The layman’s version: IMF’ 2026 Article IV Consultation and Sixth Review (Ghana)

Ghana may have fixed the government's immediate debt problem. But if state-owned companies continue to lose money, the next fiscal crisis could quietly build outside the national budget.

When most Ghanaians hear the words "government debt", they probably think about money borrowed directly by the government.

But there is another side of Ghana's financial problem that is much less visible.

It is the money owed, lost or accumulated by companies and institutions owned or controlled by the government.

These are known as State-Owned Enterprises, or SOEs.

They include important institutions involved in electricity, cocoa, petroleum, water, banking, oil and gas and other strategic sectors.

The International Monetary Fund's latest 2026 Article IV consultation and final review of Ghana's IMF programme makes one thing clear:

Ghana cannot achieve lasting financial stability unless it deals with the financial problems of its state-owned enterprises.

What Exactly Is a State-Owned Enterprise?

Let us start with the basics.
A State-Owned Enterprise is simply a company owned wholly or partly by the government.

The idea behind having such companies is understandable.

Government may want to control businesses that are considered too important to leave entirely to the private sector.

Electricity, water, petroleum, cocoa and banking are examples of sectors that can have major implications for national development.

The problem begins when these companies consistently spend more money than they generate.

The Hidden Nature of the Problem
This is what makes SOEs particularly dangerous.

When government spends GH¢1 billion building a road, that expenditure appears in the national budget.

But when a state-owned company accumulates unpaid bills, borrows money or fails to collect revenue, the problem may not immediately look like government spending.

Yet eventually government may have to step in.

This is what economists call a contingent liability.

That tells us something important:
SOE problems are not separate from Ghana's national debt problem.

They are part of it.
ECG: The Elephant in the Room
Perhaps the clearest example is the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG).

Electricity is one of the most important services in any economy.

Factories need electricity.
Banks need electricity.
Hospitals need electricity.
Schools need electricity.
Small businesses need electricity.
Households need electricity.
But electricity also costs money to generate, transmit and distribute.

If ECG supplies electricity but fails to collect enough money from customers, a financial hole develops.

And that hole does not simply disappear.
Ghana cannot afford to keep pouring public money into an electricity system that does not collect enough revenue to pay for the electricity it distributes.

The Problem Is Not Simply Electricity Prices

It is important to understand that the solution is not simply to increase electricity tariffs.

If tariffs go up but ECG continues losing electricity or failing to collect bills, the fundamental problem remains.

The IMF's concern is therefore broader.
Ghana needs to improve:
Collection.
Efficiency.
Payment discipline.
Loss reduction.
Management.
Transparency.
Accountability.
The goal should be to create an electricity distribution system that can stand financially on its own.

And Then There Is COCOBOD
The second major SOE issue identified by the IMF is Ghana Cocoa Board — COCOBOD.

COCOBOD plays an extremely important role in Ghana's economy.

It supports cocoa farmers, organizes the marketing of cocoa and has historically played a major role in financing the cocoa sector.

But the organization has also accumulated significant financial obligations.

The IMF's debt analysis specifically includes COCOBOD's gross debt in the assessment of Ghana's public-sector debt because of the organization's significant involvement in activities that can have fiscal consequences.

The Cocoa Price Problem
The price paid to cocoa farmers has to balance several competing interests.

Farmers need a price high enough to make cocoa farming attractive.

But COCOBOD also needs to be financially capable of buying and marketing the cocoa.

If the price paid to farmers is increased significantly without properly considering the financial position of the sector, the system can eventually develop another funding gap.

The IMF therefore points to more frequent farmgate price adjustments and reforms to streamline costs and improve efficiency.

This is not necessarily about paying farmers less.

It is about ensuring that the entire cocoa system is financially sustainable.

Ghana's Recent Crisis Shows Why This Matters

Ghana's recent debt crisis did not happen because of one single mistake.

