Contemporary Decisions Of The Court Of Appeal And Supreme Court Incriminal Trials: Lessons For Investigators And Prosecutors

1. Introduction
In recent years, Ghana’s criminal justice landscape has been significantly reshaped by a series of landmark decisions from the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court. These judgments have sent clear signals to investigators and prosecutors. The courts have demanded precision, diligence, and strict adherence to constitutional safeguards, particularly the right to a fair trial under Article 19 of the 1992 Constitution.

Four recent Court of Appeal and Supreme Court cases, in particular, have set the standard for what is expected of those who ply their trade in criminal investigations and prosecutions. The decision in The Republic v. Ernest Thompson, John Hagan Mensah, Juliet Hassana Kramer, Caleb Kwaku Afaglo and Peter Hayibor, [2021] 171 GMJ established the standard for properly drafted charges. Cassiel Ato Forson, Sylvester Anemana and Richard Jakpa v. The Republic, Court of Appeal (Suit No. H2/22/2023), judgment dated 30th July, 2024 held that the prosecution must connect the evidence to the elements of the charge. The acquittal of Michael Nyinaku in Michael Nyinaku v. The Republic, Court of Appeal (Suit No. H2/41/2022), Judgment dated 24th July, 2025 exposed the risks of relying on suspicion over substance. And the Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Sedina Christine Tamakloe Attionu v. The Republic (Suit No. H2/17/2026), Judgment dated 30th July,2026 reinforced the fundamental principle that the burden of proof never shifts from the prosecution. These cases send a single, unified message: “A conviction that withstands appellate scrutiny begins with meticulous investigation and ends with a charge sheet that leaves no room for doubt about the specific conduct alleged.”

2. The Republic v. Ernest Thompson, John Hagan Mensah, Juliet Hassana Kramer, Caleb Kwaku Afaglo and Peter Hayibor, [2021] 171 GMJ (The Ernest Thompson Case

Brief Facts
Ernest Thompson, the former Director-General of the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT), and four others were arraigned before the High Court on 29 counts of various offences, including conspiracy to cause financial loss to the Republic and wilfully causing financial loss to the Republic. The charges arose from the controversial and failed $72 million IT project, the Operational Business Suite (OBS).

In January 2019, Ernest Thompson applied to the trial High Court for an order compelling the prosecution to provide details of the “actus reus”, the specific acts and/or omissions he was directly responsible for that would provide the basis for the charges. The trial judge declined the application, holding that the charges as laid contained adequate and reasonable details of the acts constituting the Offence in the particulars of offence to enable the Accused defend himself. Ernest Thompson appealed to the Court of Appeal, which by a majority decision, upheld his appeal and directed the prosecution to amend the charges. The Republic then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issues
The key question was whether the offences for which Ernest Thompson was arraigned satisfied the necessary details and/or particulars of offence as required by Article 19(2)(d) of the Constitution and Section 112 of the Criminal and Other Offences (Procedure) Act, 1960 (Act 30).

Holdings
The Supreme Court, per Amadu JSC, dismissed the Republic’s appeal and affirmed the Court of Appeal’s decision. The Court held that the particulars of the offences for conspiracy and causing financial loss did not specify the particular acts and/or omissions committed by Ernest Thompson that constituted the offences. There was no difference between the statement of offence and the particulars of offence in the manner in which they were drafted. The prosecution merely repeated the statutory definition of the offence rather than providing details of the acts Ernest Thompson actually did to constitute the offences.

Reasoning
The Court undertook a careful examination of both the offence of conspiracy and the offence of wilfully causing financial loss. For conspiracy, it observed that the particulars in counts 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13 and 15 merely stated that the accused persons “... agreed to act together with a common purpose to wilfully cause financial loss to the State.” There was nothing showing how Ernest Thompson agreed, what specific act he engaged in, or what role he played.

Similarly, for the offence of wilfully causing financial loss, the particulars failed to disclose what act or omission Ernest Thompson engaged in that resulted in the financial loss, nor did they disclose facts from which his “wilfulness” could be inferred.

The Court cited the earlier decision in Osei Kwadjo II v. The Republic [2007-2008] 2 SCGLR 1148, emphasising that the particulars of offence must “... allege that the Accused person did or omitted to do a specific act having the ingredients of the offence.”

The Court distinguished between providing details of the acts or omissions constituting the offence and providing the evidence required to prove those acts or omissions. The court held that informing an accused person of the very act and/or omission that he engaged in does not amount to making available the prosecution’s evidence.

Lessons for Investigators and Prosecutors

Lesson One: Particulars Must Be Specific.

The days of drafting charges that merely re state the statutory definition are over. Investigators and prosecutors must work together to identify the specific conduct that constitutes the offence. For conspiracy, this means outlining how the agreement was formed and what acts constitute the common purpose. For causing financial loss, it means identifying the precise act or omission and how it caused the loss.

