In Madagascar, Gen-Z overthrew a corrupt regime but the battle against state capture has barely begun

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Youth-led demonstrations that shook Madagascar in late 2025 began as protests over water and electricity shortages. They quickly evolved into bigger demands for political change, forcing president Andry Rajoelina into exile. The Gen-Z protesters (most born between 1997 and 2012) spoke of dignity, corruption and a broken social contract.

A military-led transitional government took advantage of the turmoil to take power. In a new book chapter and co-authored paper published by the GI-ACE research programme at the University of Sussex, Ketakandriana Rafitoson and Tom Shipley argue that the protesters overthrew a captured state.

But what is state capture? What does it look like in Madagascar? And what could happen next?

What is state capture?

State capture is a harmful corruption phenomenon. It involves powerful political and business networks reshaping the rules – laws and institutions – to serve their own ends.

Originally conceived by economists at the World Bank, state capture has the distinct idea of “shaping the rules of the game”. This is in contrast to everyday forms of corruption, which involve breaking the rules. It's the difference between the pharmaceutical firm that uses its political connections to lower regulatory standards and the bribe paid to a nurse by a patient to secure vital treatment.

During protests in countries as diverse as Bangladesh, Serbia and Madagascar, the language of state capture provided a powerful mobilising force. This has brought new attention to a concept which for many years was a niche academic term.

What does state capture look like in Madagascar?

It is no accident that Madagascar was ranked among 10 countries at the bottom of the UN Human Development Index in 2025. Access to basic public services is low, holding back the economic prospects of young protesters.

State capture helps explain why.

Our colleague Liz Dávid-Barrett at the Centre for the Study of Corruption has developed a helpful framework that unbundles state capture into three pillars.

The first pillar is about fixing the rules governing key aspects of economic and political life. In Madagascar, the constitution has formed the bedrock of capture. Enacted amid a political crisis in 2010, it grants the presidency extensive powers. These include the right to appoint one-third of the members of the senate, a power relentlessly exploited by former president Rajoelina (2009-2014 and 2019-2025) to build patronage networks.

The second pillar is about controlling the implementation of public policy. Madagascar's state bureaucracy is packed with political loyalists. Captors have also zeroed in on certain institutions, such as the national power and water utility, where there are opportunities to profit from corruption. This has had disastrous economic consequences. For instance, Madagascar's electrification rates are among the lowest globally and power cuts are common.

The third pillar is about deflecting accountability by controlling or attacking institutions like the judiciary, the media and civil society. As an example, captors cleverly manipulated the design of an anti-corruption court to ensure their own immunity from prosecution. A High Court of Justice was created in 2018 to try senior officials. It has made zero prosecutions despite 37 cases being brought before the court. Threats of violence and legal action against activists were constant, repressing democratic activism.

Control of central state structures is only part of the story, however.

Captor networks have generated vast profits in vacuums of state authority, giving them powerful incentives to resist efforts to regulate those sectors.

At an early stage illegal rosewood logging helped captor networks under Rajoelina build the wealth used to control state institutions. Over time, these networks adapted as new economic opportunities emerged. They shifted from rosewood to vanilla and gold. Madagascar is the world's leading producer of vanilla, while illegal gold exports have been a major source of profits for captor networks.

This economic activity in the shadows illustrates a conundrum that also applies to other countries where there is not much of a functioning state. Captor networks do not always need state institutions to control resources and retain power. They use formal rules when those rules serve their interests – and bypass them when they don't.

Madagascar's Gen Z-led protests brought these questions of concentrated political and economic power into focus.

How likely is change?

This isn't the first time the Malagasy people have created a window of opportunity for change. Street protests against the rising cost of living and corruption facilitated Rajoelina's entry into power in 2009. These windows have been shut without much achieved, however.

Exploiting the most recent upheaval, a transitional military government headed by Colonel Michael Randrianirina seized power in late 2025. It made commitments to a two-year transition period before elections.

But concerns the timetable will slip are merited. This is especially given growing Russian influence around Randrianirina which could lead to the postponement, or even cancellation, of elections in 2027.

The protest movement faces complications of its own. A recent survey found that 52% of citizens don't trust the movement. The military government and old networks have also sought to infiltrate and intimidate activist groups.

The Concertation Nationale (national dialogue) – scheduled to begin in August 2026 but repeatedly delayed – will be a test of the direction of travel.

A national dialogue is an inclusive process for building consensus at a time of crisis. In theory, then, it could be a valuable forum for re-defining the rules of the game in a captured state. Constitutional change is expected to be on the table in a process overseen by church groups, but there are concerns about their independence.

What needs to happen instead?

The main focus of European governments now is the elections timetable. These donors retain influence but are in competition with Russia for the transition government's ear.

Elections are important, of course, but likely to be flawed if structural issues around how they run are not addressed. Political finance, for example, has long been a black hole, which works to the advantage of established powerbrokers.

On anti-corruption, measures supported by international donors tend to focus on law enforcement efforts – going after the bad guys – over systemic reform. In a situation of state capture where corruption is systemic, this carries risks and can be counterproductive. Enforcement bodies can be captured and used to pursue political opponents.

Ultimately, breaking the cycle of state capture requires more than reshuffling elites.

Gen-Z reformers, civil society organisations and supportive foreign donors need to push for measures that can deliver quick and tangible benefits for citizens. For instance, strengthening the governance of the state power utility to improve basic public service provision. Other countries have made progress in tackling corruption in critical development sectors, like health.

Gen-Z protesters created an opening in Madagascar. But it is the months leading up to elections in late 2027 that will determine whether that leads to meaningful and lasting reform.

Tom Shipley receives funding from the Governance & Integrity, Anti-Corruption Evidence Research Programme.

Ketakandriana Rafitoson does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

By Tom Shipley, Research Fellow, Centre for the Study of Corruption, University of Sussex And

Ketakandriana Rafitoson, Contributor, Centre for the Study of Corruption, University of Sussex