Our Gold, Our Development: Ghana Must Look Beyond the IMF’s “Loss”

The controversy over Ghana’s gold purchase programme has quickly become another NDC-NPP political battle. An IMF report points to losses of more than US$1.7 billion linked to the Bank of Ghana’s Domestic Gold Purchase Programme in 2025. The NPP Minority presents this as evidence that the Ghana Gold Board (GoldBod) has failed, while government officials say GoldBod itself did not record a US$1.7 billion corporate loss.

The political noise is pushing aside the more important question. Ghana must ask how much the programme cost, who benefited and whether the same results could have been achieved more cheaply. But we must also ask what Ghana received for what Ghana spent.

Is every cost a loss?

Imagine that Ghana knowingly spends US$105 to capture gold worth US$100 on the international market. Looking only at the transaction, we can say Ghana has lost US$5. But suppose the extra US$5 encourages miners and traders to sell through the formal Ghanaian system instead of smuggling the gold. Suppose it also brings foreign exchange into Ghana, strengthens our reserves, reduces pressure on the cedi and helps to build a stronger domestic gold industry.

In such circumstances, the additional US$5 may not simply be a loss. It may be the cost of achieving a wider development goal. This does not mean every expense connected with GoldBod should be defended. We must still ask whether Ghana received value for money and whether it could have achieved the same benefits at a lower cost. However, the calculation must be made from Ghana’s development interests, not only from the IMF’s accounting framework.

This point was strongly debated on the WhatsApp platform of the Kpasec Old Students Association Year Group 1979/81 (KOSA 79/81). One contributor argued that the IMF’s use of the word “loss” would naturally be seized upon by Ghanaian politicians and turned into another partisan fight. Another argued, more forcefully, that Ghana must remember that the gold is ours and that decisions about how we use it must serve our national interest. Others questioned the many hours being spent arguing over the word “loss” instead of asking what the policy had actually achieved for Ghana. That discussion helped to sharpen the central question of this article:

What did Ghana receive for what Ghana spent?

When politics replaces economic debate

This is why the NPP’s handling of the issue deserves criticism. The opposition has every right, and indeed a duty, to demand accountability. It should ask how the programme was financed, whether Ghana obtained competitive prices, who received commissions, whether politically connected people benefited and whether the Bank of Ghana carried costs that should have appeared more clearly in the national budget.

What is less responsible is reducing a complicated economic policy to the slogan that “GoldBod lost US$1.7 billion” and presenting that as proof that the institution has failed. The figure relates to the wider gold purchase system and to costs carried substantially through the Bank of Ghana. Whether those costs were high should be investigated, but presenting the entire amount as a GoldBod trading loss gives the public only part of the story.

This kind of politicisation makes serious economic debate difficult. Large figures are easy to repeat in the media and circulate online, but it is harder to assess whether more gold entered the official system, foreign exchange increased, reserves improved, and pressure on the cedi eased. If Ghana overpaid for gold or allowed private interests to profit at the state’s expense, the government must be held accountable. But if high costs produced larger economic benefits, those benefits must also be included.

The IMF and the Bretton Woods legacy

The controversy also raises a wider question about Ghana’s relationship with the IMF. The IMF and World Bank were created at the Bretton Woods Conference in the United States in 1944, when most African countries were still under colonial rule. Ghana did not become independent until 1957. African countries therefore entered a system whose main institutions and economic ideas had already been established.

The IMF was created mainly to promote monetary and financial stability, not as an African development institution. Over the decades, African governments facing crisis have repeatedly turned to it for financial support, often accepting conditions involving lower deficits, tighter spending, market reforms, subsidy cuts and limits on some forms of state intervention.

Some of these measures have been necessary. African governments cannot blame the IMF for corruption, reckless borrowing or poor economic management. Ghana also cannot repeatedly seek IMF assistance and then argue that the institution should have no interest in how our economy is managed.

However, the IMF’s preferred approach need not determine Ghana’s long-term development strategy. Stabilising an economy is not the same as transforming it. Ghana needs stable public finances, but also industrialisation, domestic production, value addition and greater control over our natural resources.

Our gold must serve our development

Gold makes this contradiction clear. Ghana has produced enormous quantities of gold, yet we still suffer foreign-exchange shortages and return to the IMF for support. Gold leaves Ghana, large amounts of foreign exchange are generated from its sale, and yet the cedi can still come under severe pressure and our reserves can fall dangerously low.

We are therefore entitled to ask whether a different arrangement can serve us better. GoldBod is an attempt to bring more of the gold trade, particularly small-scale gold, into the formal economy and under greater national control. If it can reduce smuggling, bring more foreign exchange into Ghana, strengthen reserves, improve traceability and eventually support local refining and value addition, then it can serve a development purpose.

Ghana should not abandon that objective simply because it does not fit an international financial institution’s preferred thinking. At the same time, saying “it is our gold” cannot excuse poor management. The gold belongs to Ghanaians, not to a government, political party, GoldBod officials or private traders. We deserve to know how the system works, what it costs and who benefits.

Economic sovereignty requires responsibility

The best way for Ghana to reduce the IMF’s influence is not to complain about it, but to manage our economy well enough that we do not repeatedly need IMF rescue. Real economic sovereignty requires disciplined spending, less corruption, better tax collection, stronger domestic production and careful management of our resources.

It also requires transparency from GoldBod. Ghanaians should know how much is paid for gold, what commissions aggregators receive, what discounts are given to international buyers and how much foreign exchange finally enters the country. We must also ensure that gold bought through the official system can be traced so that the programme does not indirectly reward illegal mining and environmental destruction.

The GoldBod controversy should therefore move beyond the claim that US$1.7 billion was “lost”. Ghana should examine the cost alongside the gold and foreign exchange captured, the contribution to reserves and currency stability, who benefited and whether the same results could have been achieved more efficiently. Only then can we decide whether Ghana lost money or made a strategic investment.

The IMF has every right to advise Ghana, the opposition must scrutinise government, and government must account for public money. But Ghana must retain the confidence to decide how its resources can best serve its development. The final calculation must be ours.

Acknowledgement: I am grateful to members of the Kpasec Old Students Association Year Group 1979/81 (KOSA 79/81). A weekend discussion on our WhatsApp platform about Ghana’s gold policy, GoldBod, the IMF report, and the NPP Minority’s reaction, led by Alexander Afenyo-Markin, helped stimulate some of the reflections developed in this article.