Lesson Two: Distinguish Between Details and Evidence.

Providing details of the offence is not the same as providing evidence. The accused is entitled to know what he is alleged to have done, not necessarily what the prosecution will use to prove it. Prosecutors should not confuse the two.

Lesson Three: The adequacy of each charge must be determined on its own merit.

The Court emphasised that the adequacy of particulars must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. A template approach to drafting charges will not suffice.

Lesson Four: The Constitution Means What It Says.

Article 19(2)(d) is mandatory. The accused must be informed in detail of the nature of the offence. This is not a mere technicality; it is a constitutional guarantee that goes to the heart of a fair trial.

3. Cassiel Ato Forson, Sylvester Anemana and Richard Jakpa v. The Republic, Court of Appeal (Suit No. H2/22/2023), judgment dated 30th July, 2024 (The Ambulance Case)

Brief Facts
The case, popularly known as the “Ambulance Case,” involved Dr. Cassiel Ato Forson, the former Deputy Minister of Finance (as he then was), and Richard Jakpa, the local representative of Big Sea General Trading Limited. The prosecution alleged that Ato Forson had wilfully caused financial loss of €2,370,000 to the Republic by authorising irrevocable letters of credit valued at €3,950,000, out of which payments were made to Big Sea General Trading LLC for the supply of vehicles purporting to be ambulances “without due cause and authorization.”

The charges against Ato Forson were in counts 1 and 5 namely wilfully causing financial loss to the Republic and intentionally misapplying public property. At the close of the prosecution’s case, Ato Forson made a submission of no case to answer. The trial judge dismissed the submission and called upon him to open his defence. Both Ato Forson and Richard Jakpa appealed to the Court of Appeal.

Issues
The central issue was whether the prosecution had adduced sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case against the accused persons, warranting the order to open their defence.

Holdings
The Court of Appeal, in a unanimous decision, allowed the appeals and acquitted and discharged both Ato Forson and Richard Jakpa. The Court held that there was no logical connection between the evidence and the finding that a prima facie case had been established.

Reasoning
Ackah-Boafo JA (as he then was), in the lead judgment, carefully analysed the evidence against Ato Forson. He noted that the prosecution’s own witnesses admitted that a Letter of Credit is not a payment but a guarantee. Ato Forson had merely requested the Bank of Ghana to establish the LC; the payments themselves were authorised by the Ministry of Health, which was the applicant for the LCs.

The Court found that the trial judge had erred in shifting the burden of proof onto Ato Forson. The particulars of the charge alleged that Ato Forson had acted “... without due cause and authorization.” Yet the trial judge required Ato Forson to prove that he had authority to act. This, the Court held, was wrong. The prosecution bore the burden of proving the negative averment.

Regarding Richard Jakpa, the Court found that there was no positive evidence linking him to the alleged loss. Jakpa @ Business was the agent of Big Sea LLC, not a party to the contract. The prosecution failed to show what specific action or omission by Jakpa caused the loss.

Bright Mensah JA, in his concurring opinion, emphasised the test for a submission of no case as established in State v. Ali Kassena [1962] 2 GLR 144 and Michael Asamoah & Anor v. The Republic [2017-2018] 1 SCGLR 486.

Lessons for Investigators and Prosecutors

Lesson One: Know What You Are Proving.

The prosecution’s own evidence in this case undermined its case. Witnesses confirmed that LCs are not payments, contradicting the prosecution’s narrative. Prosecutors must ensure that the evidence they lead actually supports the charges, not rebuts them.

Lesson Two: The Burden of Proof Never Shifts.

The prosecution cannot hide behind the negative averment argument to place an evidential burden on the accused. Unless a statute expressly places a burden on the accused, the prosecution must prove every element of the offence, including any negative assertions.

Lesson Three: Call Material Witnesses.

The prosecution failed to call the then Minister of Finance, Seth Terkper, who was a material witness on whether Ato Forson had authority. The Court held that his testimony would have helped resolve the issue. Prosecutors must identify and call material witnesses, even if they fear the testimony may not support the prosecution’s case.

Lesson Four: A “Prima Facie Case” is Not a Low Bar.

The Court stated that there must be evidence capable of supporting the inferences necessary to establish the essential elements of the case. Speculation and conjecture are not enough.

4. Michael Nyinaku v. The Republic, Court of Appeal (Suit No. H2/41/2022), Judgment dated 24th July, 2025 (The Beige Bank Case)

Brief Facts
Michael Nyinaku, the founder and Chief Executive Officer of the defunct Beige Bank, was arraigned on 43 counts of stealing, fraudulent breach of trust, and money laundering. The prosecution alleged that between 2015 and 2018, Nyinaku orchestrated a scheme to divert depositor funds amounting to over GHS 1.2 billion from Beige Bank to related entities he controlled. This included transferring GHS 448.6 million in customer fixed deposits to Beige Capital Asset Management and creating a fictitious account in the name of First Africa Savings and Loans to channel funds.

