Independence On Trial: The Fight For Ghana’s Anti-Corruption Soul

Independence, Accountability, and the Future of Anti-Corruption Enforcement in Ghana

Across constitutional democracies, one question keeps resurfacing whenever corruption touches the powerful: who investigates the investigators when politics and prosecution collide?

That question has sat at the centre of Ghana’s debate over the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), established under the Office of the Special Prosecutor Act, 2017 (Act 959). It has also found its way before the Supreme Court, where the legal boundaries between the Attorney-General’s constitutional role and the OSP’s statutory mandate are being tested. Judgment is expected to be delivered tomorrow, Wednesday 29^thJuly 2026.

This is not merely a legal dispute, but a stress test of Ghana’s institutional design and of Parliament’s vision for an independent anti-corruption regime. Unsurprisingly, the constitutional questions surrounding the Office of the Special Prosecutor have attracted thoughtful commentary from legal scholars, practitioners, former public officials and political leaders. While they approach the issue from different perspectives, they all underscore the importance of getting the institutional architecture right.

Professor Stephen Kwaku Asare has argued that the Office of the Special Prosecutor was not created on a whim, but after years of public demand and deliberate legislative reform to establish a specialised prosecutorial body insulated from the institutional pressures that have historically undermined the fight against corruption.

The former Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, Godfred Dame, has a different constitutional view, arguing that there is no fundamental constitutional conflict between the OSP Act and the Attorney-General’s prosecutorial authority. His position is that the statutory framework establishing the OSP already recognises the Attorney-General’s constitutional role and therefore the existence of an independent Special Prosecutor does not necessarily create a constitutional inconsistency.

Lawyer and Former Tamale Central MP, Inusah Fuseini, has maintained that although the Attorney-General retains constitutional prosecutorial authority, requiring the Special Prosecutor to depend on that office in the discharge of its prosecutorial mandate would undermine the very purpose for which Parliament created the OSP. In his view, any arrangement that permits the Attorney-General to determine or influence which cases the Special Prosecutor may prosecute would compromise the Office’s intended independence.

President John Dramani Mahama has also publicly expressed the view that Ghana’s constitutional framework leaves room for an effective Office of the Special Prosecutor with special prosecutorial powers, signalling support for a specialised institution operating within the broader constitutional order.

Why independence was built into the system

The OSP was created as a specialised anti-corruption institution to investigate and prosecute corruption and corruption-related offences, particularly in contexts where ordinary enforcement mechanisms may face conflict-of-interest concerns. This is to say where the ones being investigated and or prosecuted have enough political magic dust to make the case go away. Perhaps the more important question is not who is being prosecuted today, but why some powerful individuals were never prosecuted when they had the machinery of state behind them.

This design aligns with international governance standards, including the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), which encourages States to ensure that anti-corruption bodies are granted sufficient independence to perform their functions effectively and without undue influence (Articles 6 and 36). The logic is simple. Corruption enforcement loses credibility when it is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as vulnerable to political control.

The constitutional tension at the centre of the debate

At the heart of the current legal debate is a structural question in Ghana’s 1992 Constitution, particularly Article 88, which vests prosecutorial authority in the Attorney-General as principal legal adviser and chief public prosecutor. The OSP, however, introduces a parallel prosecutorial structure for corruption-related offences under Act 959 which has createda constitutional friction point.

The Supreme Court is now being asked to interpret if Parliament has the power to create prosecutorial independence for the OSP without undermining the Constitution.

This is a legitimate constitutional question and it is precisely the kind of issue the Supreme Court exist to resolve.

What comparative practice shows: South Korea

Ghana is not alone in grappling with this challenge. South Korea’s Independent Special Counsel system offers a useful comparison.

In South Korea, special prosecutors are appointed for specific politically sensitive investigations and once appointed under statute, they operate independently of the Ministry of Justice and the ordinary prosecutorial hierarchy for the duration of their mandate. Why so? Now the aim is not to weaken existing institutions but to ensure credibility in cases where public trust might otherwise be questioned.

Thisprinciple is widely recognised in comparative governance. Independence can serve as a corrective mechanism where ordinary enforcement structures face perceived or actual conflict-of-interest constraints.

Two competing governance logics

The debate ultimately rests on two legitimate but competing constitutional logics.

1. Centralised accountability model

This view emphasises coherence in prosecution under the Attorney-General, ensuring a single line of authority and constitutional clarity.

2. Functional independence model

This view argues that certain categories of corruption enforcement require insulation from political or institutional influence to maintain credibility.

Neither model is inherently anti-democratic, but the question is rather one of balance.

What is really at stake

More often, the concern in debates of this nature is rarely about whether corruption should be prosecuted. The disagreement is about institutional architecture, specifically who controls prosecutorial discretion in politically sensitive cases.

If prosecutorial authority is fully centralised, coherence is strengthened, but perception risks may increase in politically exposed cases. Again, ifindependence is expanded it leads to credibility in sensitive investigations being improved, but constitutional and coordination tensions may arise.

These are structural trade-offs and not ideological absolutes.

What international standards suggest

Global governance frameworks do not prescribe a single model, but they consistently emphasise one principle, thus, anti-corruption institutions must be capable of performing their functions free from undue influence while remaining accountable to law and oversight mechanisms.

UNCAC, the Jakarta Principles on Anti-Corruption Agencies and broader OECD governance guidance converge on this balance, which is, INDEPENDENCEmust be real but not unchecked.

A caution on interpretation and intent

Note that it is important to distinguish between constitutional litigation and institutional hostility. Legal challenges to the OSP’s mandate are a legitimate feature of constitutional democracy, and again courts exist precisely to resolve such disputes.

However, it is equally important not to confuse legal interpretation with intent. Whether a constitutional argument ultimately narrows or expands institutional independence is a matter for judicial determination and not assumption about motive.

The broader governance lesson

Comparative experience, including South Korea’s model shows a recurring pattern. When corruption involves politically exposed persons, democracies often experiment with functional independence in prosecution to preserve public confidence.

Ghana’s approach is more structural and permanent through the OSP, which makes constitutional clarity even more important. But the underlying policy rationale remains consistent across systems, where credibility in anti-corruption enforcement depends as much on perceived independence as on legal authority.

The real measure of reform

At the centre of this debate is not a clash between institutions, but a question of design maturity.

Can Ghana’s constitutional architecture sustain both a strong, central prosecutorial authority under the Attorney-General and a credible, sufficiently independent anti-corruption institution capable of investigating sensitive cases and with the sole authority to prosecute? The answer will not come from rhetoric, but rather from constitutional interpretation, legislative refinement and institutional restraint.

South Korea’s experience suggests that when democracies confront high-level corruption, they often move toward strengthening investigative independence rather than weakening it while still preserving oversight through law.

Ghana now faces its own calibration moment. In the end, the effectiveness of an anti-corruption system is not judged by how power is arranged on paper but by the public’s confidence that when allegations of corruption arise against the powerful, they will be investigated and where the evidence warrants it, the case will be prosecuted according to law by an institution whose operational independence is preserved against undue political pressure/influence and free from institutional direction or control, consistent with the very purpose (statutory mandate) for which Parliament created it.