From a geography of blocs to a geography of civilisations: Europe between Minsk, Belgrade and the Adriatic

In contemporary geopolitics, the continent’s most consequential maps are no longer drawn by armies and generals. They are increasingly shaped by knowledge, the economy, digital networks and shared interests. When corridors matter more than trenches, borders become points of connection and data emerges as a new form of strategic energy, security ceases to be merely a defensive wall against threats and becomes the capacity to foster a space of stability, connectivity and strategic resilience.

The greatest victory in the twenty-first century lies not in defeating an adversary within the very environment that sustains its power, but in transforming that environment itself – reshaping it so that conflict loses its rationale and the interests of peace become incomparably stronger than the impulses that lead to war.

Europe today stands before the mirror of its own history. Over recent decades, the continent has suffered not from a lack of power, but from an excess of militarised geography that has deepened divisions. Each new crisis has expanded military geography at the expense of economic and developmental connectivity, while the balance of power—though capable of postponing war—rarely eradicated its underlying causes. The real strategic question is therefore no longer simply how much military power a state possesses, but the environment in which that power is exercised and the nature of geography created by its alliances. Europe consequently faces a choice between a geography shaped by fatalism and buffer zones and one built on networks, interdependence and civilisational connectivity.

Belarus stands at the centre of this transformation, strategically positioned between Russia and the EU/NATO, with broader significance for European security and continental communication routes. Across the wider European landscape stretches a belt of non-EU states – Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and other Western Balkan countries – whose geographical location further links central, eastern and south-eastern Europe and the Adriatic and Mediterranean.

These are neither territories on the periphery of other powers’ spheres of interest nor isolated entities. On the contrary, they form part of a wider interconnected macro-region and constitute an inseparable and crucial part of both Eurasia and the Euro-Mediterranean area. From the Belarusian plains linking the Baltic to the Eurasian landmass, through Serbia's Danube and Morava corridors, to the Adriatic-Ionian basin, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, this belt constitutes a crucial geographical and infrastructural bridge between continental Eurasia and the economic openness of the Mediterranean. It is across this wider space, a veritable bridge between Eurasian strategic depth and the Mediterranean, that a new geography of the future is being forged – one in which crises are not addressed through force alone, but their root causes are gradually diminished through connectivity, interdependence and shared prosperity.

1. Belarus – a strategic node in European and Eurasian geography

Belarus occupies a pivotal geopolitical space where Russian, European and transatlantic security interests converge. Particularly sensitive in this context is the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, territorially separated from the rest of Russia and surrounded by NATO member states. Its geographic isolation, coupled with the position of the Suwałki Gap, makes the area one of the more vulnerable points in Europe’s security architecture. Any serious threat to Russia’s strategic interests in Kaliningrad would carry the risk of wider military escalation, including a nuclear dimension, and would pose a major security challenge for Europe.

Situated on one of the key continental routes linking the Russian landmass with the Baltic and Central Europe, Belarus occupies a geographical position whose significance extends far beyond its national borders and has a direct bearing on Europe’s security architecture. Consequently, this territory should not be perceived only as a potential line of confrontation, but also as an area where stability, predictability and communication links carry broader European significance. In this regard, Minsk can be viewed as an important node in the wider reshaping of Europe’s security geography – from a space marked by division and heightened tensions towards one in which dialogue, economic connectivity and institutional predictability could reduce the risks of confrontation.

By virtue of its geographical location, Belarus therefore remains one of the crucial strategic areas in Europe’s security landscape, while also serving as a zone of encounter, competition and tension between Russia, NATO and the European Union.

This dimension of Belarus’s potential needs to be understood against the broader transformation of power in the contemporary world. Even before its relations with the West deteriorated, Belarus had developed a substantial IT sector, clustered in particular around the High-Tech Park. The digital economy, artificial intelligence and IT service exports constituted a critical pillar of its economic structure, while the country’s logistical capabilities and geographical location rendered Belarus a vital link in corridors connecting East and West. In this sense, power today is defined less and less by the volume of steel and increasingly by the capacity to manage information, technology, infrastructure and logistical flows.

This convergence of geography, technology and logistics demonstrates that Belarus’s strategic importance derives not only from its location between Russia and the European sphere, but also from its capacity to build its own economic and technological capabilities. The country can therefore be viewed not merely through the lens of security risks, but also in terms of the regional value of its infrastructure, digital networks and communication potential.

