Policy Brief: Dealing with Expensive Rent and Traffic Congestion in Ghana by Hon Abilolo Billionaire

Theme: Urban Renewal, Infrastructure, Productivity, and Cost of Living

Executive Summary
Ghana’s public sector faces a silent productivity crisis. Thousands of essential workers being Nurses, Teachers, Doctors, Administrators, Engineers, and many other technical staff commute for up to 4 hours daily from distant suburbs like Oyarifa, Kasoa, Ejisu, Abuakwa, etc to reach the Central Business Districts (CBDs) and ministries in Accra and Kumasi for instance. This spatial inefficiency is eroding the quality of life of the nation’s workforce and constraining state capacity.

Current arrangements force young professionals to spend 40–60% of their net income on transportation and rent in distant, underserviced peripheries. Meanwhile, prime public land in city centres remains underutilized, occupied by low-rise, aging office blocks that fail to meet modern standards. There are sadly, instances of lands being leased or sold to private estate developers to raise buildings the average Ghanaian public sector worker can never afford to rent or purchase in a lifetime.

The Urban Core Reset proposes a radical yet pragmatic solution: the phased demolition and redevelopment of key government office precincts into high-density, mixed-use complexes. These complexes will integrate modern vertical office space with affordable rental staff apartments located within walking distance of workplaces.

This should not be reduced to a mere social housing programme; it is an economic productivity intervention. By reducing the time and money wasted on long commutes, the State can effectively give its workers a pay rise without altering the national pay structure, while simultaneously decongesting cities and stimulating the construction sector.

1. The Problem: The Cost of Dislocation
1.1 The Commute Tax
The current spatial arrangement of public sector work constitutes a hidden tax on the working class. A junior officer posted to the Ministries area in Accra, but residing in Oyarifa or Aburi due to affordable rent, incurs the following annual costs:

i. Time: ~720 hours lost annually in transit (based on a 3-hour daily round trip).

ii. Fuel/Transport: GHS 4,000–6,000 per annum.

iii. Health: Chronic fatigue and increased risk of road rage and accidents especially between vehicles and okada riders.

1.2 The Rent Gradient Myth
The assumption that “farther is cheaper” is increasingly false. While rent per square foot is lower in peri-urban areas, the total cost of living (rent + transport) often exceeds that of living closer to the CBD. Workers are paying a premium in time and transport to access cheaper rent, a trade-off that nets zero financial gain but results in significant productivity loss.

1.3 Underutilised Public Assets
Current public office infrastructure is horizontally sprawled. In Accra, the Ministries enclave comprises dozens of low-density, single-purpose buildings surrounded by vast areas of parking lots. This land, serviced by trunk infrastructure (water, electricity, fibre optics), I believe is operating below its economic potential.

2. The Policy Proposal: Redevelop, Density, Decongest

This policy proposes a 15-year National Public Sector Infrastructure Modernisation Programme, beginning with pilot phases in Accra (Ministries) and Kumasi (Adum).

Core Mechanism:
1. Land Value Capture: Government partners with the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT), State Housing Company (SHC), Ghana Association of Engineers, and private developers.

2. Vertical Integration: Existing low-rise office blocks will be demolished and replaced with high-rise towers (15–30 storeys).

3. Mixed-Use Zoning: The lower floors (1–10) will house consolidated government offices. The upper floors (11–30) will contain staff apartments.

4. On-site Accommodation: Workers assigned to that precinct will have the option to reside in these apartments, accessible via elevator or a short walk.

2.1 Housing Tenure Models
To ensure the policy remains administratively clean and fiscally sustainable, no ownership or mortgage-to-own scheme is attached.

a. Tenure: Units are rented exclusively to active duty public sector workers assigned to that precinct.

b. Subsidised Rental: For early-career staff (Years 1–5), rent is capped at 20% of net salary, significantly lower than current market rates in Cantonments, Airport Hills, or Ridge.

c. Exit: Upon transfer, retirement, or separation from service, the occupant vacates the unit within a stipulated notice period (60–90 days). The unit is reallocated to another eligible staff member.

d. Portability: Workers transferred to another region are eligible for similar accommodation in that region under the same rental terms.

This is staff housing and hence the State retains ownership of the asset in perpetuity, ensuring the benefit accrues to successive generations of public servants rather than being privatised upon retirement.

