial project to the present-day traditional institutions.

Consequences

The manner in which senior military officers are being shifted in favor of creating space for Gen Muhoozi is causing tension within the army and anxiety among the citizens. This is more apparent among the army veterans led by the Internal Affairs Minister, Gen Kahinda Otafiire, with whom Gen Museveni started the ‘salvation’ war in the 1960s. But Muhoozi, like his father, is sure to exert his authority using the vastly extended military might in the region. Already a number of armed proxies affiliated to Fronasa are present in the regional countries including the M23 in DRC, National Salvation Army (NSA) in South Sudan and an unnamed group in Puntland territory of Somalia.

Conclusion
From the above perspectives, therefore, it’s conclusive that there is generally a lukewarm reception of Mr Museveni’s son as the next president of Uganda. This is evidenced in the movements he has been conducting across the country prior to the new appointment. Hence, he is already facing serious domestic resentments at the social, political, security and economic levels. To navigate these challenges, it will require him to build political and security networks across the region starting with regional refugees in Uganda. Historically, the fronasa outfit emerged from refugee seekers and informed the decision for Uganda today to have one of the most progressive refugee policies in the world. The possibility of using refugees to propel the ‘salvation’ mission in the region is already facilitated by a newly appointed minister for refugees (Ms Aber) who is Muhoozi’s close political ally. The regional recruits will form the branches of Patriotic Leagues (PLs) in their respective countries to eventually turn into a regional political party within the East African Community (EAC). The EAC bloc will soon launch a political confederation for trial purposes to later turn into a full political federation where member countries will cede their sovereign rights to a single regional political administration. Mr Museveni anticipates to at-least partake in the leadership of the initial Confederation stage in the remaining period before 2031 and then use that influence for his son’s regional party, PLU to assume the ultimate regional presidency. Perhaps by then, with Muhoozi closing to 60 years of age, his peer, the Rwandan president’s elder son, Ivan Cyomoro Kagame (a highly decorated army officer) would have successfully formed a sham regional opposition party, for these two entities to permanently dominate the social, political, economic and military stewardship of the EAC bloc. This will mark the completion of the salvation struggle started by Mr Museveni decades ago in which, midway, the Rwandan president, Mr Kagame prominently participated. Very few, if any, today at local, regional and international levels commit deep pondering into this hugely consequential trajectory to facilitate a development of alternative directions.