16.12.2020 Feature Article

Dance Of Dollars And Market Revolts: Whither Nigeria-Ghana Trade Wars

Dance Of Dollars And Market Revolts: Whither Nigeria-Ghana Trade Wars
16.12.2020 LISTEN


Nigeria and Ghana are neighbours and leading Anglophone countries in West Africa. They have shared historical, political and social experiences. For these reasons and more they have had robust relationships. The robustness of these relationships is oftenest superscripted by moments of misunderstandings, misgivings and misdemeanours. One such moment is the current Nigerian traders’ travails and tribulations occasioned by the charge of One Million US Dollar for registration of business by foreigners in Ghana by the Ghana Investment Promotion Act (GIPA). This paper assesses the Nigerian traders’ crisis in Ghana. The paper consents to the sovereign powers of Ghana to initiate public policies that would conduce to her national interests; however, it makes the argument the exercise of such power and policy measures should be tempered by so many other considerations. In the specific case of the GIPA registration fee, it argues that it is financial stupendous and aloof; it negates the ideals of pan-Africanism which both countries subscribes to and serves as the philosophical foundation of their foreign policies; and is contrary to the spirit of African economic integration espoused on the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and African Continental Free Trade Association (AfCFTA) which they are both signatory to. The paper therefore calls for the immediate rapprochement in their rifted relations in the truest spirit and tradition of African solidarity and unity.

Nigeria-Ghana Relations

There have been in recent times growing diplomatic tension and misunderstanding between Nigeria and Ghana. These tensions and misunderstanding are largely built around economic and diplomatic matters. Although the smoke of the economic crisis had been swirling for some times, it is the diplomatic matter of the violation of the diplomatic premises of Nigerian High Commission in Accra that lit the fire. On the heels of the incipiency of a diplomatic debacle between the two countries, a plethora of postulations pullulate to explicate the crisis. A peep through the historical lens shows a phenomenal pattern of the production and reproduction of crisis in the relationships of both countries.

Many reasons have been adduced as the reasons that undergird the cyclicality and phenomenality of perturbation in Nigeria-Ghana relations (Aluko 1976; Otoghile and Obakhedo 2011; Osuntokun 2020). Firstly, is the dissonance in ideological and philosophical perspectives whence both countries sprung to nationhood. In the period of anti-colonialist agitations, Ghana, (then known as Gold Coast), under the intellectual inspiration of Kwame Nkrumah, was ideologically inclined to radical revolutionary political and social change. Nkrumah espoused this much in his nationalist rhetoric and writings. The nationalist vanguard in Nigeria on the other hand moved athwart revolutionary radicalism. For taking this course of action, Kwame Nkrumah and his ideological cohort slammed the charge of conservatism and prevarications on the colonial question against Nigeria.

These differences were fired by salvoes of polemical tirades. Nkrumah, for instance, was levied of possessing a mentality of ideological heroism and political messianism (per Maitama Sule, Akinyemi 1974); and on account of this Nigeria’s Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, dismissed Ghana as geographically infinitesimal, insignificant and unworthy of envy (Aluko 1981). The spleen of this acrimony was vented on the hallowed grounds of the formation of Organisation of African Unity (OAU). It emblematised in Ghana leading the Casablanca Group and Nigeria the Monrovia Group. The former was said to be radical and the latter conservative in their exposition of ideas concerning continental solidarity, pan-Africanism, anti-colonialism and imperialism. Although there has been ideological and philosophical dehydration in the contemporary thinking of both countries, nonetheless, the roots of these differences may have percolated through their psychological veins; and perhaps, recalibrated and shaped the trajectory of their contemporary relationships.

Some other reasons that are likely to have strained Nigeria-Ghana relations are: Ghana and Nigeria are pitted against each other as to which of them should be ascribed as the ideological and political leader of Anglophone West African; Ghana’s support for the Biafran secession (1967-1970); demographic demobilizations eventuating in the expulsion of Nigerians in 1969 and the counter-expulsion of Ghanaians from Nigeria in 1985. Indeed, there have been incidences of expulsion and counter-expulsions between both countries. Broadly, Otoghile and Obakhedo (2011) identified six stages in Nigeria-Ghana relations to wit: period of jealousy and suspicion, 1960-1966; the era of unpredictability, 1966-1975; cooperation and understanding, 1975-1979; discord and cooperation, 1984-1993; the period of consultation, 1994-1999; and the period of intense cooperation and discord, 1999-2010.