3. Rationale and Justification
i. Economic Efficiency
Current commuter patterns represent massive deadweight loss. The fuel burned and hours lost in traffic contribute nothing to GDP. By relocating workers vertically above their offices and in apartments within walking distance, we convert lost time into productive output and leisure.

ii. Lowering the Cost of Living
The single greatest strain on the young public sector worker is the combination of rent and transport. This policy directly addresses both simultaneously. In real terms, a worker who saves GHS 800 on transport and GHS 500 on rent has effectively received a GHS 1,300 monthly income boost, without inflationary pressure on the public sector wage bill.

iii. Climate and Congestion
Accra and Kumasi are gridlocked. While electric vehicles and BRT systems are long-term goals, the fastest way to reduce vehicle trips is to eliminate the need for the trip entirely. Decanting 5,000 workers into an on-site housing arrangement removes 5,000 vehicles from the morning and evening rush hours. They can travel home over the weekends, any way.

iv. Inter-Agency Collaboration
Co-locating related agencies (e.g., Ministry of Finance and Controller and Accountant General; Ministry of Health, Ghana Health Service and National Health Insurance Authority) in the same vertical hub reduces paperwork delays and improves communication.

4. Expected Impact
1. Financial Relief for the Youth:
Eliminates the urgency for young professionals to seek loans and unaffordable mortgages or endure exploitative rental agreements in far-flung areas. It stabilises the early-career phase.

2. National Productivity Gain:
Reduced absenteeism, reduced lateness, and higher cognitive performance from well-rested workers.

3. Urban Decongestion:
A measurable reduction in vehicular traffic entering the CBD core during peak hours, lowering emissions and fuel import bills.

4. Economic Stimulus:
The construction phase will create thousands of high-quality jobs for architects, engineers, masons, and electricians. Post-construction, the ground floors of these complexes will host retail and commercial services (pharmacies, banks, restaurants), creating a 24-hour economy within the civil service zone.

5. Asset Creation for the State:
Government transitions from owning depreciating single-storey buildings to owning appreciating high-value real estate assets.

5. Implementation Framework
Phase 1: Feasibility & Pilot (Months 1–12)

a. Audit: Ministry of Works and Housing to audit all government-owned land within a 2km radius of major ministries.

b. PPP Structuring: Establish the "Urban Core Redevelopment Authority" (UCRA) to oversee public-private partnerships.

c. Pilot 1 – Accra: Redevelop the block housing Ministries area.

d. Pilot 2 – Kumasi: Redevelop the Ashanti Regional Coordinating Council enclave.

Phase 2: Decanting & Construction (Years 2–5)

a. Temporary Relocation: Staff are moved to modular office spaces (or leased private offices) during demolition.

b. Vertical Construction: High-speed construction tenders to local firms with international technical partners.

Phase 3: Occupation & National Rollout (Years 5–10)

a. Allocation: Transparent bidding/application system for staff housing based on grade, years of service, and distance travelled previously.

b. Expansion: Replicate model in Sekondi-Takoradi, Tamale, and Cape Coast.

6. Costing and Financing
NB: This whole redevelopment must be guided by the fact that it is a public investment with very much needed returns.

i. Primary Financing: Private developers finance construction in exchange for long-term management rights of the residential units and commercial retail spaces (Design, Build, Finance, Operate model).

ii. Public Contribution: Government contributes the land (already owned) and guarantees the occupancy of office floors via long-term leases.

iii. Annuity Savings: Savings from reduced fuel import burden and reduced maintenance of old buildings are redirected into the project.

7. Political Value Proposition
For the policymaker or candidate, this policy offers a tangible, visible legacy.

1. Visible Transformation: It moves beyond promises of "fixing the economy" to actually rebuilding the physical landscape of our cities.

2. Solves a Tangible Pain: Every young worker in Accra knows the pain of the Oyarifa-Ministries commute. Fixing this is more politically resonant than abstract macroeconomic stability.

3. Multi-Term Project: It is a generational project that frames the leader as a nation-builder, not just a caretaker.

8. Conclusion
The current situation, where the very people who administer the state spend their lives in transit rather than in service or rest, is unsustainable and demoralising.

The Urban Core Reset reimagines the relationship between the Ghanaian worker and the State. It recognises that the worker is not a resource to be extracted from the periphery each morning, but a citizen who deserves to live with dignity within the city they help to build.

By leveraging the latent value of our urban lands, we can lower the cost of living, boost productivity, and reshape Ghana’s cities for the 21st century.

Thanks for Reading.
© Michael A. Sarfo-Kantanka
[email protected]