Professor Yunus’ China Visit and Its Impact on India Relations

The four-day visit of Bangladesh’s Chief Adviser, Professor Muhammad Yunus, to China from March 26 to March 29, 2025, has drawn significant attention, not only for its implications on Dhaka-Beijing ties but also for its impact on Bangladesh-India relations. While Professor Yunus initially intended to visit India before heading to China, he did not receive a favorable response from New Delhi, according to his press secretary’s statement to The Hindu, reflecting his goodwill to minimize the tension with the neighbor. This visit, marking his first major bilateral engagement after attending global events in Davos, Washington DC, and Cairo, was far from a solitary diplomatic endeavor. Professor Yunus was accompanied by a high-level delegation, including advisers on foreign affairs, power, energy, minerals, road transport, bridges, and railways, along with the principal coordinator for Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and his press secretary. The engagement in these types of activities is likely to have a significant impact on the diplomatic and strategic relationship with India.

Meanwhile, Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh, Yao Wen, described the visit as “potentially the most important by a Bangladeshi leader in fifty years.” Dhaka’s Foreign Secretary Mohammad Jashim Uddin also emphasized the significance of the visit, stating that by prioritizing China, Bangladesh was conveying a deliberate diplomatic message. The timing and substance of the trip suggest a strategic move in Bangladesh’s external engagements, particularly as its relations with India undergo a recalibration following the political transition that saw Sheikh Hasina’s departure from power.

Against such backdrop, the following portions aim to examine the geopolitical and diplomatic implications of Professor Muhammad Yunus’ visit to China on Bangladesh-India relations. The visit, which resulted in several bilateral agreements, signifies a potential shift in Bangladesh’s foreign policy orientation, raising strategic concerns for India. CA Yunus’s remarks regarding Northeast India have elicited strong reactions from Indian political leaders, further intensifying bilateral tensions. By analyzing the economic, political, and security dimensions of this visit, this study seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of its impact on regional stability, strategic alignments, and future diplomatic engagements between Bangladesh, China, and India.

Changing Dynamics in Bangladesh-India Relations

With Sheikh Hasina’s exit, Dhaka and New Delhi are grappling with the challenge of redefining their working relationship. Meanwhile, Beijing appears poised to deepen its foothold in Bangladesh. Political changes in Dhaka may be contributing to the increased outreach to China, a move that has not gone unnoticed in New Delhi. India faces a challenging phase ahead, particularly as Dhaka’s internal political environment presents opportunities for China to expand its influence.

Here, India is expected to leverage two major issues in its diplomatic approach toward Bangladesh: allegations of attacks against Hindu minorities and the rise in anti-India rhetoric among political leaders, where the latter has been already portrayed as a security threat in multiple media houses in India. India may amplify its stance on the issue, seeking international attention and potentially taking the narrative to global platforms. Bangladesh’s call for Sheikh Hasina’s extradition adds further complications to the bilateral equation.

For Beijing, Bangladesh holds immense strategic significance due to its geographical location in the Bay of Bengal. Following Sheikh Hasina’s departure, the Chinese envoy in Dhaka promptly engaged with key political stakeholders, including the National Citizen Party (NCP), Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and Jamaat-e-Islami, signaling Beijing’s intent to maintain robust ties with the new administration. The timing of Professor Yunus’ visit, commencing on Bangladesh’s 54th Independence Day, further underscored the evolving diplomatic alignment. This indicates a distinct shift in approach, as previously, India held a diplomatic and strategic advantage due to its longstanding traditional relationships.

Agreements and Economic Engagements
During the visit, both sides finalized an agreement on economic and technical cooperation and signed eight Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) across various sectors. The discussions also extended to future investments, the establishment of the Chinese Economic and Industrial Zone (CEIZ) in Chittagong, and the modernization and expansion of Mongla port. These agreements are set to enhance China’s involvement in Bangladesh’s two largest ports, which also serve as transit points for Indian trade.

Bangladesh extended an invitation to Chinese companies to participate in the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project, a development that brings China closer to India’s borders. Previously, Sheikh Hasina’s administration had transferred the project to India, a decision that reportedly displeased Beijing. With Dhaka now shifting its policies, India has expressed concerns about China’s growing role in Bangladesh’s water management initiatives.

Bangladesh and China have initiated negotiations to accelerate talks on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). India has raised alarms over the potential implications of such a deal, fearing that it could enable the indirect flow of Chinese goods into Indian markets through Bangladesh.

Regional Trends and Implications
Professor Yunus’ current actions are not isolated incidents but these seem to be part of a broader regional pattern. Leaders such as Maldives’ President Mohamed Muizzu and Nepal’s former Prime Minister K. P. Oli have also pursued closer ties with Beijing, signing agreements that challenge India’s strategic position in South Asia. India may align its approach to Bangladesh with the strategies it has devised for the previously mentioned countries.

Despite China’s ambitious commitments, uncertainties persist regarding its ability to fully honor its promises. In recent years, Beijing has adjusted its regional strategy, transitioning from large-scale financial assistance to a blended approach of grants and investments. Furthermore, China's reluctance to offer timely debt restructuring and financial aid to nations such as Sri Lanka and the Maldives has cast doubt on its sustained commitment to economic partnerships. Should India recognize this pattern, it will likely seize the opportunity to reinforce its influence by shaping domestic and external discourse in Bangladesh. Additionally, India may leverage international platforms to strengthen its strategic position.

Escalating Border Tensions
The tensions between Bangladesh and India are poised to escalate following recent incidents, particularly after the visit. In early February 2025, India’s Border Security Force (BSF) halted Bangladesh’s Border Guard (BGB) from carrying out bunker construction near the international border in the Dahagram Angarpota area along North Bengal’s frontier. Just a month earlier, in January 2025, the BSF encountered resistance from the BGB when it attempted to install barbed wire fencing along the border. Further complications arose when reports surfaced of clashes between farmers from both sides near Malda, West Bengal, exacerbating the already strained border relations.