Several problems came together.
Government deficits increased.
Debt accumulated.
Interest costs increased.
The cedi weakened.
Inflation increased.
Investor confidence fell.
And financial obligations accumulated across different parts of the public sector.

The IMF's current message is essentially:

Do not allow these problems to build up again.

The Fund specifically says Ghana needs stronger fiscal-risk management and stronger oversight of SOEs and quasi-fiscal activities.

The IMF Is Also Watching State-Owned Banks

The SOE problem is not limited to electricity and cocoa.

Ghana also has state-owned financial institutions.

The IMF's 2026 assessment says vulnerabilities remain in some state-owned and private banks and specialized deposit-taking institutions. It calls for stronger supervision, corrective measures and restructuring strategies where necessary.

Why does this matter?
Because when a government-owned bank gets into serious financial trouble, taxpayers can eventually be asked to rescue it.

Ghana has already experienced the enormous cost of cleaning up problems in the financial sector.

The lesson should therefore be:
Government ownership does not guarantee financial safety.

State-owned banks must be run as professionally and responsibly as any other financial institution.

The Numbers Show Why Ghana Cannot Relax

The IMF's July 2026 assessment shows that Ghana has made major progress.

Real GDP grew by 6.0% in 2025, while growth reached 6.4% year-on-year in the first quarter of 2026.

Inflation fell to 5.4% at the end of 2025 and 5.3% in June 2026.

Ghana's primary fiscal balance improved to a 2.1% of GDP surplus in 2025.

Public debt also fell significantly, with the IMF's latest projections putting gross public debt at 48.8% of GDP in 2025 and 52.6% in 2026 under the latest projections.

These are major improvements.
But the IMF is effectively saying:
Do not celebrate too early.
The recovery must be protected.
And one of the ways to protect it is to stop SOEs from creating new financial problems.

The 45% Debt Target Is Still Important

Ghana has a long-term debt anchor of 45% of GDP by 2034.

The IMF says the current fiscal strategy can preserve that target.

But that assumes Ghana controls its financial risks.

If SOEs accumulate large new debts and government eventually has to absorb those debts, Ghana could move away from the 45% target.

So when we talk about Ghana reducing public debt, we should not look only at the Ministry of Finance.

We must also look at:
ECG.
COCOBOD.
State-owned banks.
Energy-sector obligations.
Other SOEs.
Government guarantees.
Arrears.
These can all affect the taxpayer.
What About Privatization?
The IMF has pointed to private-sector participation as part of the solution in electricity distribution.

This does not necessarily mean that everything must be sold.

It means Ghana should be willing to ask a basic question:

Who can provide the service most efficiently and sustainably?

If government can operate something efficiently, there is a case for government ownership.

If private participation can improve efficiency, reduce losses and protect taxpayers, that option should also be seriously considered.

The issue should not be ideological.
The issue should be:
What gives Ghanaians the best service at the lowest sustainable cost?

What Should Ghana Do About Its SOEs?
The IMF's message points toward several practical solutions.

1. Know exactly how much each SOE owes

Government should maintain a complete and regularly updated picture of SOE debts, guarantees, arrears and other financial obligations.

2. Make SOEs publish reliable financial information

Ghanaians should be able to see how much these companies earn, spend, borrow and owe.

3. Stop automatic bailouts
A government company should not assume that taxpayers will always rescue it.

4. Set clear performance targets
SOEs should be measured against clear targets for revenue, costs, productivity and profitability where appropriate.

5. Professionalize management
Appointments should be based increasingly on competence, experience and performance rather than political considerations.

6. Fix the energy sector
Reduce electricity losses, improve collections, enforce payment discipline and deal with old debts.

7. Complete the COCOBOD turnaround
COCOBOD needs a financially sustainable model that protects farmers while preventing the organization from accumulating unsustainable obligations.

8. Strengthen state-owned banks
Weak banks should be restructured or recapitalized where necessary, with strong supervision.