The predominant impression oftenest cast is that Nigeria-Ghana relations are embroiled by threads of conflicts. Nothing could be farthest from this impression. Nigeria and Ghana have had robust and friendly political, economic and diplomatic relations. Until recently that Ghana found oil in commercial quantity, Nigeria used to be her main source of oil and on concessional basis with three months grace to pay. And more, the building housing the Ghanaian embassy in Nigeria was built and gifted to Ghana during the regime of Abacha (Osuntokun, 2020). Aremu (2014) has demonstrated how both countries have cooperated in areas as diverse as economy, education, trade, music, language and culture, political and military affairs. Do all these postulations put the lid to the narrative of the phenomenality and cyclicality of crisis in Nigeria-Ghana relations? We chary to answer monosyllabically. It would be trifle misleading to characterise Nigeria-Ghana relations in polar dimensions; it can at best be characterised as bitter-sweet relations, exposed and tossed to and fro by the wind and vicissitude of the vagaries of national interests.

This bitter-sweet relation is tinged with a touch of irony. Or how else would it be explained that the foreign policy of both countries is philosophically and conceptually planted on the soil of pan-Africanism and yet their mutual relations is anything but pan-African. The foreign policy of Ghana as envisioned by Kwame Nkrumah is underscored by the principles of pan-Africanism, nonalignment, anti-colonialism, imperialism and the liberation of Africa. The frontiers of these principles have in the light of contemporary social and political changes undergone conceptual changes to include economic diplomacy, good neighbourliness, promotion of democracy, good governance, international peace and security among many others (Owusu 1994; Gebe 2008). The current Nigerian traders’ travails and tribulations in Ghana, the expulsions and counter-expulsions of nationals of both countries, the incipiency of xenophobia and the untoward posturing of both countries gesture to anti-pan-Africanism and does no end of good to both countries.

The current bone of contention between Nigeria and Ghana centres on the economy. Here again, both countries espouse the doctrine of economic diplomacy as a central pillar of their foreign policies. And yet, the espousal and understanding of economic diplomacy between both countries is conceptually and philosophically incongruous. Or how else is it explainable that both countries cannot mutually tap from their areas of comparative advantage and economies of scale. Since 2007, under the instrument of Ghana Investment Promotion Act (GIPA), there has been growing increase in the amount of money for registering business by foreigners in Ghana. And more, certain categories of trade are barred to foreigners.

Although it is within the sovereign rights of Ghana to legislate on whatsoever matters that may promote and advance their national interests, it has been argued that the amount of money charged for opening of businesses by foreigners is financial stupendous; a shorthand expression of asking foreigners to leave. It goes beyond this point. It is conjectured that, the main target of these increases in registration of business fees is Nigerians on account of their being the largest and predominant expatriate business community in Ghana. Rightly or wrongly, it has been postulated by some commentators that the abbreviated intent of the GIPA act is that Nigerians should exit the Ghanaian economy and society. Else, how would it be surmised that some Nigerians who have met the financial requirements of business registration have had their shops closed down.

It is worthy to note that both countries are aware of the bitter-sweet nature of their bilateral relations. In virtue of this understanding, they have erected bridges of bilateral and diplomatic understanding to enhance their relationship. In April 1989, the Ghana-Nigeria Permanent Joint Commission for Cooperation was established to mediate and enhance the relations of both countries. In a similar vein, in April 1999, the Nigerian Association of Commerce, Industry, Mines and Agriculture (NACCIMA) and its Ghanaian counterpart, the Private Enterprises Foundation (PEF) converged on Lagos to explore common grounds in their business and commercial relations and regional integration. In short, there have been many covert and overt attempts to smoothen the rough edges of the political, economic, diplomatic and social relationships of both countries. The itemisation and exposition of such attempts is immediately beyond the pale of this analysis. But the cyclically frequent perturbation in the relationship of both countries gives an indication that these efforts are yet to attain the desired goal. Our attempt here is to look at the ongoing Nigerian traders’ crisis in Ghana and the attempts made to resolve the crisis.