These incidents have grown beyond mere local disputes and are evolving into active diplomatic confrontations. On January 12, 2025, Bangladesh’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs summoned the Indian High Commissioner over the BSF’s “unauthorized” attempt to construct barbed wire fencing. The following day, India’s Ministry of External Affairs summoned Bangladesh’s official, lodging a formal protest. India reiterated that previous agreements should be honored and emphasized the importance of cooperation in tackling cross-border crimes. The Indian government claimed that the BSF adhered to all protocols while installing the fencing.

India’s unilateral actions to build the barbed wire fencing along multiple segments of the border have sparked significant backlash in Bangladesh. The construction violates the 1975 Memorandum of Understanding, which prohibits any development within 150 yards of the border’s zero line without mutual consent. While India defends its actions as necessary to control smuggling and unauthorized migration, Bangladesh views the construction as a direct challenge to its sovereignty and an erosion of trust. Resistance from the BGB and local communities has been particularly evident in areas like Lalmonirhat and Chapainawabganj. The issue has also sparked debate within India, where critics, including former diplomats and academics, argue that the fence undermines the spirit of cooperation that should define Bangladesh-India relations. These critics contend that it is contradictory to advocate for stronger bilateral ties while simultaneously erecting barriers that physically separate the two nations.

Domestic politics in India have further complicated the situation. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has intensified nationalist rhetoric by emphasizing border security. Visits by BJP lawmakers to inspect the fence and engage with the BSF not only project a tough stance but also inflame nationalist sentiment. For Bangladesh, this has introduced a new layer of complexity. The political rhetoric in India, particularly around “securing the border,” amplifies fears in Bangladesh that it could be scapegoated for domestic political purposes. While such nationalism may galvanize domestic support, it risks having long-lasting and damaging effects on bilateral relations. Following the visit, border tensions may escalate further, introducing new complexities in security dynamics and bilateral relations between Bangladesh and India since this time talk on Teesta was on the table.

Implications for Northeast India
Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus’s recent remarks regarding India’s northeastern states, made during his visit to Beijing, have sparked strong reactions from Indian political leaders, further straining Bangladesh-India relations. The issue underscores how Dhaka’s increasing engagement with Beijing is intensifying regional sensitivities, with Indian leaders expected to escalate their rhetoric in response.

During a roundtable discussion in Beijing on March 28, Yunus urged Chinese businesses to invest in Bangladesh, highlighting the country’s strategic location as a gateway to the sea for landlocked regions such as India’s northeastern states, Nepal, and Bhutan. He emphasized the potential for regional connectivity, stating, “Seven Sisters of India are a landlocked region—they have no way to reach the ocean. We are the only guardian of the ocean for all of this region. This opens up a huge possibility.” He further noted that Nepal and Bhutan’s vast hydropower resources could be harnessed for industrial development in Bangladesh, offering opportunities for export and economic growth.

These comments have triggered sharp criticism in India. Assam Chief Minister Himanta Biswa Sarma condemned Yunus’s remarks as “offensive” and warned that they underscored geopolitical challenges surrounding India’s sensitive “Chicken’s Neck” corridor. He called for stronger railway and road networks in the region to reduce India’s dependence on Bangladesh for connectivity. Pradyot Manikya, leader of the Tipra Motha Party and a titular king from Tripura, took a more aggressive stance, suggesting that India should reconsider its access to the sea by breaking up Bangladesh. He controversially proposed that indigenous communities in Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts, including the Tripuri, Garo, Khasi, and Chakma, be supported in their efforts to secure a strategic sea route for India. Indian scholars have also criticized the remarks, interpreting them as a deliberate provocation. The growing backlash suggests that India may increasingly use such statements to fuel nationalist sentiments and justify a stronger stance on regional connectivity and security.

Responding to the controversy, Khalilur Rahman, Professor Yunus’s high representative on the Rohingya issue and other key matters, clarified that the statement was made with “honest intention” and aligned with Bangladesh’s broader vision for regional economic cooperation. He emphasized that similar comments had been made in the past, including in 2012, and that they were consistent with the Bay of Bengal Industrial Growth Belt (BIG-B) concept proposed by former Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in 2023.

Mr. Rahman reiterated that Bangladesh has no intention of imposing connectivity on any country. “If anybody accepts, well. What can we do if it is not accepted? We have nothing to do. We can only say that we are willing to provide connectivity for the equitable benefit of all.” Despite these clarifications, the reactions from Indian leaders indicate that statements like Professor Yunus’s will likely face increased scrutiny. Given India’s growing concerns over Bangladesh’s deepening ties with China, New Delhi may use such prospects to reinforce narratives about regional security and connectivity, adding further complexity to bilateral relations.

Conclusion: The Larger Strategic Picture

China’s expanding presence in South Asia represents a direct challenge to India’s regional influence. Beijing has strategically capitalized on existing tensions between New Delhi and its neighbors to enhance its footprint in the region. Certain agreements, particularly those related to defense cooperation and maritime security, are perceived as red lines by India. Bangladesh’s outreach to China, particularly at this point of time, is likely to have long-term consequences for Dhaka-New Delhi relations. But, CA Yunus’ visit to China marks a pivotal moment in Bangladesh’s foreign policy domain. While the immediate gains from enhanced economic cooperation with China are evident, the broader geopolitical implications of this shift will continue to unfold in the coming years. As Bangladesh charts its evolving partnerships, the balancing act between China and India will remain a defining feature of its diplomatic strategy.