The Sahara Pipeline: Can Africa Finally Build the Gas Route That Keeps Europe Warm?

Let me start with a number that should make every energy executive and European policymaker pay attention. Thirty billion cubic metres. That is how much natural gas the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline could deliver to Europe every year if it is ever completed. That is about 10 to 15 percent of what Europe used to import from Russia before the invasion of Ukraine. And after decades of delays, false starts, and broken promises, construction has actually begun on the Algerian section. That is not a study. That is not a memorandum of understanding. That is ground being broken. For one of Africa's largest planned energy infrastructure projects, the moment is significant. The question is whether the momentum can be sustained across three countries, through one of the most unstable regions on the continent, and into a European market that is simultaneously desperate for gas and committed to ending its dependence on fossil fuels.

Let me walk you through the project, the politics, and the probability of success reported by Accra Street Journal

The pipeline is designed to stretch 4,128 kilometres from Warri in southern Nigeria to Algeria's Hassi R'Mel gas hub, passing through Niger. From Hassi R'Mel, the gas can be moved through Algeria's extensive existing pipeline network to Mediterranean export terminals and onward to Europe. Algeria already supplies about 12 percent of the European Union's gas imports. It has the infrastructure. It has the experience. What it needs is more gas. Nigeria has the gas. The country has proven reserves of over 200 trillion cubic feet, but it has struggled to monetise them due to lack of infrastructure, investment, and security. Niger is the transit country. It has no significant gas reserves of its own, but it sits between two gas-rich neighbours. Its interest is transit fees and the economic development that a major infrastructure project could bring.

The construction that has begun is on the Algerian section. It will run about 1,210 kilometres from the border with Niger to Aoulef in southern Algeria, connecting with existing infrastructure to Hassi R'Mel. Algeria has the technical capability and the financial resources, though it will likely seek external financing. The security situation in Algeria is relatively stable, though the southern regions have experienced some instability.

Niger's commitment is the critical variable. The country has said it expects to begin work on its 720-kilometre section in early 2027. That is a timeline. But Niger is also one of the poorest countries in the world, and it is ruled by a military junta that seized power in July 2023. The country has experienced coups, sanctions, and a deteriorating security situation. The pipeline will pass through the Sahel, an area that has become the epicentre of jihadist insurgency. Protecting a 720-kilometre pipeline through that terrain is not a small challenge. It is a military operation.

Nigeria's section is the longest and most complex. The pipeline will start in Warri, in the Niger Delta, a region that has experienced oil theft, pipeline vandalism, and community unrest for decades. Nigeria has struggled to maintain existing pipelines, let alone build new ones. The government has promised to provide security, but its track record is not encouraging.

The European demand driver is powerful. The European Union has committed to ending its reliance on Russian gas. Liquefied natural gas imports are supposed to stop by December 31, 2026. Pipeline gas imports from Russia are supposed to stop by September 30, 2027. That creates an urgent need for alternative supplies. The Trans-Saharan pipeline, if completed, could provide up to 30 billion cubic metres annually. The timeline, however, is a problem. Construction has only just begun on the Algerian section. Niger expects to start in 2027. The pipeline will not be completed until the early 2030s at the earliest. By then, Europe may have already found other sources, including LNG from the United States, Qatar, and Australia, and pipeline gas from Norway, Azerbaijan, and other suppliers.

The competition with the proposed Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline is also worth noting. That route would follow the Atlantic coast, connecting several West African countries before reaching Morocco and potentially Europe. It is longer and more expensive, but it has stronger regional integration benefits, connecting multiple countries that desperately need energy. The Trans-Saharan route is shorter and cheaper, but it passes through the Sahel, which is unstable. The two projects are competing for the same gas and the same European market. Only one is likely to be built.

The financing challenge is substantial. The estimated cost of the pipeline is in the billions of dollars. The African Development Bank has expressed interest. European financial institutions may provide funding, given Europe's interest in diversifying gas supply. Private investors will require guarantees, given the political and security risks. The three governments will need to provide sovereign guarantees, which may be difficult for Niger, which is under sanctions and has a poor credit rating.

The security challenge is perhaps the most intractable. The pipeline will pass through the Sahel, which has experienced coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, and a persistent insurgency by groups affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. These groups have attacked pipelines in the region before. The pipeline will be a target. The governments must deploy security forces to protect it, but those forces are already stretched thin fighting insurgencies. International partners may provide security assistance, but that is not guaranteed.

Algerian Energy and Mines Minister Mohamed Arkab described the pipeline as a driver of economic and social development, a source of wealth and employment, and a tool for strengthening African energy integration. That is the official line. It is not wrong, but it is incomplete. The pipeline will create jobs during construction, but those jobs are temporary. It will generate transit fees for Niger, but those fees depend on gas flows and prices. It will strengthen African energy integration, but integration also requires that African countries can afford to buy the gas, not just transit it.

Niger's Petroleum Minister Hamadou Tini described the pipeline as a historic undertaking that would have a significant economic and social impact on communities along the pipeline route. That is the hope. The reality is that major infrastructure projects in Africa have often promised more than they delivered. Communities along the route have legitimate concerns about land acquisition, environmental impact, and benefit sharing. If those concerns are not addressed, the pipeline could face local opposition that delays or derails the project.

For Nigeria, the pipeline provides a new export route. The country has vast gas reserves but has struggled to monetise them. The pipeline could generate billions in export revenue. It would also reduce flaring, the burning of natural gas that has caused environmental damage in the Niger Delta. But Nigeria must also address its domestic gas challenges. The country suffers from chronic power shortages, partly because gas is not reliably supplied to power plants. Exporting more gas without addressing domestic needs would be a policy failure.

For Niger, the pipeline could be transformative. The country is one of the poorest in the world. Transit fees could provide a significant source of revenue. But Niger is also a transit country for migrants and contraband. The pipeline could attract investment in other sectors, but only if the security situation stabilises.

For Algeria, the pipeline reinforces its position as a major gas supplier to Europe. The country already has the infrastructure. The pipeline will increase utilisation. Algeria also gains politically, as Europe becomes more dependent on its gas. But Algeria has its own domestic challenges, including economic stagnation and political fragility.

For European energy security, the pipeline provides diversification. Europe is reducing dependence on Russia. New sources are needed. But the pipeline will not be completed by the 2027 deadline. Europe will need interim solutions, including LNG from the United States, Qatar, and other suppliers. The pipeline may be a long-term solution, but it is not a short-term fix.

The global gas market is also changing. The International Energy Agency projects that gas demand may peak by 2030 and then decline as the energy transition accelerates. European climate policies are ambitious. By the time the pipeline is completed in the early 2030s, European gas demand may be falling. The pipeline's economics depend on gas prices staying high enough to justify the investment. That is not guaranteed.

The Trans-Saharan pipeline is a bold project. The start of construction on the Algerian section is a significant milestone. But significant challenges remain. Financing, security, and the completion of Niger's section are all uncertain. The project is not yet a certainty. The governments and their partners must sustain momentum. They must also be realistic about the timeline. This pipeline will not solve Europe's immediate gas crisis. It may, however, be part of the long-term solution. The Sahara is vast. The pipeline is long. The challenges are many. But for the first time in decades, ground has been broken. That is progress. The question is whether it will be sustained. The answer is not yet written. But the stakes are high. For African energy integration, for European energy security, and for the communities along the route, the pipeline matters. Let us hope it is built. And let us hope it delivers the benefits that have been promised. Because broken promises are not just disappointing. They are expensive. And Africa has had enough of those.

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Source Used: Accra Street Journal