Nigerian Traders’ Crisis in Ghana: Actions and Reactions

Trade relations between Nigeria and Ghana are quite old. The earliest case of economic relations between both countries is in the area of fishing. The marine and lagoon communities of Lagos have over time played host to well over three thousand Ghanaian migrant fishermen. A number of factors account for the surge of these fishermen. In his comment on the factors responsible for the large presence of Ghanaian migrant fishermen in Nigeria, Aremu (2014, p:25) posited thusly, ‘economic related factors such as the seasonal migration of commercial fish species; the availability of more fish species with bigger sizes in Nigeria than in Ghana, including shark, croakers, sardine, shiny nose, and bonga; the appeal of a larger market for fish due to the country’s large population; and very good networks between the old and new migrants. Reports of good catches throughout the year and reasonable returns from fishing activities which were usually heard by Ghanaians back home indeed stimulated more migrations into Nigeria on yearly basis.’ Beyond fishing, the artisanal sub-sector of the informal economy is heavily populated with Ghanaians.

Until recently that oil was found in large quantity in Ghana, her oil and gas needs were provided for by Nigeria on very favourable terms. Oil was supplied to Ghana on concessionary terms with three months payment grace. Both countries are involved in diverse economic and commercial relations. But on the whole, the balance of trade between both countries weighs in favour of Nigeria; with Nigeria dealing more in the oil and services sector, while Ghana predominates in the export of manufactured goods to Nigeria. Nigeria-Ghana economic relations have been smoothened over the years by the Nigeria-Ghana Joint Commission for Cooperation and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) protocols on trade and economic relations. The ongoing misunderstanding in Nigeria-Ghana traders’ altercations is a first of its kind in their economic relations. What could have given rise to the crisis?

Officially speaking, the major reason that has been postulated by the Ghanaian authorities for the closure of Nigerian traders’ shops is their inability to pay the requisite registration fees for foreigners trading in Ghana. There has been a progressive increase in the amount of fees payable by foreigners doing business in Ghana since 2007. Commenting on the business registration fees and the fate of Nigerian traders in Ghana, Uwah (2020, p.31) postulates that ‘the peril of Nigerian traders in Ghana dates back to 2007 when Ghana apparently moved to protect Ghanaian traders against the keen contest in their land by the more resourceful Nigerian traders. Ghana enacting a law that makes it mandatory for “foreign traders” to pay a levy of $1 million before they could open their shops. Nigerian traders were the actual target of the law. The levy imposed by Ghana on Nigerian traders is N470 million today. It is enough to build and stock a supermarket on three plots of land.’

The Ghanaian authorities have consistently in their comments on the matter refused to bring Nigerian traders into the picture. Their position is that the GIPC Act in Section 27 (2&3) relate solely to persons who are not citizens of Ghana but want to engage in retail trade or trading activities, which are otherwise restricted to Ghanaians. In his comments on the controversy, Ghana’s Minister of Information, Mr. Kojo Oppong, stated that according to the Act (Aleke 2020: p.23) ‘… a person who is not a citizen may engage in a trading enterprise if that person invests in the enterprise, not less than one million United States Dollars in cash or goods and services relevant to the investments. Trading includes purchasing and selling of imported goods and services. The amount does not relate to the broad universe of investors.’ The difference between his postulation and complaint of Nigerian traders has been dubbed as mere linguistic gymnastics; a craft in diplomatese. What, for instance, is the difference between trading in imported goods and services and broad ‘universe of investor?’

The official reason apart, Nigerian governmental policies in recent times and especially as they affect the health of the Ghanaian economy seems to be a major underlining factor in the trade imbroglio. This assertion is corroborated by what could pass as Freudian slip of the Ghanaian Minister of Information, Mr. Kojo Oppong Nkrumah, in his response to a press release issued by his Nigerian counterpart, Lai Mohammed, on the Nigerian traders’ crisis in Ghana. According to him (Aleke 2020c, p.23) ‘the federal republic, on the other hand, is on record to have taken a number of steps in recent months, in pursuit of her national interests, which have gravely affected other countries in the region. These include the closure of Nigeria’s Seme Krake border from August 2019 to date and the issuance of executive orders by Nigeria’s presidency, preventing foreigners from getting jobs which Nigerians can do, to mention but a few.’

