From Europe to South Asia: Cyber power moves into the battlespace

In Europe, the shift is being driven by the need to keep transportation networks, government systems and critical infrastructure functioning during a major crisis. In South Asia, the May 2025 India-Pakistan confrontation demonstrated a more operational version of the same trend: cyber capabilities being integrated with air power, electronic warfare, intelligence and information operations.

The missions are different. Europe is primarily building resilience and coordinated response mechanisms, while Pakistan has described offensive cyber operations conducted during an armed confrontation. But both point toward the same strategic reality: military effectiveness increasingly depends on digital systems, information advantage and the ability to connect different domains of warfare.

Europe turns cyber resilience into defense infrastructure

Cyber Europe 2026 made that connection unusually visible. On June 10 and 11, around 5,000 specialists participated in an EU-wide exercise simulating coordinated attacks on rail and maritime networks.

The scenario reflected the dual-use nature of European infrastructure. Railways that move passengers and freight in peacetime may also carry troops and equipment during a crisis, while commercial ports can become reinforcement and logistics hubs.

That creates a new vulnerability. A railway does not have to be physically destroyed to become militarily ineffective; disrupting signaling, communications or logistics software may be enough to slow military movement.

The exercise also tested mechanisms associated with the EU Cyber Blueprint and Cybersecurity Reserve, reinforcing a broader strategic principle: military mobility increasingly depends on digital survivability.

Ukraine is being drawn deeper into this architecture. The EU launched EU4CyberUA, a €10 million program running from 2026 to 2029 to strengthen critical infrastructure, government information systems, professional training and cooperation between Ukrainian and European institutions. Kyiv has also gained access to support through the EU Cybersecurity Reserve.

This goes beyond conventional technical assistance. Ukraine is increasingly being connected to mechanisms Europe is developing for its own resilience.

That does not amount to a NATO-style collective-defense guarantee. But it shows how security integration can deepen through shared standards, institutions and emergency-response mechanisms even before formal alliance structures change.

Cyber defense is also moving into operational planning. At the June 22 EU Military Staff-NATO International Military Staff conference, cyber issues were discussed alongside logistics, intelligence, communications, space and military mobility.

Europe is therefore treating cyber resilience less as an isolated IT concern and more as infrastructure necessary to keep governments, transportation systems and military forces functioning under pressure.

Pakistan’s multi-domain approach in South Asia

The May 2025 India-Pakistan confrontation illustrated the same technological convergence under very different strategic conditions.

Aircraft, missiles, drones, electronic warfare, intelligence systems and cyber capabilities increasingly formed parts of an interconnected battlespace. Pakistan associated its cyber activity with Operation Divine Bytes, which Pakistani accounts presented as part of a broader effort to integrate cyber capabilities with conventional air operations, electronic warfare and information systems.

Pakistan Air Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmed Babar Sidhu later said PAF cyber forces had targeted Indian communication hubs, power grids and transport infrastructure during the four-day confrontation.

India did not publicly confirm the claimed effects, and cyber operations are inherently difficult to verify independently. Establishing that a system was disrupted, identifying who caused it and determining its military impact are separate questions.

But the strategic significance of Pakistan’s experience lies less in individual claims of cyber success than in the PAF’s apparent effort to integrate multiple capabilities within a common operational framework.

That represents an important evolution in air power.

Traditional assessments often concentrate on aircraft numbers, missile ranges or individual platforms. Modern air warfare increasingly depends on whether those platforms are connected to reliable intelligence, communications, electronic warfare, surveillance and cyber systems.

In that environment, the ability to process information quickly, disrupt an adversary’s networks and coordinate effects across multiple domains can become as important as the performance of any single aircraft.

Operation Divine Bytes therefore matters not because it proves absolute technological superiority over India, but because it points toward a PAF increasingly organized around information advantage, cross-domain coordination and faster decision-making.

This is consistent with a broader shift toward multi-domain warfare in which aircraft, drones, electronic warfare, cyber operations and intelligence are planned as complementary capabilities rather than separate functions.

That approach can create an operational advantage if one force is able to detect threats, process information and coordinate responses more quickly than its opponent.

In this sense, the PAF case is significant as evidence of doctrinal adaptation. It suggests a move beyond a platform-centric concept of air power toward a networked model in which cyber and electronic effects can reinforce conventional operations.

South Asia, however, adds an additional layer of risk.

India and Pakistan are nuclear-armed rivals, and cyber operations can create ambiguous signals during fast-moving crises. An intrusion into military communications, surveillance systems or a power grid could be interpreted either as limited disruption or preparation for a wider attack.

Attribution takes time, while modern command systems are accelerating decision cycles. That combination can make escalation harder to control.

Different missions, one changing battlespace

Europe and South Asia are not pursuing identical cyber strategies.

Europe is emphasizing resilience, continuity and collective response. Pakistan’s experience illustrates how cyber capabilities can be integrated directly with conventional military operations.

Yet both reveal the same transformation.
Modern military power depends increasingly on networks connecting sensors, communications, logistics, intelligence and weapons systems. A force that cannot protect those networks or exploit weaknesses in an opponent’s may struggle even if it possesses advanced conventional platforms.

The same dependence also narrows the distinction between civilian and military infrastructure. Power grids, telecommunications networks, ports and railways serve civilians while simultaneously supporting military operations. Cyber activity directed at strategic logistics can therefore spill rapidly into civilian life.

The emerging contest is consequently not simply over who has the better fighter, missile or drone.

Increasingly, it is about who can see first, understand first, decide first and act first.

Europe’s resilience drive and Pakistan’s multi-domain experience arrive from different strategic directions, but both point toward the same future: cyber capability is moving closer to the core of military power.

The next major conflict may still become visible through aircraft, missiles or drones. But the decisive contest may already be under way inside the networks that determine whether those systems can operate effectively at all.

Saima Afzal is a researcher specializing in South Asian security, counterterrorism, and broader geopolitical dynamics across the Middle East, Afghanistan, and the Indo-Pacific. Her work examines strategic affairs and evolving patterns of regional conflict. She is currently a Research Scholar at Justus Liebig University, Germany.