9. Bring hidden liabilities into the open

If government may eventually have to pay a debt, taxpayers deserve to know about it today.

10. Make Parliament and the public part of the oversight process

Major government guarantees and potentially costly SOE obligations should receive proper scrutiny.

The Bigger Lesson From the IMF
The most important message from the IMF's 2026 report is that Ghana cannot simply look at the government's annual budget and declare the country's finances healthy.

We need to look at the whole public sector.

How much does ECG owe?
How much does COCOBOD owe?
What obligations are sitting with other SOEs?

How much government-guaranteed debt exists?
What arrears are accumulating?
What risks are sitting with state-owned banks?

What financial commitments could eventually become government debt?

These questions matter because the next Ghanaian fiscal crisis may not begin with government announcing that it has borrowed too much.

It may begin quietly inside a government-owned company.

The Question Ghanaians Should Be Asking

When government announces that Ghana's debt is falling, we should celebrate.

But we should also ask:
What is happening to the debts of government-owned companies?

When government says the budget is balanced, we should ask:

Are SOEs accumulating unpaid bills that government will eventually have to pay?

When government announces a new project, we should ask:

Who will operate it, who will pay for it and who will carry the financial risk if it fails?

And when government creates a new state-owned company, we should ask:

What is the business case?
These are not anti-government questions.
They are taxpayer-protection questions.

Conclusion: Ghana Must Stop Hiding Fiscal Problems in Plain Sight

Ghana has spent years trying to escape a debt crisis.

Inflation has fallen.
Growth has recovered.
Foreign reserves have increased.
Debt sustainability has improved.
Investor confidence is returning.
But the country cannot afford to repeat the same mistakes that brought it to the IMF in the first place.

And one of the biggest lessons from the IMF's 2026 assessment is this:

Fiscal discipline must extend beyond the national budget.

It must reach every government-owned company.

Every government guarantee.
Every unpaid bill.
Every state-owned bank.
Every energy-sector obligation.
Every cocoa-sector liability.
Every quasi-fiscal activity.
Because at the end of the day, there is no such thing as a completely "hidden" government debt.

Eventually, somebody pays.
And when the company is owned by government, that somebody is usually the Ghanaian taxpayer.

Ghana therefore needs a new culture of state ownership:

Own strategically.
Manage professionally.
Report transparently.
Measure performance.
Stop waste.
Reward efficiency.
And do not automatically make taxpayers responsible for every failure.

The IMF has helped Ghana stabilize its economy.

But the next stage is even more important.
Ghana must ensure that the companies it owns do not become the reason it needs another rescue.

The next fiscal crisis may not come from the government's borrowing.

It may come quietly from the debts government-owned companies are accumulating today.

Reference
IMF — Ghana: 2026 Article IV Consultation and Sixth Review announcement

About the Author
Dr. Philip Takyi is a seasoned Financial Security and Risk Management Expert with over 20 years of executive experience spanning corporate governance, financial systems protection, and strategic risk advisory across Africa, Europe, Latin America, and the United States. A member of several professional bodies in Africa and the United States, he holds a Doctorate from SBS Swiss Business School (Switzerland), along with a Master of Business Administration, Finance (UG-Ghana) and a Master of Applied Business Research (SBS, Switzerland), complemented by Executive MBA in cybersecurity from Ottawa University (USA) and BSc. Banking and Finance (UG-Ghana). He is a member of Chartered Institute of Bankers (Nigeria), Doctoral Fellow of Chartered Institute of Financial and Investment Analysts (Ghana), member of Chartered Institute of Leadership & Governance (USA), among others.

A financial consultant with a strong focus on financial security innovation, cyber-enabled risk management, and governance transformation. He currently leads PTSolutionz Investments LLC (USA), a consultancy supporting Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) in adopting advanced, technology-driven solutions to address complex financial and operational risks in an increasingly digital global economy.