Conflict In North Kivu: When The M23 Uses Chinese Weapons

While international media coverage of the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo has intensified around its most visible protagonists, the M23 rebel movement, the Allied Democratic Forces, the Congolese national army known as FARDC, and Rwanda, one actor has consistently operated with far greater discretion.

The People's Republic of China has positioned itself publicly as a mediator in the conflict, organizing diplomatic visits to both Kinshasa and Kigali and repeatedly affirming its support for Congolese territorial integrity. Behind that carefully cultivated diplomatic posture, however, lies a materially different story: mounting evidence that Chinese-manufactured weapons, delivered to Rwanda and diverted into M23 hands, have become a significant enabler of one of the most consequential rebel advances Central Africa has seen in over a decade.

A decade-old conflict, an unprecedented advance
The conflict in North and South Kivu has ground on for more than ten years, but between late 2024 and early 2026 it entered a dramatically new phase. The M23 doubled its territorial control to roughly ten thousand square kilometers of Congolese territory, capturing both provincial capitals of Kivu, Goma and Bukavu, among other cities.

The movement, now rebranded in parts of its command structure as the AFC/M23 alliance, holds sway over more than five million people, backed by a force the United Nations Group of Experts has estimated at more than thirty thousand fighters including allied militias. This is not merely an incremental gain in a long-running insurgency; it represents a qualitative shift in the balance of power in eastern Congo.

The material explanation
Part of the explanation for the M23's battlefield success lies in a simple but underappreciated fact: the movement now fields weaponry of a quality equal to, and in some respects superior to, that of the Congolese national army it faces. Rwanda remains the M23's principal supplier of heavy weapons, exercising remote operational control over the movement in pursuit of access to Kivu's lucrative mineral wealth, including coltan, cassiterite, gold and wolframite. But Rwanda itself depends heavily on China for its own arsenal, and a substantial share of that Chinese-supplied equipment has, whether through direct transfer or battlefield diversion, ended up in M23 hands.

The Chinese footprint inside Rwanda's arsenal
Chinese-manufactured equipment can be found at nearly every level of the Rwandan Defence Force's inventory: Type-85 machine guns, HJ-9A armoured vehicles, CS/SH-1 self-propelled guns, Type-54 mortars, and large quantities of the Type 56 rifle, China's licensed variant of the AK-47. Analysts tracking arms flows in the region note that Beijing has been aware for years of the risks that weapons sold to Rwanda could be diverted into the hands of armed groups operating across the border, yet the sales, and the diversions, have continued.

A more direct channel: China Xinxing
Beyond the question of diversion through Rwanda, reporting from Congolese outlets including Politico.cd has pointed to a more direct channel of supply: the state-owned Guangzhou-based export company China Xinxing, described in company materials as Beijing's officially recognized and exclusive exporter of military supplies and logistical equipment. Images circulating on Congolese social media in recent months have shown Chinese-manufactured equipment, including a China Xinxing-branded NIJ IIIA FAST combat helmet sold exclusively through that company, in the possession of M23 fighters. FARDC forces have on multiple occasions’ recovered Chinese-made equipment abandoned by retreating M23 units after the capture of strategic positions, including helmets, boots, machine guns, bulletproof vests and rocket launchers.

What the equipment inventory shows
Congolese defence analyst Jean-Jacques Wondo Omanyundu, who has closely tracked the weapons recovered from M23 positions, has catalogued an inventory that is almost entirely Chinese in origin: 7.62 millimeter Type 80 Kalashnikov-pattern light machine guns, 7.62 millimeter Type 81 assault rifles, 120 millimeter and 117 millimeter mortars, and 40 millimeter Type 69 anti-tank rocket launchers, alongside older Soviet-era 82 millimeter mortars likely inherited from earlier conflict cycles. Photographic evidence has also documented a Chinese-made Type 63 107 millimeter gun in active M23 use, a Chinese variant of the Russian KM-8 Gran guided artillery shell, and a Chinese Type 92 Yitian armoured vehicle operated by M23 forces near Bumbi, close to Goma.

The diplomatic contradiction
This pattern sits awkwardly alongside Beijing's carefully maintained public posture as an evenhanded mediator in the Great Lakes conflict. China has organized diplomatic engagements with both Kinshasa and Kigali and has consistently voiced rhetorical support for Congolese territorial integrity even as its weapons, sold to Rwanda through official channels or exported through state-linked companies, continue to arm the very rebel movement violating that territorial integrity. Human Rights Watch has documented executions of civilians by M23 forces in Goma, meaning the atrocities enabled in part by this weapons pipeline are not abstract but form part of a documented human rights record.

Conclusion
China's role in the Kivu conflict illustrates a pattern increasingly familiar across African conflict zones: a great power publicly performing neutrality and mediation while its commercial and state-linked arms exports materially sustain one side of the fighting. Whether through the deliberate diversion risk Beijing has long been aware of in its Rwanda sales, or through more direct channels involving state-owned exporters like China Xinxing, the weapons recovered from M23 positions tell a story that China's diplomatic statements have yet to reconcile. For a conflict that has already displaced millions and claimed the two provincial capitals of Kivu, the question of who is arming the M23, and with whose knowledge, deserves far more scrutiny than it has so far received.

Mustapha Bature Sallama.
Medical/ Science Communicator,
Private Investigator, Criminal investigation and Intelligence Analysis.
International Conflict Management and Peace Building.USIP
[email protected]
+233-555-275-880

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