body-container-line-1

Why Election Disinformation Wins in Local Languages and Loses in English - From Ghana 2024 to the World

Why Election Disinformation Wins in Local Languages and Loses in English - From Ghana 2024 to the World

Accra - During Ghana's 2024 election, the most dangerous lie was not on television. It was not in a newspaper. It was not in English.

It was in a voice note in Twi, forwarded on WhatsApp at 9pm. In Ewe, shared in a church group. In Ga, played aloud in a market in Accra.

One voice note claimed the Electoral Commission had already printed ballot papers with a thumbprint for one party. Another claimed soldiers would be at polling stations to arrest voters from a particular region. A third claimed a candidate had died.

None of it was true. All of it travelled faster than any fact-check.

This is the central problem of election disinformation in Africa today: We fight it in English, but it wins in local languages.

In Ghana 2024, fact-checkers did excellent work. Dubawa, Fact Check Ghana, and the major newsrooms debunked false claims in English, on websites and on X. But the voters who received the voice note in Twi did not visit those websites. They heard a familiar voice, speaking their mother tongue, with urgency and emotion. They believed it because it sounded like home.

English is the language of the state. Local languages are the language of trust.

That trust is now being weaponised.
The pattern is not unique to Ghana. In the Sahel, researchers have documented how extremist groups and political actors use local languages - Hausa, Fulfulde, Bambara, Tamasheq - to spread recruitment messages, conspiracy theories, and anti-state propaganda on WhatsApp, Telegram, and community radio. The messages are rarely in French. They are in the language people pray in, mourn in, and argue in at home.

The UN, the African Union, and the ECOWAS have all warned about the same gap: Disinformation systems are built for English and French, while the information crisis happens in African languages.

This creates three dangers.
First, a detection gap. Most AI moderation tools, fact-checking databases, and platform policies are trained in English. A false claim in Ewe can circulate for days before anyone with the linguistic skill and the platform access flags it.

Second, a trust gap. When the official correction comes in English, it feels foreign. When the lie comes in Twi, it feels personal. People do not ask, "Is this true?" They ask, "Who sent it?" If it came from an uncle, a pastor, or a market queen, it must be true.

Third, a response gap. Electoral Commissions, ministries, and international observers still hold press conferences in English. They publish PDFs in English. They tweet in English. Meanwhile, the rumour moves in voice notes that cannot be searched, cannot be easily traced, and cannot be deleted.

Ghana 2024 showed us both the danger and the solution.

In some communities, local radio stations in Twi and Ewe began live fact-checking. They played the voice note, then invited an Electoral Commission official to respond in the same language, in the same tone. It worked. People listened because the correction spoke their language.

In other communities, market queens, pastors, and traditional leaders became informal fact-checkers. They told their groups: "Don't forward until we verify." That simple rule slowed the spread more than any platform policy.

The lesson for the world is simple: Speak internationally, listen locally.

If we want to protect elections, we cannot only translate fact-checks. We must produce them in Twi, Ewe, Ga, Hausa, Dagbani, and all the languages where elections are actually decided.

That means funding local-language fact-checkers, not just English newsrooms. It means training community radio presenters as first responders. It means Electoral Commissions must issue voice-note rebuttals in local languages within hours, not press releases in English days later.

It also means international organisations must stop treating local languages as a "translation problem." They are a democracy problem.

Ghana's 2024 election was largely peaceful, despite the rumours. That was not because disinformation failed. It was because communities fought back in their own languages.

The next election - in Ghana, in Senegal, in Kenya, in the Sahel - will be won or lost not on television, but on WhatsApp, in a voice note, in a language the fact-checkers do not speak.

If we do not listen in that language, we will lose.

Maurice Mawugbe
Maurice Mawugbe, © 2026

Maurice Dodji K. Mawugbe is a Lecturer, Journalist, Broadcaster, Columnist and Researcher. He holds 3 MAs in International Affairs & Diplomacy, Strategic Public Relations, and Electoral Policy & Administration. Research focus: Security, Diplomacy, Political Affairs, Strategic Communication and International Cooperation.Column: Maurice Mawugbe

Disclaimer: "The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect ModernGhana official position. ModernGhana will not be responsible or liable for any inaccurate or incorrect statements in the contributions or columns here." Follow our WhatsApp channel for meaningful stories picked for your day.

Just in....
body-container-line