The Government Is Not the Owner of Ghana's Sovereignty: Let the People Decide on the Separation of Parliament and the Executive

The recent debate over the recommendation of the Constitution Review Committee (CRC) that Ministers of State should be appointed from outside Parliament raises one of the most

fundamental questions about democratic governance in Ghana: Who ultimately owns the power to determine how the country should be governed—the Government or the people of Ghana?

This question becomes even more important because the CRC's recommendation was not made in isolation. It followed extensive consultations with citizens, civil society organisations and

other stakeholders across the country. The Committee was established precisely to listen to the

people and identify constitutional reforms that could improve the governance of the Republic.

The 1992 Constitution provides, in Article 1(1), that the sovereignty of Ghana resides in the people of Ghana, in whose name and for whose welfare the powers of government are to be

exercised. This constitutional provision establishes a fundamental principle: Government is the servant and trustee of the people; it is not the owner of the people's sovereignty.

It is therefore legitimate to ask whether the Government should have the final say in rejecting a recommendation that emerged from a process designed to ascertain the views of the very citizens whose sovereignty the Government exercises.

To be clear, the Government is legally entitled to express its views on the recommendations of the CRC. The CRC's recommendations do not automatically become law. Constitutional

amendments must follow the procedures prescribed by the Constitution. Therefore, the Government cannot be said to be acting illegally merely because it disagrees with a recommendation of the Committee.

But there is a deeper democratic and constitutional question that cannot be ignored.

A Potential Conflict of Interest

The recommendation that Ministers should not be sitting Members of Parliament is intended, among other things, to strengthen the separation of powers between the Executive and the Legislature.

Under the present constitutional arrangement, the President appoints Ministers, and the Constitution requires that the majority of Ministers be appointed from among Members of Parliament.

This arrangement creates an unusual overlap between two arms of government.

Parliament's constitutional role includes making laws and exercising oversight over the Executive. The Executive, on the other hand, is responsible for implementing government policies and administering the affairs of the State.

Yet, under the current arrangement, Members of Parliament who are expected to scrutinise the Executive may themselves become members of the Executive.

This creates a potential institutional conflict.

A Member of Parliament who becomes a Minister now occupies a position within the Executive that Parliament is constitutionally expected to scrutinise. The Minister's primary loyalty and responsibility naturally shift towards the Executive functions of government. At the same time, the Minister remains a Member of Parliament.

The question therefore arises: Can Parliament exercise the strongest possible oversight over an Executive in which many of its own members serve as Ministers?

This is precisely the problem that the CRC's recommendation seeks to address.

Why Should Government Decide on a Reform That Could Limit Its Own Power?

There is an even more fundamental concern.
The present arrangement may be advantageous to the Government of the day because it gives the Executive considerable influence within Parliament. Ministers who are also MPs are members of the parliamentary majority and, in most cases, are expected to support the Government's

legislative agenda.
Consequently, a system in which Ministers are drawn from Parliament can potentially weaken the independence of Parliament as an institution of scrutiny and oversight.

It is therefore reasonable to ask whether the Government, which benefits from the present constitutional arrangement, should be the principal institution determining whether that arrangement should continue.

This is not an accusation against any particular government or political party. It is a question of

institutional self-interest.

Where a proposed constitutional reform would reduce the power or influence of the Executive, there is an inherent risk that the Executive may assess the proposal from the perspective of its own institutional interests rather than from the broader perspective of the long-term interests of the Republic.

In that sense, the Government's position on this particular recommendation could raise a potential conflict of interest.

The issue is therefore bigger than whether the current Government agrees or disagrees with the CRC.

The real issue is whether the people of Ghana should be allowed to determine whether the present constitutional arrangement is in the best interest of democratic governance.

The People's Voice Must Not Be Treated as a Mere Consultation Exercise

The CRC's nationwide consultations should not be regarded as a public-relations exercise whose outcome the Government can simply accept or reject according to its own preference.

The people who participated in those consultations are the sovereign citizens of Ghana.

