In Sudan, Protection of Civilians or Reshaping the Balance of Power?

Equating the national army with an armed militia under the banner of “protecting civilians” appears, at its core, to be an evasive approach to the real question: Who possesses arms to protect civilians, and who uses them to attack them?

Not all weapons are equal in their function or in the legal status of those who bear them. There is a national military institution that is supposed to operate under the law and under political authority. The right of states to defend themselves and their citizens is a natural and inherent right, guaranteed under Article 51 of the UN Charter and customary international law. How could it be otherwise when such an institution is confronting a parallel militia that, according to documented international reports, has been associated with mass killings, ethnic cleansing, sexual violence, displacement, looting and the destruction of property?

It has now become clear that the slogan of “protecting civilians” risks becoming a case of a good slogan being used to justify a fundamentally flawed policy. The tragedy of Darfur has demonstrated with particular clarity the dangers of ignoring the nature of the force confronting the state.

In El Geneina, UN experts estimated that as many as 15,000 people were killed during the waves of violence that swept through the city. International human rights organisations and UN reports, most notably those of Human Rights Watch, documented acts of genocide and ethnic cleansing against the Masalit community in West Darfur allegedly carried out by the militia.

Similarly, in El Fasher, the United Nations documented the killing of more than 6,000 people during the first days of the final assault in October 2025, in addition to other grave violations documented by the UN Fact-Finding Mission. The Mission issued a report entitled “The Hallmarks of Genocide in El Fasher”, concluding that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) had carried out a systematic campaign of destruction and mass killings targeting non-Arab communities, including the Zaghawa and Fur, and indicating that there was evidence of at least three underlying acts constituting the crime of genocide.

Against the backdrop of the current US proposal to expand the existing arms embargo on Darfur to cover the whole of Sudan, legitimate questions arise that cannot simply be ignored:**Resolution 1591 was adopted in 2005 and imposed an arms embargo on Darfur. If the international community has been unable to enforce that embargo effectively even within a geographically limited region, how can expanding it to cover the entire country possibly make it more effective?**And the more importantly : Why now?

Why were similar draft resolutions not proposed shortly after April 2023, when the Rapid Support Forces were expanding from Darfur into Khartoum and central Sudan, committing widespread violations against civilians? At the end of the day, “none so blind as those who will not see.”

There is another fundamental point. If the stated objective is genuinely the protection of civilians, then the discussion should not focus solely on weapons already inside Sudan. It should also address the sources of weapons and the external networks of financing and supply that sustain the war.

International reports currently before the international community speak clearly of external support to the militia and of regional and international networks that have contributed to providing weapons, equipment and logistical support.

This raises a simple ethical and political question: Why are the states and entities supplying weapons and financing the war not placed at the centre of the sanctions policy?

The essence of the selectivity in the US approach, and that of other countries supporting it at the Security Council, lies in calling for restrictions on the flow of weapons from within Sudan while leaving external sources and support networks largely beyond effective pressure.

The practical consequence is one: weakening and stripping the state's ability to defend its citizens without ending necessarily, the militia's ability to continue the war.

Watch out! at a time Yale Humanitarian Research Lab is reporting an unprecedented build-up of weapons and military equipment at a militia base in Ethiopia near the Sudanese border, the international community, if genuinely serious about protecting civilians, should urgently pursue a coherent policy based on:

• effective enforcement of the existing arms embargo;
• combating external smuggling, financing and arms-supply networks; and
• holding perpetrators of violations accountable, regardless of their position or affiliation.

Imposing additional restrictions on the state's military capacity while leaving external support networks for the militia outside effective pressure does not appear to constitute a genuine policy for the protection of civilians. Rather, it risks reshaping the balance of power in favour of the aggressor and those supporting it, under a humanitarian guise.

Our thanks go to the friendly countries that stood for truth and justice at the United Nations Security Council—Russia, China and Pakistan—and our particular appreciation goes to the three African members of the Council: Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia.

Again, the international community itself, before the Sudan, must ask forcefully: Fow long such selectivity will persist ? And in whose interest?