One possible reason for the commercial commotion between the Nigerian traders, Ghanaian traders and Ghanaian authorities is the imagined threat that Nigerian traders pose to Ghanaian traders. There is a massive demographic surge of Nigerian traders in Ghana with concomitant capital and trading skills that dwarfs those of the host traders. This is what Uwah (2020, p.31) meant by ‘keen contest in their land by the more resourceful Nigerian traders.’ The fear is that if the competition posed to Ghanaian traders by Nigerian counterparts is not nipped in the bud, sooner than later, Nigerians would take over the Ghanaian trading and commercial space leaving the host to be scavengers in their country.

The chairman of Nigerians in Diaspora Commission (NiDCOM), Abike Dabiri-Erewa, gives vent to this point in her postulation that at the centre of the maltreatment in Ghana is not due to the economic policies of the federal government of Nigeria that have negative impact on the Ghanaian economy. Rather the reason is simply that Ghanaian traders cannot compete Nigerian traders in the commercial space; were this not the case, she avers, Nigerian banks operating in Ghana would have since wound up. As she puts it (Abike 2020; p.4) ‘we are talking of people that have been living in your country, working very well for years. Now, I’ll ask you something; if it has to do with the borders, why didn’t they send away the big industries in Ghana; we have six banks in Ghana. Why didn’t they tell them to leave, if they are afraid of border closure? There is the gas pipeline going to Ghana, why don’t you cut it off?’ Although this point is submerged in the flood of diplomatic niceties and psychological fortitude, its potency and validity, its empiricism and realism, is apparent and palpable.

Although the two major reasons for charging $1m dollars on Nigerian traders in Ghana can hardly be far from recent economic policies taken by the federal government and the competition posed by Nigerian traders to their Ghanaian counterparts, the Ghanaian authorities have consistently been mute on these points. Indeed, in the public space, top Ghanaian officials are wont to make light of the imbroglio and make promises of a light at the end of the tunnel. It is in this sense that the Ghanaian Minister of Information sounded conciliatory thusly, ‘Ghana and other West African countries continue to believe redress to even actions like these can be sought, diplomatically without resorting to media statements and related activities that have the potential to aggravate further the situation’ (Aleke 2020b, p.23); and further reprimanded Nigeria’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Onyema Ugochukwu, for his tweets which he says puts Ghana in negative light.

Whatever trajectory of thought may truly encapsulates the underlining causes of the crisis, the one ineradicable point is that it has been a source of concern to both countries and on account of that shuttle diplomacies have been carried out to put paid to the menace. There have been both presidential and legislative levels mediations into the crisis. For instance, President Muhammadu Buhari at the sidelines during the United Nations General Assembly in 2017 met his Ghanaian counterpart where they discussed the issue. At the end, the Ghanaian president promised that Nigerians shop would be opened. The shops were opened as promised, but sooner than later, the shops were closed again. Referencing this point, Abike (2020; p.4) averred that, ‘this thing has been on for years. In New York, three years ago, Mr. President took up with the Ghanaian President, and he gave an assurance that they are sorry about it and will open the shops. Then they opened and closed again, to their whims and caprices. I’m sure you will agree with me that we can’t continue like this.’

At the legislative level, the Speaker of Nigeria’s House of Representatives, Femi Gbajabiamila, received presidential assent to embark on parliamentary diplomacy to Ghana with the view of resolving the crisis. The Speaker met with the Nigerian community in Ghana, his Ghanaian counterpart and the President of Ghana; whereupon the knotty issues surrounding the crisis were tabled and discussed. Essentially the shuttle by the Speaker was a continuation of the diplomatic efforts to end the crisis through evolving parliamentary and inter-parliamentary measures such as putting in place legislations and their subsequent domestication across the national frontiers of both countries (Alkassim 2020; Krishi 2020; Olaniyi 2020). Nothing materially tangible has been achieved from these shuttle diplomacies; to the contrary, it appears the crisis may have taken a turn for the worse with Nigerian traders calling for their evacuation from Ghana (Salau 2020; Jimoh 2020).

Restoring Amity: What is to be done?