In this context, shifts in relations between Washington and Minsk show that Belarus, despite profound geopolitical confrontation, remains a country that major powers must continue to reckon with. The relationship between US President Donald Trump and Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko dates back to Trump’s first term in the White House and at certain stages was characterised by more direct diplomatic communication and efforts to open channels of dialogue with Minsk via special envoys. This evolution illustrates that even amidst deep geopolitical divisions, opportunities exist for pragmatic diplomacy whenever mutual interests align.

This reinforces a broader principle underlying this analysis: geography can be both a source of vulnerability and an asset of diplomatic significance. Contemporary strategic power is not confined to leveraging geography as a shield; it also lies in the ability to turn geographical potential into an instrument of connectivity, stability and cooperation. Seen in this light, Belarus demonstrates how a country exposed to sustained geopolitical pressure may also possess the potential to become part of a wider network of economic, infrastructural and communication links.

2. Serbia – a continental state and a regional network of corridors

The same logic of civilisational geography as a geography of connectivity applies equally to Serbia. The fact that it is landlocked does not necessarily pose an obstacle to its economic and strategic development. Switzerland, Austria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary demonstrate that the lack of a coastline does not in itself determine a country’s prosperity, influence or level of development. The sea is not destiny; what increasingly matters are networks, corridors and the capacity to connect with wider economic areas.

Civilisational geography, in this sense, is not a geography of civilisational blocs but of connections – one in which infrastructure, institutions, knowledge, the economy and communication can transform geographical space from a potential zone of conflict into an arena of cooperation.

Serbia can turn its continental location into an advantage precisely because it lies along major European communication routes. Rather than direct access to the sea, its geographical value is further defined by the Danube and the Sava as well as the key overland transport arteries linking central, south-eastern and southern Europe. Within such a geography, advantage derives not from the mere possession of a coastline, but from a country’s ability to embed its territory within broader networks of trade, transport, energy and communication.

Aleksandar Vučić’s policy strives to balance Serbia’s strong economic links with Europe with efforts to develop relations with a diverse range of international partners. Infrastructure projects such as Corridor X, the Morava Corridor and the Belgrade–Novi Sad high-speed railway hold a prominent place in this approach, alongside ongoing investments in transport infrastructure, digitalisation and logistical capabilities.

These investments further reinforce Serbia’s standing as the largest economy in the Western Balkans and a major regional transport and logistics hub. The expansion of motorway, rail and digital infrastructure also deepens overall economic and regional interdependence. In turn, such interdependence can raise the cost of conflict and thereby contribute to greater stability.

Seen in this light, infrastructure development is not solely a matter of economics and connectivity; it can also serve a broader geopolitical role by positioning Serbia as a vital regional crossroads and a partner for various international actors, while simultaneously preserving robust economic ties with Europe.

European history in the aftermath of the Second World War gave rise to statesmen who forged the foundations of modern European states amidst wartime devastation and geopolitical uncertainty. Konrad Adenauer[2] steered post-war West Germany towards political stability, economic recovery and European integration. Charles de Gaulle[3] sought to restore France’s strategic autonomy and international influence, insisting that the French state independently define its fundamental interests. Alcide De Gasperi[4] helped guide Italy’s post-war reconstruction and became a staunch advocate of European integration, reconciliation and the creation of common European institutions.

Europe’s post-war experience demonstrates how political stability, economic reconstruction, infrastructure and international connectivity have frequently functioned as interlocking elements of long-term strategic consolidation. That same combination of statecraft, development and connectivity is highly relevant to understanding Serbia’s contemporary geopolitical position. Seen in this broader perspective, Minsk and Belgrade can be regarded as two important geographical nodes on the European continent – places whose strategic significance stems from their location, communication routes and capacity to connect wider regions. Geography is neither an advantage nor a weakness in itself; it becomes a strategic asset when a state is able to translate it into connectivity, development and stability.

3. Western Balkans, security corridors and the Adriatic-Ionian basin

The expansion of this network of connectivity is difficult to imagine without Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. The corridors traversing these countries are more than transport infrastructure; they are integral to Europe’s economic and security connectivity. Further development of Corridor Vc, energy interconnections and digital networks could tighten the links between the Balkan hinterland and the Adriatic while reinforcing regional interdependence.