If citizens were invited to express their views on how the Constitution should be reformed, and a recommendation subsequently emerged from that process, then the Government has a democratic responsibility to take those views seriously.

Of course, consultation is not the same as a referendum. A consultation does not, by itself, legally bind the Government or Parliament.

Nevertheless, the Government should not dismiss the result of extensive public consultation without providing compelling reasons to the people.

At the very least, the Government should publish its detailed reasons for accepting or rejecting the CRC's recommendations and allow the citizens of Ghana to examine and debate those reasons.

Let the People Decide

If there is genuine disagreement between the Government and the people over this fundamental question of constitutional governance, then the most democratic solution may be to allow the people themselves to decide.

If the proposed reform falls within a category of constitutional amendments requiring a referendum under Article 290 of the 1992 Constitution, then the matter should be submitted to the people through a referendum.

Even if the particular amendment is not constitutionally subject to a referendum, the Government and Parliament should consider whether the issue is sufficiently fundamental to warrant the broadest possible public engagement before any decision is taken. The principle should be simple:

Where the question concerns the structure of power in the Republic, the people who are the ultimate source of that power should have the strongest possible voice.

The Executive should not be allowed to determine the matter solely on the basis of what is convenient for the Government of the day.

The Separation of Powers Is Not a Political Luxury

The separation of powers among the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary is not merely an academic constitutional principle.

It is a safeguard against the concentration and abuse of power.

Parliament must be sufficiently independent to scrutinise government expenditure, investigate public institutions, examine executive decisions and hold Ministers accountable.

The Judiciary must be sufficiently independent to interpret the Constitution and the laws of Ghana without interference.

The Executive must have the authority necessary to govern effectively, but that authority must be balanced by effective checks and oversight.

If the Executive and Legislature become too closely intertwined, the system of checks and balances may be weakened.

The question before Ghana, therefore, should not be: "What is convenient for the Government?"

The question should be:
"What constitutional arrangement will best protect the interests of the Ghanaian people, strengthen accountability, prevent the concentration of power and ensure effective

separation of powers for generations to come?"

The Government Must Remember Who Holds Sovereignty

The Government of Ghana must always remember that it is exercising power entrusted to it by the people.

The Constitution does not say that sovereignty resides in the President, the Cabinet, Parliament or any political party.

It says that sovereignty resides in the people of Ghana.

Therefore, while the Government has the constitutional right to express its opinion on the recommendations of the CRC, it should be cautious about rejecting a recommendation simply because it may reduce the Executive's influence over Parliament.

The people should not be asked for their views on constitutional reform only for their views to be discarded when those views become inconvenient to those in power.

A government that truly respects the sovereignty of the people should welcome reforms that strengthen democratic accountability, even when those reforms place greater restrictions on the Government itself.

Conclusion: The People Must Have the Final Word

Ghana's constitutional democracy belongs to the Ghanaian people.

The Government is temporary. Political parties come and go. Presidents serve limited terms. Ministers change. But the Constitution and the institutions of the Republic must endure.

For this reason, the debate over whether Ministers should be appointed from outside Parliament should not be reduced to a contest between the Government and the CRC.

It should be a national conversation about the kind of democracy Ghanaians want to bequeath to future generations.

If the Government believes that the CRC's recommendation is wrong, it should make its case openly and transparently before the Ghanaian people.

If Parliament disagrees, it should explain why.

If civil society disagrees, it should make its case.

But where the fundamental issue is whether the Executive and Legislature should be more clearly separated, the Government should not be both a beneficiary of the existing system and the final judge of whether that system should change.

That is why, if necessary, the matter should be placed before the people of Ghana through the constitutionally appropriate process, including a referendum where the Constitution requires one.

Ultimately, the guiding principle must remain the words of Article 1 of the 1992 Constitution:

Sovereignty resides in the people of Ghana. The Government does not own that sovereignty. It holds power in trust for the people.

And when the structure of that power itself is in question, the people must never be denied the opportunity to have the final word.

By Lawrence Bezagrebere