A “Legacy-Defining” Strike on Iran? History Suggests Otherwise

Calls for a dramatic showdown with Iran have become a recurring feature of American politics. The latest comes from former US Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley, who argues that President Donald Trump has a “legacy-defining” opportunity to “nip Iran in the bud” by ending its nuclear ambitions once and for all. It is a striking phrase, decisive, muscular, morally certain. But it is also deeply misleading. The idea that a single burst of American resolve, military or otherwise, could permanently neutralize Iran’s nuclear programme ignores decades of evidence about how nuclear proliferation, deterrence, regional politics and unintended consequences actually work.

If history offers any lesson, it is that efforts to eliminate nuclear programmes through coercion alone rarely produce finality. More often, they produce delay, retaliation and long-term instability.

The Record of Military Solutions
Proponents of a harder line often point to Israel’s 1981 strike on Iraq’s Osirak reactor or the 2007 bombing of Syria’s Al-Kibar facility as proof that decisive action can end nuclear threats. Yet the broader historical record complicates that narrative. Israel’s strike on Osirak did not end Saddam Hussein’s nuclear ambitions. According to post-1991 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections, Iraq expanded and dispersed its nuclear programme after the attack, accelerating clandestine efforts under tighter secrecy. Scholars such as Dan Reiter and Richard Betts have argued that preventive strikes often reinforce a regime’s determination to acquire nuclear deterrence, not abandon it.

The US experience with Iraq in 2003 is even more sobering. A war launched in part over weapons of mass destruction that did not exist cost over 4,400 American lives and, by some estimates, more than 200,000 Iraqi civilian lives. Brown University’s Costs of War project estimates the total financial cost to the US at over $2 trillion. Rather than producing regional stability, the invasion destabilized Iraq, empowered Iranian influence in Baghdad and contributed to the rise of ISIS.

Military action against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure today would likely produce similar results: delay, not destruction. Iran’s facilities are dispersed, hardened and in some cases buried deep underground, such as the Fordow enrichment plant, constructed inside a mountain near Qom. US intelligence assessments over the years have consistently suggested that airstrikes could set the programme back by perhaps one to three years, but not eliminate the technical knowledge or infrastructure entirely.

Nuclear expertise cannot be bombed out of existence.

The JCPOA
Haley frames the choice as one between “Obama 2.0” diplomacy and decisive strength. But the empirical record of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) undermines the suggestion that negotiation equals weakness. Under the JCPOA, Iran reduced its stockpile of enriched uranium by 98 percent, from roughly 10,000 kilograms to 300 kilograms. It dismantled two-thirds of its centrifuges and allowed continuous IAEA monitoring of key facilities. According to IAEA reports between 2015 and 2018, Iran was in verified compliance with its obligations.

Most importantly, the agreement extended Iran’s “breakout time”, the time required to produce enough fissile material for a single nuclear weapon, from an estimated two to three months to roughly one year.

After the United States withdrew from the deal in 2018 and reimposed sanctions, Iran gradually resumed enrichment activities. By 2023, the IAEA reported that Iran had enriched uranium to 60 percent purity, far closer to weapons-grade levels than under the JCPOA. Its stockpile expanded dramatically and breakout time shrank again to a matter of weeks, according to independent assessments. The evidence is clear: when diplomacy was in force, Iran’s programme was constrained and monitored. When it collapsed, the programme advanced. That is not a partisan talking point; it is a matter of documented inspection data.

Sanctions and Their Limits
Haley argues that Washington must maintain maximalist demands: zero enrichment, no ballistic missile programme, no support for regional proxies and expanded political freedoms. These may be morally appealing goals. But in negotiation theory and diplomatic practice, maximalist demands often guarantee stalemate. The Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign imposed some of the harshest sanctions ever levied on Iran. Iranian oil exports fell from roughly 2.5 million barrels per day in 2017 to under 500,000 in 2019. The country’s GDP contracted sharply, by around 6 percent in 2018 and nearly 7 percent in 2019, according to World Bank data. Inflation surged above 40 percent.

Yet the sanctions did not compel Iran to capitulate on enrichment. Instead, Tehran responded by escalating regionally, targeting Gulf shipping, downing a US drone in 2019 and supporting proxy attacks on US forces in Iraq. Economic pain alone rarely produces regime surrender, especially in authoritarian systems that can shift burdens onto populations. Cuba, North Korea and Venezuela all demonstrate the durability of sanctioned regimes. Sanctions can create leverage, but they are not magic wands.

