Where it is. The dark fleet is mostly a paper presence in West Africa, with some physical activity offshore. Its main foothold is in the region's ship registries. Benin, Comoros,
The Gambia, Guinea and Sierra Leone have all seen large increases in registered tonnage linked to high-risk shadow-fleet tankers. Moscow's attraction is concealment. Researchers say African flags let the fleet hide the true ownership of its tankers.
Cameroon is the hotspot. By the end of April 2026, 127 of the 193 vessels flying its flag had been identified as shadow fleet. In January 2026 it accounted for 13 per cent of all sanctioned tankers worldwide.
Between December 2025 and February 2026 alone, 37 tankers registered there. On 29 May, Cameroon's transport minister announced sanctions on about 40 vessels after an audit, following a freeze on suspicious registrations and the deregistration of more than 20 vessels.
The others.
Sierra Leone: 85 tankers registered there are currently sanctioned by the EU.
Guinea: It has seen a 76 per cent expansion in shadow-fleet-linked registered tonnage.
Benin: It sent the IMO a formal complaint in October 2025 after finding that 33 vessels were operating illegally under its flag.
A moving target. The fleet adapts quickly. In one week, 20 tankers dropped false flags and registered with Cameroon's obscure but legitimate registry. A crackdown in one registry can therefore push vessels to the next. The IMO found that half of all reported fraudulent ship registrations occur in Africa.
At sea. The Gulf of Guinea is also a transfer zone. Ship-tracking data, in an older October 2024 analysis, showed ship-to-ship transfers off West Africa spiking 65 per cent year on year. The analysis suspected Iranian and Venezuelan cargoes, with weak enforcement making the region a natural hub.
The danger is not only sanctions. Ukrainian long-range strikes have reached as far as Senegal, with the December 2025 strike on the MT Mersin showing the region is not immune.
A catastrophic spill would cause considerable harm. There is also a laundering risk. Sanctioned crude could be transferred so that it looks Nigerian, as in a 2014 scheme laundered through Ghana's Salt Pond facility.
The response. Analysts point to the new Combined Maritime Task Force, which focuses on operations, and to Ghana's recent legislation making it harder for criminals to operate. But registry audits are reactive, and few coastal states can monitor their waters at scale.
The other side. Registry states say they are open for business, and some have acted once presented with evidence. Operators argue that these cargoes are legal trade, since sanctions are imposed by Western governments, not the UN. Enforcement bodies counter that falsified papers and switched-off trackers are not lawful commerce.
Mustapha Bature Sallama
Medical/ Science Communicator,
Private Investigator, Criminal Investigation and Intelligence Analysis,
International Conflict Management and Peacebuilding. (USIP)
[email protected]
+233555275880
Sources: Africa Defense Forum (12 May 2026); ModernGhana, "Ghost Ships and African Flags"; ModernGhana, "Sovereignty Stolen at Sea"; FTM; S&P Global (Oct 2024); DefenceWeb (9 Nov 2026).



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