Targeting Sudan and Opening Alternative Fronts: From Ethiopian Aggression to the Truce Trap and the Arms Embargo

It is difficult to view the simultaneous targeting of power stations and fuel facilities in several Sudanese cities as merely an isolated military development, or to separate it from the broader political and military context of the war against Sudan. The question that inevitably arises is: What interest does Ethiopia have in engaging in an act of aggression that targets Sudan’s vital infrastructure, threatens the lives of millions of civilians, and opens the door to a regional confrontation that serves neither the stability nor the interests of the region?

A strategic reading of this development suggests that this aggression may constitute a new episode in the long-running campaign of external targeting against Sudan—a campaign that did not begin with the outbreak of the war in April 2023, but has continued for decades, employing different instruments, methods, and actors.

In this context, it cannot be ruled out that the objective of opening this new front is to draw the Sudanese Armed Forces into a military confrontation with Ethiopia, diverting them from their primary theatre of operations, where they have been making battlefield advances in Kordofan and along the approaches to Darfur, as part of their efforts to break the rebellion’s military strength and liberate territories that remain under militia control.

Journalist Adel Al-Baz has drawn attention to a point that deserves serious consideration: these drones could potentially have been launched from within Sudanese territory itself, specifically from areas controlled by the militia in Blue Nile and Darfur.

This observation raises fundamental questions about the motives behind expanding the scope of military operations and the parties that might benefit from shifting the confrontation towards the Sudanese-Ethiopian border.

The forces encouraging this course of action do not necessarily seek an Ethiopian victory in a war against Sudan. Rather, they may seek to draw Sudan into a battlefield of their choosing, at a time of their choosing, and using instruments of their own design.

This would achieve two interconnected objectives. First, it would disperse Sudan’s military efforts and compel the Armed Forces to distribute their capabilities across multiple fronts. Second, it would portray the Sudanese war as a regional security threat extending beyond Sudan’s borders, thereby opening the door to marketing international intervention under the slogans of protecting civilians and preventing the conflict from spreading.

Sudan, however, appears to understand the nature of this trap. It recognizes that its principal battle at this stage is to defeat the rebellion within Sudanese territory, break its military strength, and liberate the areas that remain under its control.

As for external aggression, the Sudanese state has the right to respond and possesses the instruments of defence and sovereignty necessary to address it, at the time and in the manner dictated by the national interest.

Opening a new front at this particular moment appears more like a last-ditch attempt to rescue the militia from complete collapse, following the failure of previous efforts to provide it with a political or military lifeline.

The truce card has already been played, accompanied by various pressures and initiatives. Allegations concerning chemical weapons have been raised amid escalating political pressure. Attempts have also emerged to restrict Sudan’s diplomatic presence internationally, including reports concerning the denial of a visa required by the Chairman of Sudan’s Sovereignty Council to address the United Nations General Assembly.

These developments have coincided with an intensification of rhetoric surrounding famine and the humanitarian situation, in an apparent attempt to impose a truce that would allow the militia to catch its breath, reorganize its ranks, and subsequently be reintroduced as an indispensable party in any political framework for the post-war period.

It is important to recognize that a truce, as long as the armed militia remains in existence, retains control over territory, and continues to have access to its supply networks, does not necessarily mean an end to the war. Rather, it could become an opportunity to reproduce the conflict under different conditions.

The Arms Embargo: Protecting Civilians or Stripping the State of Its Means of Defence?

In this same context, the American initiative to extend the arms embargo to cover the entirety of Sudan, rather than limiting it to the Darfur region, stands out as one of the most controversial approaches.

The United States presents this measure under the banner of protecting civilians. Yet, in doing so, it overlooks a fundamental distinction that cannot legitimately be ignored: there is a national army entrusted, under the Constitution and the law, with protecting the state and its citizens and defending its sovereignty; and there is a rebel militia that has committed killings, rape, looting, destruction, and forced displacement, targeting civilians in their homes and attacking public facilities and institutions.

Equating the two sides through an arms embargo is not a neutral technical measure. It carries within it an unacceptable political and moral equivalence between weapons that are supposed to protect civilians and weapons that have been turned against them to kill, displace, and dispossess them.

This does not mean that the national army is above accountability, or that the protection of civilians does not apply to it. Any violations must be subject to accountability under the standards of international law, regardless of the identity of those responsible. But accountability is one matter; stripping the state of its capacity to defend its citizens and sovereignty is an entirely different matter.

Sudan’s own experience provides compelling evidence of the dangers of confusing these two issues.

Following the fall of El Geneina to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their allies, the city and its surrounding areas witnessed horrific episodes of mass killings and ethnic cleansing targeting civilians, particularly members of the Masalit community.

El Fasher, too, witnessed one of the most appalling waves of violence in the history of the war in October 2025. According to the latest report of the Panel of Experts, more than 6,000 people were reportedly killed within 48 hours.

These events raise a question that cannot be evaded: What became of civilians in the cities that fell under militia control when the army lacked the capacity to protect them or reach them?

Recent history demonstrates that the fall of cities and military institutions into militia hands did not lead to the protection of civilians. Instead, it opened the door to waves of mass killings, ethnic persecution, rape, looting, and forced displacement. Consequently, weakening the army’s ability to defend cities and areas that remain under state control cannot serve as a guarantee of civilian protection. On the contrary, it may multiply the dangers facing civilians.

Resolution 1591: Why Was the Arms Embargo Not Enforced in Darfur First?

This brings us to the greatest contradiction in the American approach.

United Nations Security Council Resolution 1591, adopted in March 2005, imposed measures concerning the supply of arms to the parties covered by the resolution in Darfur. More than two decades have passed since its adoption, yet international mechanisms have failed to ensure its effective implementation and have been unable to prevent the flow of weapons and military supplies that have contributed to the continuation and expansion of the conflict.

