‎Togo, Chad and the AES: Flirtation Without a Wedding For Now ‎

Reports and social media chatter periodically claim that Togo and Chad have "joined" the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). As of this writing, that claim is premature. Neither Lomé nor N'Djamena has formally acceded to the AES confederation, whose treaty membership remains limited to Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

What is accurate and arguably more consequential for West African geopolitics is that both countries have drifted unmistakably into the AES orbit, blurring the line between formal membership and functional alignment.

Togo: courtship without a ring
Togo's flirtation with the AES has been running since January 2025, when Foreign Minister Robert Dussey first said the possibility was "not impossible," while stressing the final call belonged to President Faure Gnassingbé. Since then, Dussey has repeatedly floated Togolese accession, and Lomé has steadily deepened practical cooperation with the bloc even while remaining a full ECOWAS member.

The substance is economic and military rather than diplomatic theatre. The Port of Lomé has become the principal maritime gateway for landlocked Burkina Faso and Niger, displacing Cotonou's role for those states. In April 2026, Togo unveiled a formal "Togo–Sahel Strategy 2026–2028," a five-pillar roadmap covering intensified political dialogue with AES states, transport corridors, trade facilitation and security cooperation, including intelligence-sharing against jihadist groups active on Togo's northern border. Togolese troops have also joined AES states in joint military exercises, most notably the "Tarhanakale" drills in Niger.

Domestic opinion has moved in the same direction. An Afrobarometer survey of roughly 1,200 Togolese conducted in late 2025 found that a majority, about 54%, favoured joining the AES over remaining in ECOWAS, with support higher among men than women and higher in urban than rural areas. Still, a durable minority around a third wants Togo to stay put, wary of the AES juntas' record on elections and governance.

Analysts, including Leiden University researchers, have cautioned that Dussey's statements should be read as attention-grabbing signalling rather than a firm policy commitment, given how little Togo a constitutional, if contested, civilian-fronted government actually has in common with three military juntas born of coups. Fact-checkers in Ghana and Togo have also had to debunk viral clips falsely claiming President Gnassingbé had confirmed accession outright; he has not.

Chad: the quieter alignment
Chad's posture is different in texture but points the same direction. N'Djamena was never inside the ECOWAS-versus-AES dispute to begin with Chad sits in Central Africa and belongs to separate regional bodies but it has taken what regional analysts describe as a soft, sympathetic position toward the AES bloc, participating in joint Sahelian military exercises alongside Togo and the three AES states as early as 2024.

Chad has also drawn closer to Russia-aligned security cooperation trends sweeping the wider Sahel, even as it continues to host a residual French military footprint that Paris is now drawing down as part of its broader retreat from West and Central Africa.

Why the distinction matters
The gap between "aligned with" and "member of" is not pedantry; it carries real consequences. Formal AES membership would mean leaving ECOWAS, UEMOA and other regional frameworks, exposing a state to the kind of sanctions and diplomatic isolation Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso absorbed after their own departures.

For Togo in particular, full accession risks alienating an already fragile domestic opposition and drawing further Western scrutiny of Gnassingbé's governance record, at a moment when France has been openly critical.

What both Togo and Chad appear to be doing instead is hedging: banking the practical benefits of AES cooperation port access, security coordination, diversified alliances without triggering the costs of a formal break with existing regional architecture. For the AES bloc, that suits their interests too. Sea access through Lomé and a friendly Chadian posture on their eastern flank matter more operationally than a signature on an accession treaty.

The outlook
Barring a dramatic political shift in Lomé or N'Djamena, expect continued deepening of functional ties rather than a formal accession announcement in the near term. The more useful story for readers to watch is not "will Togo join AES" but how far security and economic integration proceeds before either country is forced by Brussels, Paris, Washington, or their own domestic publics to choose a side more explicitly.

Mustapha Bature Sallama
Medical/Science communicator, Private Investigator, Criminal Investigation and Intelligence Analysis,United States Institute of Peace (USIP), [email protected] +233555275880

Sources
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