As seemly insufferably insuperable that the Nigeria-Ghana traders’ squabbles is, the wholesale evacuation of Nigerian traders in Ghana is extreme, unadvisable and would do no end of good to the bilateral relations of both countries. Evacuation, oftenest is the last resort in cases of breakdown of civil order and threat to life and property. In this instance, the situation has not degenerated to that point; there are still windows of opportunities to be exploited. One fundamental area that both countries can look towards is to their natal roots as Africans. In this sense, they should invoke the ideology of pan-Africanism to break through the artificiality of the ramparts of colonial cartography that puts a wedge in between the racial bounds of the peoples of Africans. The feud should be imagined as a manifestation of the erosion of the spirit of African brotherhood that the colonial enterprise inspired in Africa; and that besides, there are familial relations and other social capital variables that binds nationals of both countries (Osuntokun 2020; Utume 2020).

Expounding on the pan-Africanism elements of the crisis, Utume (2020, p.34) sees the modern state as bequeathed to Africans as a major source of alienation and destroyer of community life. Rather than integrate and instil a sense of brotherhood amongst Africans it amplifies national differences and a false sense of competition. As he argues (Utume 2020, p.34) ‘I believe in pan- Africanism and African perspective as being capable of espousing viewpoints that aim at the ultimate emancipation of not just Africans, but the entire human race. Therefore, my opinion regarding the misunderstanding is that the problem arises from what yields from the post- colonial society of Africa (sic). To operate the state forms that colonialism bequeathed to Africa which have now alienated us from our community life cannot but lead to such crises. With that state form, we have uncritically accepted the notions of citizenship and sovereignty, which are exclusionary concepts.’ As the world increasingly becomes globalized, the imperative of exploring specific local experiences, that is, glocalization, cannot be gainsaid. Pan-Africanism as an organizing principle of racial solidarity lends itself as a conciliatory ideology in addressing intra-African palavers.

Another veritable platform of addressing the crisis is to seek recourse to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States came into effect on May 28th-1975 with the core objective to ‘promote co-operation and development in all fields of industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions and in social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its peoples, of increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer relations among its members and of contributing to the progress and development of the African continent.’ In Article 27 (1) of the Treaty, it expressly states that ‘citizens of Member states shall be regarded as Community citizens and accordingly member states undertake to abolish all obstacles to their freedom of movement and residence within the Community.’ Article 27 (2) states that Member States shall by agreements with each other exempt Community citizens from holding visitors’ visas and residence permits and allow them to work and undertake commercial and industrial activities within their territories’(Akinyemi et al, 1983).

In furtherance of the pursuit of the noble agenda of the establishment ECOWAS, the member states in May 1979 enacted the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment of West African citizens. Specifically Article 2 and 3 of the Protocol empowers ECOWAS citizens or citizens of the Community the right to free entry and exit, employment, participation and cultural activities. The spirit and letters of both the ECOWAS treaty and Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons and Residence are contrary to the anti-Nigerian traders’ posture of Ghana. As veritably formidable as ECOWAS option is, Nigeria has not explored it as a measure of resolving the intractable trade conflict. The reasons for not exploring the ECOWAS window are not immediately decipherable; but whatever the reasons may turn out to be, the option in the circumstances is formidable and chimes with the spirit of multilateralism as a diplomatic framework of mediation and conflict resolution.

The negation of the ECOWAS agency as a strategy for resolving the trade conflict according to Saleh (2020, p.34) is a manifestation of ‘poverty of diplomacy at the highest level.’ To reverse this lapse into diplomatic poverty, he makes the case for Nigeria to approach ECOWAS as a regional multilateral agency to intervene in the dispute. As he notes (Saleh 2020, p.34) ‘Nigerian policy makers are to be blamed for not properly articulating her national interest in her dealings with her West African neighbours; Africa and the larger world. Unless we do that we will continue to be at the receiving end. Nigerian state has failed to protect the life of its citizens abroad, not only in Ghana but South Africa, Indonesia, Malaysia, Britain etc.’

In a similar vein, at the African continental level and pursuant to the agenda of regional economic integration, Nigeria should also explore the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) option. The AfCFTA was adopted in 2012 and it is expected to come into full force in January 1st, 2021 with the core objective of creating a ‘single continental market for goods and services with free movement of business persons and investment, thus pave the way for accelerating the establishment of the continental customs union and the African Customs Union’ (Pine 2017, p.6). The anti-trade policies of Ghana run athwart the vision of the AfCFTA; exploring the mechanism of AfCFTA is a formidable strategy for resolving the lingering Nigeria-Ghana trade conflict. In the event it would do immense end of good to African economic integration.