After the prosecution closed its case, Nyinaku made a submission of no case to answer. The trial High Court dismissed the submission and called upon him to open his defence. Nyinaku appealed to the Court of Appeal.

Issues

1. Whether the High Court was right to dismiss the submission of no case and order Nyinaku to open his defence,
2. Whether Nyinaku was properly charged for money laundering under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2020 (Act 1044) when the offences were committed when the repealed Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2008 (Act 749) was the operational law in force.

Holdings
The Court of Appeal allowed Nyinaku's appeal, acquitted and discharged him on all 43 counts, and set aside the High Court’s ruling. The Court found that the trial judge had failed to analyse each count individually and that the prosecution had not proved the essential elements of the offences, particularly dishonesty.

The court also held that Nyinaku should have been charged under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2008 (Act 749) when the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2020 (Act 1044) did not have a saving clause and the charges were not pending before the court before the repeal and thus were saved under the Evidence Act.

Reasoning
Dr. Ernest Owusu-Dapaa JA delivered a comprehensive judgment that analysed the prosecution’s evidence in detail. The Court found that the prosecution had established ledger movements but had not prove the mens reaof “dishonest” appropriation. The transfers were documented, approved through proper channels, and reflected legitimate corporate purposes such as managing liquidity and undertaking capital expenditure.

Regarding the stealing counts, the Court noted that customer deposits, once received, become the bank’s property. There was no evidence that the transfers were unauthorised or dishonest. The Court also found that the prosecution had not proved that the impugned dealings lay outside the company’s powers or were effected for an unlawful purpose.

On the money laundering counts, the Court found a constitutional violation. The events occurred between 2015 and 2018, but the charges were brought under Act 1044, which came into force on 29 December 2020. The Court held that this violated Article 19(5) of the Constitution, which prohibits ex post facto criminal laws. Section 64 of Act 1044 preserved prosecutions under the repealed enactments but did not authorise fresh charges under the new Act for pre-2020 conduct.

The Court also rejected the trial judge’s aggregated approach to the counts, holding that each count must be considered individually on its merits.

Lessons for Investigators and Prosecutors

Lesson One: Prove Dishonesty, Not Just Transfers.

The prosecution’s case in the Beige Bank case demonstrated that investigators sometimes confuse large financial movements with criminality. The Court held that documented, approved transactions within a corporate group do not, without more, establish dishonesty. Investigators must look for evidence of unauthorised or unlawful purpose, not just the fact of transfer.

Lesson Two: Know the Applicable Law.
The money laundering charges were fatally defective because they were brought under a law that did not exist at the time of the alleged conduct. Prosecutors must be meticulous about identifying the correct statutory provisions, including commencement dates and transitional provisions.

Lesson Three: Consider Each Count Separately.

The trial judge’s admission that examining each count individually would be “... tedious and burdensome” was roundly rejected by the Court of Appeal. The liberty of an accused person is jealously guarded by the law. Every count must be scrutinised on its merits.

Lesson Four: Regulatory Insolvency is Not a Crime.

Beige Bank’s collapse and the government bailout were not evidence of theft. The Court held that bank failures often arise from liquidity shocks, loss of confidence, or macroeconomic headwinds. Prosecutors must not assume that every failed financial institution is the result of criminal conduct.

Lesson Five: Hearsay is Inadmissible.
The prosecution relied heavily on the Receiver’s report, which the Court noted was not an audit but an investigative aide-mémoire. Investigators must gather admissible evidence, not just rely on reports and second-hand accounts.

5. Sedina Christine Tamakloe Attionu v. The Republic (Suit No. H2/17/2026), Judgment dated 30th July,2026 (The Sedina Tamakloe Case)

Brief Facts
Sedina Christine Tamakloe Attionu, the former Chief Executive Officer of the Microfinance and Small Loans Centre (MASLOC), and one Daniel Axim were charged with 78 counts of conspiracy to steal, stealing, conspiracy to wilfully cause financial loss, causing financial loss, causing loss to public property, improper payment of public funds, unauthorised commitment, money laundering, and contravention of the Public Procurement Act, 2003 (Act.

The prosecution alleged that Tamakloe had appropriated GHS 500,000 refunded by Obaatanpa Microfinance, misappropriated funds intended for sensitisation programmes and committed other financial irregularities. Tamakloe ceased attending trial after her passport was released for medical travel, and was ultimately convicted and sentenced in absentia to ten years imprisonment. She appealed to the Court of Appeal.

Issues
1. Whether the charges were defective for failing to provide sufficient particulars.

