Pakistan-Afghanistan: From Frienemies to a Framework of Trust

Pakistan and Afghanistan are not simply two neighbouring states divided by a border. Their relationship is deeply rooted in centuries of shared civilisation, religion, culture, social traditions and moral values—long before the partition of 1947. Yet today, a relationship that should have been built upon mutual trust increasingly resembles that of “frienemies”, where strategic calculations have weakened historical bonds.

The reopening of trade routes provides an opportunity to reconsider what went wrong and how the relationship can be repaired. The prolonged closure of the Pakistan-Afghanistan trade corridor has constrained economic activity by billions of dollars, affecting traders, transporters and communities on both sides, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The question is no longer merely when the routes will reopen, but whether both states can reopen the political channel of trust alongside them.

What actually went wrong when the Taliban-led government came to power on August 15, 2021?

The Doha process was still underway, and several conditions concerning Afghanistan’s political future remained unresolved. Pakistan was effectively expected to deal with both the US-backed government of Ashraf Ghani and the Taliban. Then came the sudden withdrawal of US and NATO forces. The speed of the transition left little time for regional diplomacy to prepare for its consequences.

According to former Pakistani ambassador to Afghanistan Mansoor Ali Khan, Pakistan’s embassy remained operational in Kabul while several other foreign missions shifted their operations towards Kabul airport. The Taliban takeover itself encountered remarkably little resistance in the major cities, making the transfer of power far smoother than many had anticipated.

Pakistan, meanwhile, was undergoing its own political transition and appeared to expect greater leverage with the incoming Taliban administration. But the Taliban had a different calculation. Having fought for decades and endured imprisonment and political isolation, they wanted to be treated as an equal sovereign actor rather than as a dependent political force. Their message was effectively clear: Pakistan could be a neighbour and facilitator, but not a superior stakeholder.

That difference in expectations became one of the earliest sources of mistrust.

What did the Afghanistan-led Taliban regime do through off-track diplomacy?

The Taliban understood that international recognition would not come abruptly. Their immediate objective was internal consolidation despite limited institutional capacity. They therefore expanded diplomatic engagement with China, Russia, Iran and India, seeking to demonstrate that Afghanistan could diversify its external relationships.

What they lacked, however, was a convincing strategy to communicate their security concerns and humanitarian difficulties to the wider international community. Instead of presenting themselves primarily through the lens of a conflict-affected society seeking stability, they often appeared to engage the international system selectively.

Russian assistance and Indian engagement nevertheless provided important diplomatic and economic space during a difficult period. These relationships also demonstrated to Pakistan that Kabul was prepared to explore alternatives rather than remain dependent on Islamabad.

How was the vacuum of mistrust filled between the two states?

Pakistan’s decision to push Afghan refugees towards repatriation was intended, in part, to create pressure on the Taliban government through the social and economic consequences for Afghanistan. Kabul responded by expanding its diplomatic outreach elsewhere, including engagement with India.

This was followed by another deterioration in the security environment. Militancy and attacks inside Pakistan generated pressure for military responses, while Pakistani actions across the border created severe humanitarian and political optics. Reports of civilian casualties intensified public anger and became another source of anti-Pakistan sentiment.

The larger failure was diplomatic.
Both countries were undergoing political transitions, yet there was insufficient sustained political engagement capable of separating immediate security disputes from the long-term relationship. Short-term calculations began sacrificing long-term strategic interests.

Pakistan had expected the Taliban to recognise the helping hand extended during difficult years. The Taliban, however, wanted to demonstrate that they had achieved power through their own struggle and would not surrender their strategic independence. What Islamabad interpreted as rejection of its assistance, Kabul viewed as a demand for political leverage.

This gap in perception gradually transformed historical friendship into strategic mistrust.

When will the trade routes finally reopen?
Afghanistan’s geography makes Pakistan an indispensable transit partner. Even if Kabul seeks greater trade with India, Pakistan remains strategically important for road connectivity and access to regional markets. If Iran is incorporated into wider transit arrangements, Pakistan can still benefit through transit fees, logistics, employment and expanded regional commerce.

Therefore, reopening the routes should not be treated merely as an economic concession. It should become the first pillar of a broader Pakistan-Afghanistan reset.

Pakistan should pursue a structured diplomatic mechanism with Kabul, combining border security, counterterrorism, refugee management and trade under one continuous dialogue. Afghanistan, for its part, must ensure that its territory is not used against Pakistan.

The two countries cannot change geography, history or their shared social fabric. They can, however, change the way they manage disagreement.

Pakistan and Afghanistan do not need another cycle of pressure and retaliation. They need strategic patience, institutional dialogue and an economic framework that makes peace more profitable than confrontation.

The reopening of the trade corridors could therefore become more than the reopening of roads. It could be the first road back to trust.