It is also worthy to point out that the leadership of both countries lack the political will of resolving the conflict. While Ghana under Nana Akufo-Addo is indifferent to Nigeria-Ghana relations, Nigeria’s Muhammadu Buhari has not pursued the Nigeria-Ghana trade dispute with the seriousness it deserves. Commenting on the nature of the current Ghana’s leadership posture to Nigeria, Osuntokun (2020, p.) notes as follows, ‘Nana Akufo-Addo unlike the previous governments of John Dramani Mahama (2012-2017) and John Kufuor (2001-2009) has not been friendly to Nigeria. As soon as he got to office, he went to Oxford to give a lecture and implied that Ghanaians would develop their country by hard work and the ingenuity of its people unlike Nigeria which used to throw money around in the past. He brought back the hostility between the two countries which used to stretch to the field of sports particularly football in the 1960s’

On the issue of the incuriousness and lackluster in the pursuit of the Nigerian traders’ plight in Ghana, Akinterinwa (2020a; 2020b) attributes it to the lack of dynamism, vibrancy and proactivity exhibited by the foreign policy vision of the Buhari administration. He contends thusly, (Akinterinwa, 2020a, p.23) ‘without any iota of gainsaying, foreign policy under PMB has been most reckless and unpatriotic. It is too reactive and lacks focus.’ Commenting specifically on the Nigeria-Ghana trade conflicts he notes that, ‘the plight of Nigerians in Ghana is another major reflection of foreign policy lackluster in which agreements are done without follow-up and in which sufferings of Nigerians are always rhetorically sacrificed on the altar of sustaining bilateral relationship….Nigeria’s Minister of Foreign Affairs has a standard reply to every mistreatment of Nigerians or when Nigeria’s national interest is assaulted: expression of concern, readiness to be seized with the problem, summoning the ambassador of the aggressor country, and avoiding deterioration of good ties, but all of which have always been to no avail.’

In fact, the place of political will in the arbitration and management of international relations can hardly be stressed enough. In view of this, it is advised that the political leadership of the two countries should rise up to the demands of the situation by summoning the deserved political will and energy to address this festering trade dispute between Nigerian and Ghanaian traders on the one hand, and the Ghanaian authorities and Nigerian traders on the other hand. In trying to resolve the conflict no measure and strategy should be spared, the principles embedded in Nigeria-Ghana Joint Commission should be adequately explored to promote good diplomatic, political, social, industrial, economic and commercial relations of both countries. It is in so doing that the ideology of African economic integration embedded in ECOWAS, AfCFTA, and the promotion of African brotherhood, pan-Africanism and the founding ideals of African Union (AU) and global peace and solidarity can be achieved.


Nigeria and Ghana are the leading Anglophone countries in the West African region. Relations between both countries have vacillated between sweet and bitter moments. In extreme situations, both countries have expelled nationals of each other out of their territorial enclaves. Paradoxically, the foreign policies of both countries profess African racial solidarity and pan-Africanism; and are both founding members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and have recently acceded to the treaty establishing African Continental Free Trade Association (AfCFTA), all multilateral mechanisms that are geared towards African regional economic integration. The current crisis between both countries is the issue of the payment of one million dollars business registration levy by foreign traders in Ghana. The shops of Nigerian traders doing business in Ghana have been locked by Ghanaian authorities even in cases where some have paid the registration fees. Nigerian traders in Ghana view this policy as deliberating targeting Nigerians.

This trade dispute is a major bone of contention in the relations between both countries currently. It has generated a lot of heat, evoked passions and threatening their diplomatic relations. This paper has assessed the trade dispute and suggested some measures that could address the issues in dispute and consequently restore good neighbourly relations between both countries. Some of the suggested measures are a.) invoking the principles of pan-Africanism; b.) reporting the matter to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), c.) exploring the negotiation mechanism embedded in the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) treaty which is to come into effect on Ist January 2021, and, d.) the need for the leadership of both countries to muster the political will, energy and courage to decisively and firmly address the trade conflict. In the event, it is not only envisaged that the resolution would bring amity in their bilateral relations, but incentivize regional integration, promote the spirit of racial solidarity, pan-Africanism, and global peace.


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