2. Whether the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and

3. Whether the trial judge erred in law when she shifted the burden of proof onto Sedina Tamakloe.

Holdings
The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and sentence and acquitted and discharged Tamakloe. The Court held that the charges in counts 36 to 68 (conspiracy to cause financial loss and causing financial loss) were incurably defective, and that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

Reasoning
Emmanuel Ankamah, JA delivered the lead judgment. The Court found that the counts alleging conspiracy to cause financial loss and causing financial loss were incurably deficient because they omitted an indispensable ingredient of the offence that is the particular act or omission said to have been wilfully committed. The particulars merely repeated the statutory definition without identifying any specific conduct by Tamakloe.

Regarding the GHS 500,000 Obaatanpa transaction, the Court held that the prosecution failed to prove the authenticity of the acknowledgment letter, Exhibit A. The original was not produced, no MASLOC official certified it, and Tamakloe denied authorship. The Court held that the trial judge impermissibly placed on Tamakloe the burden of proving or disproving her signature.

On the sensitisation programmes, the Court found that the prosecution relied on inadmissible hearsay. PW6 and PW7 had no personal knowledge of the programmes; their evidence was based on what Regional Directors allegedly told them. The Court held that the prosecution should have called the Regional Directors or the beneficiaries.

The Court also found that the prosecution failed to call material witnesses in the Kantamanto fire relief funds case, and that PW1 had actually admitted that the funds were applied for their intended purpose. The improper payment counts failed because the prosecution’s own witness, the Head of Finance, testified that he had processed the payments and found nothing wrong, relying on Sedina Tamakloe’s appointment letter.

The Court reiterated that the prosecution bears the burden of proof, and that an accused person’s absence does not absolve the prosecution of that duty.

Lessons for Investigators and Prosecutors

Lesson One: Charges Must Disclose the Specific Conduct.

This case reinforces the Ernest Thompson principle. Charges that merely recite the statutory definition without identifying specific acts or omissions are incurably defective. Prosecutors must ensure that each count answers the question: “What exactly did the accused do?”

Lesson Two: Prove the Documentary Evidence.

A letter purportedly signed by the accused is not self-proving. Prosecutors must call witnesses who can authenticate documents or lead proper evidence of the document’s provenance. An accused is entitled to challenge the authenticity of a document without bearing the burden of proving it is forged.

Lesson Three: Call Your Witnesses.
The prosecution cannot rely on hearsay statements from Regional Directors or other officials without calling them to testify. Investigators must gather evidence that will be admissible in court. Prosecutors must identify and call material witnesses.

Lesson Four: Don't Shift the Burden.

The trial judge repeatedly required Tamakloe to explain or disprove aspects of the prosecution’s case. The Court of Appeal emphatically rejected this approach. An accused person is under no obligation to fill gaps in the prosecution’s evidence. The privilege against self-incrimination is a constitutional guarantee.

Lesson Five: A Conviction in Absentia is Not a Free Pass.

Tamakloe absconded, but the Court still scrutinised the prosecution’s evidence with care. Prosecutors cannot expect appellate courts to rubber-stamp convictions simply because the accused failed to participate. The obligation to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt remains.

Lesson Six: The Golden Thread Remains Golden.

The Court’s decision reaffirmed the principle articulated in Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and this burden never shifts unless the enabling statute expressly says otherwise.

6. Conclusion: A Call for Diligence and Integrity

My Lords, ladies and gentlemen, these four decisions tell a powerful story about the direction of Ghanaian criminal jurisprudence. The courts are sending an unmistakable message that the prosecution must do its homework, and it must do it well. There is no substitute for diligent investigation, meticulous preparation, and adherence to the rules of evidence and procedure.

For investigators, this means going beyond the surface. It means gathering admissible evidence, not just suspicion. It means interviewing all material witnesses and documenting their accounts properly. It means understanding the legal elements of the offences under investigation and ensuring that the evidence gathered speaks to those elements. It means resisting the temptation to assume that large financial movements or regulatory breaches are necessarily criminal.

For prosecutors, the lessons are equally clear. Draft charges with precision. Ensure that the particulars of the offence identify the specific conduct alleged. Do not rely on facts that are not part of the charge. Call your material witnesses. Do not shift the burden of proof onto the accused. Know the applicable law, including transitional provisions and commencement dates. And above all, only file charges that can be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The acquittals in these cases were not technicalities; they were failures of proof. The prosecution could not answer the fundamental question: “What did the accused actually do?” When an accused person looks at the charge sheet and cannot see what he is alleged to have done, the charges are defective. When the prosecution’s own witnesses contradict its theory of the case, the foundation of the prosecution’s case crumbles.

The message is simple: be diligent, be detailed, and above all, be faithful to the law. By: Abraham Paa Brew-Sam, Esq. (B.Ed.; LLB; QCL; LLM)

Email: [email protected]