Can Pakistan Expand the Maldives’ Strategic Autonomy in the Indian Ocean?

President Mohamed Muizzu’s October 20–22 visit to Pakistan marks a further development in the Maldives’ effort to broaden its diplomatic relationships. Having secured the withdrawal of Indian military personnel in 2024 and subsequently restored cooperation with New Delhi, Muizzu is now exploring how additional regional partnerships might strengthen his country’s foreign policy options.

The visit, the first by a Maldivian president to Pakistan in 11 years, coincided with the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations. During the visit, the two governments exchanged 20 memorandums of understanding spanning defense, maritime security, technology, healthcare, education and trade. They also announced an ambitious target to increase bilateral commerce from approximately $13 million to $200 million within two years.

Yet the significance of these agreements cannot be measured by their number alone. Pakistan remains a relatively modest economic partner for the Maldives, while India and China retain far greater influence over its development and strategic environment.

The central question is whether Islamabad can provide meaningful alternatives that expand Malé’s negotiating leverage, or whether the latest agreements will primarily serve as symbols of diplomatic diversification.

From “India Out” to Diplomatic Flexibility

Muizzu’s approach to regional diplomacy has evolved considerably since the 2023 presidential election.

His campaign capitalized on concerns about Indian military personnel stationed in the Maldives, whose presence opposition groups considered inconsistent with national sovereignty. India maintained that the personnel supported aviation operations involving maritime surveillance, emergency medical evacuations and search-and-rescue missions.

Following Muizzu’s election, negotiations between Malé and New Delhi resulted in the replacement of 76 Indian military personnel with civilian technical staff by May 2024.

The withdrawal fulfilled a politically important campaign commitment but did not fundamentally alter the geographic and economic realities underpinning India-Maldives relations.

The subsequent diplomatic recovery was equally significant. During Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s July 2025 visit, the two governments announced a $565 million line of credit, initiated negotiations toward a free trade agreement and expanded development cooperation.

These developments demonstrated that Muizzu could challenge a specific security arrangement while maintaining economic and diplomatic engagement with India.

His Pakistan initiative builds on this distinction. Rather than seeking a complete realignment away from New Delhi, Malé appears to be expanding the range of partners available to support national priorities.

What Can Pakistan Actually Offer?
Pakistan's involvement introduces additional opportunities, particularly in maritime cooperation, professional training and selected economic sectors.

The October 21 agreements include separate arrangements covering defense and maritime security cooperation. These are strategically relevant because the Maldives occupies a significant position near major Indian Ocean shipping routes, while Pakistan's Arabian Sea coastline connects its commercial and naval interests with the wider maritime region.

For Islamabad, deeper engagement with Malé could strengthen institutional relationships beyond its immediate neighborhood. For the Maldives, cooperation with Pakistan might provide additional opportunities for maritime training, professional exchanges and capacity-building.

However, the operational details of these agreements remain unclear. The existence of a maritime security memorandum does not necessarily indicate joint deployments, intelligence-sharing arrangements or a new strategic alignment.

Such distinctions matter in a region where security cooperation is frequently interpreted through the rivalry between India and Pakistan.

The agreements in healthcare and education may produce more immediate benefits.

Both countries agreed to cooperate on the recruitment of healthcare professionals, while Muizzu announced plans to expand medical education opportunities, including placements for Maldivian students and potential internships for medical graduates.

These arrangements address practical requirements of an island country dependent on external expertise and international connections.

The governments also discussed establishing direct flights to encourage tourism, investment and commercial exchanges. However, discussions about connectivity should not be confused with the establishment of operational air services.

Pakistan's potential contribution therefore lies in specific institutional and economic partnerships rather than its capacity to replace India's established role in Maldivian security and development.

The Economic Test
The proposed increase in bilateral trade from $13 million to $200 million within two years is arguably the most ambitious element of the visit.

That target represents an expansion of more than fifteenfold, raising questions about how quickly the two economies can develop the commercial infrastructure needed to support it.

Existing trade volumes suggest that the relationship is starting from a relatively narrow economic base. Geographic distance, transportation costs and limited private-sector engagement could constrain rapid expansion.

Healthcare services, tourism, agricultural products and vocational training offer possible areas for cooperation. Yet converting these opportunities into sustained commercial activity will require functioning transport links, market access and institutional coordination.

Muizzu himself emphasized the importance of implementation, arguing that agreements must produce tangible benefits.

This distinction between diplomatic commitments and measurable outcomes is crucial.

An agreement that creates regular professional exchanges or improves access to healthcare personnel may contribute more directly to Maldivian resilience than an ambitious trade target that remains unrealized.

The strategic value of Pakistan's engagement will ultimately depend on whether it provides capabilities and opportunities that Malé could not otherwise access on comparable terms.

Beyond the India-China Framework
The Maldives has traditionally occupied an important place in the strategic calculations of India and China.

For New Delhi, the island nation matters to maritime security, regional connectivity and its wider Indian Ocean interests. Beijing has expanded its economic presence through infrastructure investment, financing and diplomatic engagement.

The resulting competition has often encouraged interpretations of Maldivian foreign policy as a choice between two larger powers.

Muizzu's engagement with Pakistan complicates this framework, but it does not necessarily overturn it.

Smaller states can pursue relationships with multiple partners to preserve bargaining flexibility, an approach commonly described as strategic hedging.

However, genuine hedging requires more than diplomatic engagement. Alternative partnerships must offer sufficient economic or strategic value to reduce vulnerability to pressure from dominant partners.

India's proximity, emergency assistance, development financing and longstanding security cooperation provide advantages that geographically distant partners cannot easily reproduce. China's infrastructure and financial relationships similarly shape Malé's economic calculations.

Pakistan may widen the Maldives' options in selected sectors without substantially altering these structural dependencies.

Nor should its engagement automatically be interpreted as participation in an anti-India alignment. The agreements announced in Islamabad do not establish such an arrangement.

The more relevant question is whether Malé can diversify cooperation while avoiding the expectation that engagement with one partner requires opposition to another.

Autonomy Beyond Diplomatic Symbolism
Muizzu's Pakistan visit illustrates both the opportunities and constraints facing smaller Indian Ocean states.

Expanding diplomatic relationships can strengthen negotiating flexibility, attract specialized cooperation and reduce exclusive reliance on established partners. Yet diversification can also introduce new political expectations and economic obligations.

For the Maldives, whose economy depends heavily on tourism, imports and external financing, preserving productive relations with major partners remains essential.

The 20 agreements exchanged in Islamabad represent a potentially useful foundation, but their significance will depend on implementation, commercial viability and measurable institutional benefits.

For Pakistan, the visit offers an opportunity to develop a sustained relationship with a strategically located Indian Ocean country. For Malé, it provides another channel through which to pursue development and security objectives.

The political evolution is notable. The “India Out” movement initially focused on foreign military presence and national sovereignty. Muizzu's subsequent diplomacy suggests a shift toward a broader understanding of autonomy based on preserving multiple external relationships.

Whether that strategy succeeds will depend less on the symbolism of new partnerships than on their practical contribution to Maldivian decision-making.

Pakistan cannot replace India's geographic advantages or China's economic influence. It could, however, become a useful supplementary partner in areas where cooperation produces tangible results.

For the Maldives, the decisive test is whether such partnerships create greater freedom to pursue national interests without generating new dependencies. That, rather than the number of agreements signed, will determine the significance of Muizzu's Pakistan outreach.

Nadeem Afzal is a lawyer and human right activist.