As a key nodal point within the Adriatic-Ionian basin, Montenegro links the Western Balkans with the Mediterranean. Stretching from Trieste to Thessaloniki, this area constitutes the region’s natural maritime and economic gateway, while the Port of Bar and Montenegro’s coastline can play an important role in the development of transport, the blue economy and energy ties.

A geography of networks of this kind depends on strong and effective institutions. In this context, the Parliament of Montenegro serves as an important forum for political dialogue, compromise and the democratic articulation of social differences. The role of its President, Andrija Mandić, can prove significant in fostering institutional dialogue and enabling Montenegro to speak with a clear and coherent institutional voice in its relations with European, American and regional partners.

European history has seen parliamentary speakers who, during times of profound political division, sought to make parliament a venue for dialogue, compromise and institutional reconciliation. Hermann Ehlers[5], President of the German Bundestag from 1950 to 1954, helped consolidate the parliamentary culture of post-war Germany and bring the Bundestag closer to the public. Giovanni Gronchi[6], President of the Chamber of Deputies of the Italian Parliament from 1948 to 1955, championed a more open political dialogue within a fractured Italian society. Édouard Herriot[7], President of the French National Assembly from 1947 to 1954, was a prominent advocate of parliamentary tradition and institutional dialogue in the post-war era.

Andrija Mandić’s tenure at the helm of the Parliament of Montenegro can be viewed within the framework of this broader European tradition of parliamentary dialogue and institutional compromise. From this perspective, parliament should provide a setting in which political differences are expressed and resolved through dialogue and democratic procedures, rather than exacerbated through confrontation. Fostering such a parliamentary culture can strengthen Montenegro’s internal unity and enable it to adopt a more coherent institutional approach in its relations with the European Union, the United States and regional partners.

This approach also carries wider relevance for the Adriatic-Ionian area, where stable institutions and the capacity of political actors to address differences through dialogue provide an essential foundation for cooperation, connectivity and long-term stability.

Conclusion: civilisational geography and the nature of legitimacy

Europe’s strategic challenge today is no longer merely a question of who controls territory, but of how to transform territory into a space for cooperation, development and security. Belarus, Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, each in its own way, illustrate the importance of corridors, infrastructure, digital connectivity and institutional cohesion in shaping a new European geography.

The transition from military to civilisational geography also brings the issue of political legitimacy to the fore. Long-term stability depends not only on formal elections, but also on public trust, institutional quality and the ability of governments to respond to societal needs. Sovereignty, in this sense, is not merely the capacity of the state to defend its interests, but also its ability to develop institutions and policies attuned to the needs of its own society. Robert Schuman elevated this idea to the European level: European unity is not forged by erasing national distinctiveness, but through concrete achievements that create solidarity.

A comparable vision of broader European interconnectedness was reflected in Mikhail Gorbachev’s[8] concept of the “Common European Home” – a Europe wherein security would be built not solely through divisions and blocs, but through dialogue and deeper economic and political ties.

The future of Europe is consequently, among other things, a matter of connectivity. Corridors, ports, railways, energy interconnections, digital networks and trade can become an infrastructure of peace every bit as important as traditional security mechanisms. Seen in this light, a European corridor framework stretching from Minsk through the Danube and the Western Balkans to the Adriatic can be understood as a means of linking existing and prospective transport, energy and digital networks. Its development would require greater infrastructure interoperability, stronger institutional dialogue, increased economic interdependence and flexible models of regional cooperation.

Within this geographical configuration, Minsk serves as an eastern continental node, Belgrade as a major Balkan land crossroads and the Adriatic as a gateway to the Mediterranean. Connecting these points does not imply erasing differences, but creating a space in which those differences no longer have to stand in the way of cooperation.

Here lies the essence of the transition from bloc-based to civilisational geography: geography ceases to be merely a given condition that generates division and becomes an infrastructure for connecting people, states, economies and civilisations.

The Europe of the future will be defined not only by the borders that separate, but also by the networks that link. Moving from a geography of blocs to a geography of civilisations therefore means moving from a logic of division to a logic of connectivity – from a space that is managed to one that we shape together.