There is a difference between holding GoldBod accountable and hoping GoldBod fails

Ghana’s economic story has changed dramatically over the past one and half year, and one of the most important developments has been the remarkable turnaround of the Ghanaian cedi.

After years of persistent depreciation, foreign-exchange shortages and declining confidence in the domestic currency, Ghana has experienced a significant strengthening of the cedi. The turnaround cannot be attributed to one institution or one policy alone. Fiscal consolidation, monetary policy, improved investor confidence, stronger reserves and the IMF-supported economic programme have all played important roles.

But one policy deserves particular attention: the Ghana Gold Board, GoldBod.

GoldBod has fundamentally changed the way Ghana approaches one of its most valuable natural resources. Instead of allowing significant foreign-exchange value generated from gold to leak through fragmented and informal trading channels, the new architecture seeks to centralise the purchase, aggregation and export of gold while ensuring that the resulting foreign exchange supports the domestic financial system.

That matters enormously for a country whose currency has historically been vulnerable to foreign-exchange pressures.

The Bank of Ghana has publicly credited GoldBod with helping to rebuild Ghana’s reserves. Governor Dr Johnson Asiama said in October 2025 that GoldBod had helped bring billions of dollars into the system and contributed to rebuilding reserves to around four and a half months of import cover.

By the end of 2025, Ghana’s international reserves had risen substantially, while the cedi recorded one of its strongest performances in years. GoldBod itself reported that reserves increased from approximately US$8.9 billion to US$13.8 billion by December 2025, while the cedi appreciated by more than 40 percent during the year.

These are not small numbers.
They represent a significant improvement in the country’s external position.

Gold is Ghana’s comparative advantage. The genius of the GoldBod concept is therefore not necessarily the discovery of a new resource, but the attempt to capture more of the foreign-exchange value already being generated by a resource Ghana has possessed for centuries.

And this is where credit must be given where it is due.

President John Dramani Mahama deserves credit for putting gold at the centre of the government’s economic-reset strategy and supporting the institutional architecture that produced Ghana Gold Board - GoldBod.

Finance Minister Dr Cassiel Ato Forson deserves credit for helping translate that political direction into fiscal and foreign-exchange policy, including the broader strategy of using Ghana’s gold production to strengthen reserves and reduce pressure on the cedi.

Governor Johnson Asiama and the Bank of Ghana deserve credit for implementing the monetary and reserve-management side of the strategy. Gold accumulation and foreign-exchange management cannot work without a central bank capable of converting those flows into stronger external buffers.

And Sammy Gyamfi as Chief Executive Officer of GoldBod, deserves credit for leading the institution during its formative period, building the operational machinery and aggressively positioning GoldBod as a central player in Ghana’s gold economy.

None of these individuals should receive all the credit.

But neither should any of them be denied credit.

The results are visible.
Ghana’s gold reserves have risen. Foreign-exchange buffers have strengthened. Gold exports have become a much more deliberate component of reserve accumulation. GoldBod has also become an important mechanism for bringing gold transactions into a more formal and traceable system.

The policy is therefore bigger than GoldBod’s profit or loss.

Its strategic significance lies in the relationship between gold, foreign exchange, reserves and the cedi.

This is precisely why the political reaction surrounding GoldBod deserves scrutiny.

The Minority, led by Alexander Afenyo-Markin, has raised unfounded questions about GoldBod, including concerns over the Gold-for-Reserves programme, its financial implications and its wider institutional responsibilities. Those questions, though unfounded should not be dismissed. Parliament has a legitimate responsibility to scrutinise every public institution, especially one operating with billions of cedis and foreign exchange.

But there is another dimension to the increasingly aggressive political contest over GoldBod.

One cannot ignore the political incentive surrounding the policy.

If GoldBod succeeds, if Ghana continues accumulating reserves, if the cedi remains stable, if gold revenues increasingly remain within the formal economy, if foreign-exchange leakages are reduced and if these gains translate into lower inflation, stronger investment and improved living standards, the political consequences could be significant.

That prospect will naturally worry an opposition party seeking to return to power.

The NPP therefore has every right to scrutinise GoldBod. But scrutiny should not become an attempt to undermine a policy simply because its success could strengthen the political fortunes of the government that introduced it.

There is a difference between holding GoldBod accountable and hoping GoldBod fails.

The former is the constitutional responsibility of an opposition Parliamentarian.

The latter would be an unfortunate prioritisation of electoral calculations over national economic interest.

If the NPP believes GoldBod is fundamentally flawed, it should present the evidence, propose alternatives and demonstrate how its own approach would produce better results.

Ghanaians are capable of making the judgment.

Indeed, if GoldBod succeeds, the NPP’s political problem should not be GoldBod. Its problem should be convincing Ghanaians that it has a superior economic programme.

That is how democracy should work.
The government should also resist the temptation to present every improvement in the economy as the exclusive achievement of GoldBod. That would be just as intellectually dishonest as attributing every difficulty to GoldBod.

The cedi’s recovery is the product of multiple forces: improved fiscal management, monetary-policy credibility, declining inflation, reserve accumulation, gold inflows, investor confidence and the broader IMF-supported adjustment programme. Cutting down waste, reducing unnecessary expenditure and being more disciplined are key factors to improving economic performance.

GoldBod is an important part of that equation—not the entire equation.

There is also an important warning.
GoldBod must not become politically untouchable simply because its objectives are popular and clearly defined.

The Bank of Ghana’s financial statements and IMF reviews have raised legitimate concerns about losses associated with gold-purchasing arrangements. Those concerns must be transparently addressed. A stronger cedi cannot be purchased at any cost, and reserve accumulation must be economically sustainable.

The real test, therefore, is whether GoldBod can evolve from an emergency foreign-exchange intervention mechanism into a financially sustainable national institution.

That requires transparency.
It requires Parliament to scrutinise GoldBod without politicising every question.

It requires the government to publish clear reconciliations between GoldBod, the Bank of Ghana and the national budget.

And it requires the opposition to distinguish between legitimate accountability and political opportunism.

For once, Ghana may be witnessing something unusual in its economic history: a natural resource is being deliberately placed at the centre of a strategy to strengthen the national currency and external reserves.

That experiment deserves scrutiny.
But it also deserves a fair chance to succeed.

President Mahama deserves credit for the political decision. The Finance Minister deserves credit for the fiscal architecture. The Governor deserves credit for the monetary and reserve-management execution. The GoldBod CEO and his team deserve credit for operationalising the institution.

And ultimately, if the policy succeeds, the biggest beneficiary should not be the NDC. It should be Ghana.

That is the point political actors on both sides must remember.

A stronger cedi does not belong to Mahama.
Higher reserves do not belong to GoldBod.
Lower inflation does not belong to the NDC.
And economic prosperity does not belong to the NPP or NDC.

They belong to the Ghanaian people.
If GoldBod succeeds in helping Ghana retain more value from its gold, strengthen its reserves and support a stable currency, every government—present and future—should be able to build on that success.

The opposition should therefore not fear GoldBod’s success.

It should compete with it.
Because if GoldBod succeeds and Ghana prospers, the ultimate winner will not be Mahama, Ato Forson, Asiama or Sammy Gyamfi.

The ultimate winner will be Ghana.
#GoldBod #EconomicGrowth #StrongerCedi #Accountability #KWP