The logical question, therefore, is this: If the international community has been unable to ensure the enforcement of an arms embargo in Darfur throughout all these years, how can it convince the Sudanese people that it is capable of imposing a comprehensive embargo across the entire country without turning it into an instrument for restricting the capabilities of the legitimate state, while external supply networks supporting the militia continue to operate?

An even more pressing question is: Why was the idea of extending the arms embargo to all of Sudan not raised in 2023, when the militia was sweeping through Khartoum and extensive parts of central Sudan, committing some of the most heinous crimes against civilians, including killing, burning, rape, looting, destruction, and forced displacement?

Why was a comprehensive arms embargo not an international priority when the militia was expanding militarily, seizing cities, facilities, and institutions, and using the weapons and equipment it obtained to commit widespread violations?

And why is this option being proposed now, at a time when the Sudanese Armed Forces are seeking to recover territory and liberate cities, after the balance of power on the battlefield has begun to shift?

The timing of this proposal is no less significant than its substance. It gives Sudanese people every reason to question whether the real objective is the protection of civilians, or the reshaping of the balance of power on the ground in a manner that prevents the army from capitalizing on its military advances and grants the militia another opportunity to survive.

International Selectivity: Why Is Sudan Punished While Those Supporting the War Escape Accountability?

The more fundamental question, however, concerns the countries contributing to the continuation of the war by financing and arming the parties involved.

The latest report of the Panel of Experts did not merely describe the manifestations of the conflict in Darfur. It also addressed external support networks and the actors associated with them, providing information on countries and entities connected to the supply chains sustaining the war.

This raises a question that the United States, and other international powers, cannot afford to ignore: Why is holding countries that support the war and provide weapons and supplies to the militia not at the top of the international agenda, instead of concentrating on imposing additional restrictions on Sudan?

If Washington is genuinely committed to stopping the flow of weapons, why does it not begin by holding accountable the parties identified in the Panel of Experts’ report, investigating the supply and financing networks, and imposing sanctions on entities whose involvement is established?

Why is pressure repeatedly directed at the Sudanese state and its institutions, while no commensurate measures are taken against the external support that fuels the war?

Such selectivity cannot be dismissed as merely a procedural deficiency or a difference in priorities. It raises serious suspicions of double standards and casts major doubts on the political objectives governing the international handling of the Sudanese crisis.

It is impossible to demand that the Sudanese Armed Forces be stripped of their means of defence while the militia’s supply lines remain operational. Nor can one speak of protecting civilians while ignoring those who have contributed to arming the very forces responsible for killing and displacing them.

Likewise, Sudan cannot be expected to make military and political concessions under pressure arising from the humanitarian catastrophe while those responsible for perpetuating that catastrophe remain beyond accountability.

Massad Boulos and a Settlement That Accommodates the Interests of Those Supporting the Militia

In light of these developments, the approach pursued by Massad Boulos, the US President’s Senior Adviser for Arab and African Affairs, warrants serious reconsideration.

Instead of directing American efforts towards addressing the root causes of the war, holding accountable those supplying the militia with weapons, money, and logistical support, and removing the obstacles preventing the Sudanese state from restoring its sovereignty, there appears to be an effort to pursue a political settlement that accommodates the interests of regional and international actors connected to the conflict—some of whose roles and support networks have been addressed in the Panel of Experts’ report.

The danger of this approach is that it could transform the militia, despite the crimes it has committed and the documented allegations against it, into a political actor imposed upon Sudan in the post-war period, rather than addressing the fundamental problem: armed rebellion and foreign interference.

Any settlement that is not founded on ending the rebellion, restoring the authority of the state, holding perpetrators of crimes accountable, and halting foreign interference will amount to nothing more than postponing the crisis and reproducing the conditions that gave rise to it.

Sudan does not reject peace, nor does it reject international efforts aimed at protecting civilians. What it rejects is the use of peace as a cover for rehabilitating the militia, or the exploitation of humanitarian suffering as a means of blackmailing the state and forcing it to accept political arrangements that undermine its sovereignty and reward those who took up arms against it.

Sudan Faces a Clear Equation
The developments on the Ethiopian front, the attempts to impose a truce under particular political conditions, and the push to extend the arms embargo to the entirety of Sudan should not necessarily be viewed as separate issues. Rather, they must be examined within a broader framework of pressures intended to influence the course and outcome of the war.

When external military pressure coincides with diplomatic and humanitarian pressure, and new restrictions are proposed against the army at a time when no deterrent measures are imposed on those sustaining the militia, it is entirely legitimate to question the nature of the strategy driving these moves and to ask who ultimately stands to benefit.

Sudan does not need a war whose battlefield and timing are chosen by others. It does not need a truce that gives the rebels an opportunity to reorganize their ranks. Nor does it need an arms embargo that equates the state with a militia and restricts the state's right to defend its citizens.

What Sudan needs is an end to external aggression, the dismantling of the militia’s sources of financing and armament, accountability for the countries and entities proven to be involved in sustaining the war, and the restoration of the state's full sovereignty over its territory.

Numerous attempts to rescue the militia from the fate brought upon it by its rebellion and crimes have already failed. Neither the opening of a new external front nor the imposition of selective international restrictions will change one fundamental reality: Sudan’s future cannot be built on legitimizing armed rebellion or rewarding those who have destroyed the state and violated the rights of its citizens.

The real battle is not merely against a militia carrying weapons inside Sudan. It is also against a network of interests and interventions seeking to keep Sudan weak, exhaust its army, and subordinate its national decision-making. However numerous the instruments employed by this network may be, Sudan’s right to defend itself, protect its people, and restore its sovereignty is neither a matter for bargaining nor a subject for negotiation.