Between Hasina and BRICS: The Delhi–Dhaka Deadlock

The planned visit of Bangladesh Prime Minister Tarique Rahman to New Delhi appears to have entered a diplomatic deadlock. Dhaka has made it clear that a “conducive environment” must exist before the visit can proceed, with the extradition of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina remaining the central obstacle. India, meanwhile, has invited Rahman to the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi on September 12–13, creating an unusual diplomatic dilemma: can Delhi welcome Bangladesh’s new leadership while continuing to host its most controversial former leader?

The roots of this dilemma go back to August 2024, when Sheikh Hasina fled Bangladesh following a student-led uprising and took refuge in India. Her government had increasingly been accused of authoritarianism, suppression of opposition and excessive use of state power. The quota protests eventually became a much broader movement after the government's violent response intensified public anger. The UN later estimated that as many as 1,400 people were killed during the crackdown.

Now Hasina has reopened the wound herself. In a recent press appearance in Delhi, she declared her intention to return to Bangladesh despite facing a death sentence in absentia and argued that the charges against her were politically motivated. Dhaka condemned India's allowing her public political voice, while New Delhi has maintained that it does not permit her to conduct political activities from Indian territory.

For India, therefore, Hasina is no longer simply an asylum seeker. She has become a strategic liability. New Delhi invested heavily in its relationship with her government for years, particularly on security and regional connectivity. Handing her over could be interpreted as abandoning an old strategic partner; refusing to do so risks damaging relations with the government that has replaced her.

India has so far chosen the language of law rather than politics. Its foreign ministry has said that Dhaka's extradition request is being examined according to applicable law and judicial procedures. For New Delhi, the question is therefore not merely whether Hasina should be returned, but how such a decision would affect India's strategic interests, domestic politics and its wider regional position.

For Dhaka, however, the issue is simultaneously political, legal and emotional. The current government cannot easily explain to its electorate why its prime minister should travel to Delhi for diplomatic engagement while the former leader, whom Dhaka's tribunal has sentenced to death in absentia, remains there. Tarique Rahman therefore faces a domestic credibility test: a Delhi visit without movement on Hasina could be portrayed by opponents as accommodation with India.

Yet Bangladesh cannot afford an endless confrontation with its largest neighbour either. India remains economically, geographically and strategically important. Trade, border management, water-sharing, connectivity and regional security all require functioning bilateral relations.

This is precisely why India's BRICS invitation is significant. Bangladesh has been invited as a special guest to the September 12–13 summit, although it is not a BRICS member. The invitation gives both sides a diplomatic opportunity to prevent the Hasina dispute from consuming the entire bilateral relationship.

The real diplomatic game, therefore, is not simply about whether Tarique visits Delhi. It is about what price each side is willing to pay for normalisation.

India may prefer a formula in which Hasina remains outside Bangladesh but gradually becomes politically irrelevant. Dhaka, meanwhile, wants justice, sovereignty and domestic legitimacy. A compromise could involve judicial assurances, restrictions on political activity, or even a mutually negotiated third-country arrangement. But any such solution would require political courage from both capitals.

Bangladesh also has alternatives. Its growing engagement with China, Malaysia and other partners provides diplomatic space, while Pakistan has signalled interest in deeper political, academic and economic engagement. But Dhaka should be careful not to turn diversification into dependency or regional rivalry. Its best strategy may be strategic balancing rather than replacing one dependency with another.

Ultimately, Delhi and Dhaka face the same strategic reality: geography cannot be changed by political anger. India needs a stable Bangladesh, while Bangladesh needs a predictable India.

The September BRICS invitation may therefore become more than a summit invitation. It could become the first serious test of whether Delhi and Dhaka can separate the Hasina question from the Bangladesh–India relationship.

If they cannot, the diplomatic deadlock may deepen. If they can, the crisis could become an opportunity to reset one of South Asia's most consequential relationships. Between Hasina and BRICS, Delhi and Dhaka now face a choice between preserving yesterday's strategic calculations and building tomorrow's regional order.