
The ongoing visit of the Quintet to Khartoum should be understood not merely as another diplomatic engagement, but as an opportunity to place the Sudanese-led solution at the centre of all regional and international efforts.
One of the most dangerous ways of interpreting regional and international positions on the Sudanese crisis is to turn the multiplicity of initiatives into a competition between the “Quintet” and the “Quartet,” as though the essence of the crisis lies in the question of which initiative should prevail.
The best path and the most appropriate initiative, therefore, is the one that places decisions concerning Sudan’s future in the hands of the Sudanese themselves and opens the door to an inclusive national dialogue that is not based on political exclusion or marginalisation.
It is precisely in this context that the recent developments acquire significance beyond mere coordination between one international group and another.
The welcome expressed by the African Union Commission for the launch of a Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue initiative inside Sudan, under the supervision of an independent committee of Sudanese elders and prominent national figures, represents an important development in the approach to the crisis.
More importantly, the African Union has linked this initiative to preserving Sudan’s unity and national institutions and to working towards building a democratic state.
This position did not come in isolation. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), in its previous positions, welcomed the idea of an inclusive Sudanese dialogue and a Sudanese-owned process.
The Great Lakes region organisation went a step further when, on 3 September, it welcomed the Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue initiative, describing it as an important step towards strengthening dialogue, rebuilding confidence and creating a conducive environment for peace.
More importantly. it also affirmed that sustainable peace can only be achieved through an inclusive political process led by the Sudanese themselves and taking into account the aspirations and interests of the Sudanese people.
This development should not be interpreted as a victory for one international axis over another. Rather, it should be seen as a correction of the methodology.
Sudan does not need to import a ready-made political formula, nor to recycle the same elites and political forces in every external forum, nor to allow foreign capitals to become rooms where political settlements are designed and then presented to the Sudanese for approval.
The requirement is precisely the opposite: regional and international initiatives should help the Sudanese reaching a single table, rather than replace them at that table.
Accordingly, the benchmark for assessing any initiative should not be the name of the country behind it, the number of countries participating in it, or the degree of media attention it receives. The real benchmark should be its adherence to three fundamental principles:
First: Sudanese ownership of the decision:
The Sudanese themselves must be the ultimate decision-makers in determining the future of their state, their political system, and the form of political transition they wish to pursue.
Second: Inclusiveness of the dialogue;
The dialogue must be open to political, civil and community forces that accept a peaceful solution, without prior political exclusion or predetermined lists of those to be excluded. Political exclusion does not create sustainable peace; rather, it merely postpones the conflict to another stage.
Third, and most importantly: the primacy of Sudan’s unity and national institutions.
Any settlement that fails to preserve Sudan’s unity and sovereignty, territorial integrity and national institutions will remain no more than a temporary political truce, regardless of how appealing or sophisticated its language may be.
If coordination among international and regional initiatives is necessary, such coordination should serve a unified Sudanese-owned process, rather than create yet another external track competing with Sudanese initiatives.
The experience of the war has demonstrated that the proliferation of external platforms, when they become a substitute for national dialogue, can create an ideal environment for political manoeuvring, mutual accusations, the wasting of time, and the pursuit of settlements that satisfy mediators more than they address the underlying roots of Sudan’s crisis.
Fortunately, external interventions themselves are increasingly coming under international scrutiny.
In this regard, the latest report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan clearly exposes the sinister external networks providing weapons, logistics and training to inflame conflict.
The said report heavily implicated the UAE, explicitly details how the UAE serves as the primary external hub for supplying the paramilitary RSF militia.
The report of UN investigators further uncover networks involving UAE-based recruitment firms funding and deploying foreign military contractors, specifically Colombian mercenaries known as the "Desert Wolves," to operate advanced drone systems for the RSF militia.
This further strengthens the argument that what is needed is support for peace, not the internationalisation of Sudan’s decision-making.
Again, peace cannot be imposed on Sudan from outside, just as a stable state cannot be built by excluding a segment of the Sudanese people from the political process.
Therefore, the growing African and regional support for Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue should be welcomed—not as a victory for one Sudanese party over another, but as a victory for the principle that Sudan belongs to the Sudanese, and that any sustainable political solution must be Sudanese in substance, regional in support, and international in backing.
To make long story short, the formula around which all initiatives should converge: external support, not tutelage;
mediation, not political guardianship;
facilitation, not imposition;
and Sudanese dialogue, not an imported settlement.



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