The Deterrence Paradox
There is another uncomfortable reality: nuclear programmes are often pursued precisely because states feel threatened. Security scholars call this the “security dilemma”. Iran is surrounded by nuclear-armed states (Pakistan and Israel) and by US military forces in the Gulf. It witnessed regime change in Iraq and Libya, both of which lacked nuclear deterrents, while North Korea, which acquired nuclear weapons, remains intact.

Libya’s case is particularly instructive. Muammar Gaddafi abandoned his nascent nuclear programme in 2003 in exchange for sanctions relief and normalization. Eight years later, NATO intervened militarily during Libya’s civil war. From Tehran’s perspective, that sequence reinforced the lesson that disarmament does not guarantee regime security. Thus, threats of force may accelerate the very behaviour they seek to prevent. If Iranian leaders believe regime survival is at stake, they may conclude that nuclear deterrence is the ultimate insurance policy.

Regional Consequences
Any US strike on Iran would not occur in a vacuum. Iran possesses a vast network of regional proxies and partners, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, various militias in Iraq and Syria and the Houthis in Yemen. Hezbollah alone is estimated by Israeli intelligence to possess over 100,000 rockets and missiles capable of striking Israeli territory. A conflict involving Iran could easily expand into a multi-front regional war, drawing in Israel, Gulf states and potentially US bases across the Middle East.

The Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly 20 percent of global oil supplies pass, would be a likely flashpoint. Even temporary disruption could spike global energy prices, as seen in 2019 when attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure briefly cut production by half and sent prices surging nearly 15 percent in a single day.

In an interconnected global economy, escalation in the Gulf reverberates worldwide.

The Myth of “All for Nothing”

Haley warns that without decisive action, previous efforts will have been “all for nothing”. But foreign policy is rarely binary. Outcomes exist on a spectrum of risk management. The goal of nonproliferation has never been absolute eradication of knowledge. It has been containment, monitoring and delay, buying time and reducing incentives for weaponization. Even partial constraints matter. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), despite its flaws, has limited the number of nuclear-armed states to nine, far fewer than predicted in the 1960s, when US officials feared 20 to 30 nuclear states by the end of the century.

Diplomacy does not guarantee trust. It provides verification.

Domestic Politics vs. Strategic Prudence

There is also a domestic political dimension. Framing Iran policy as a “legacy-defining moment” personalizes a complex strategic challenge. It shifts the focus from long-term stability to presidential stature. History shows that leaders who seek transformative foreign policy legacies often underestimate second-order consequences. The Iraq War was framed in part as a decisive stand against proliferation and tyranny. Its aftermath reshaped the Middle East in ways few anticipated, and not in Washington’s favour.

A durable legacy in foreign policy is less often forged through dramatic gestures than through sustained coalition-building. The original JCPOA succeeded partly because it included the European Union, Russia and China, creating multilateral pressure and legitimacy. Unilateral action, by contrast, can isolate Washington diplomatically.

A More Sustainable Path
None of this is to suggest complacency about Iran’s nuclear advances. Tehran’s enrichment to 60 percent is alarming. Its ballistic missile development is destabilizing. Its support for armed proxies fuels regional insecurity. But sustainable solutions likely require a combination of calibrated pressure and pragmatic diplomacy. This might include phased sanctions relief tied to verifiable enrichment caps, regional security dialogues involving Gulf states and parallel efforts to de-escalate proxy conflicts. Such an approach is less rhetorically satisfying than “nipping it in the bud”. It is also more consistent with empirical evidence.

Conclusion
The temptation to frame Iran as a problem that can be solved once and for all through decisive action is understandable. It offers clarity in a murky landscape. But international politics rarely rewards simplicity. The historical record, from Iraq to Libya to North Korea, demonstrates that military strikes and maximalist ultimatums do not eliminate nuclear knowledge or strategic motivations. At best, they buy time. At worst, they ignite wider wars.

If there is a lesson from the past two decades of Middle Eastern conflict, it is that unintended consequences often dwarf intended ones. A truly “legacy-defining” achievement would not be a dramatic strike, but a durable framework that verifiably constrains Iran’s nuclear programme while reducing regional tensions. That requires patience, coalition-building and realism about what power can and cannot achieve.

Strength is not measured solely by force. Sometimes it is measured by restraint backed by credible verification. History suggests that the difference matters.

The writer is a journalist, journalism lecturer, and a member of the Ghana Journalists Association, the Society of Professional Journalists, Investigative Reporters and Editors and the African Journalism Education Network.