Coup in Guinea: How to reverse it

The resurgence of the military in search of power in West Africa threatens the hard-won progress in the region since the early 1990s. The military coup in Guinea is the third in the region in a year.

Recently, 14 of the 15 members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have followed a democratic democratic trend, according to data from Freedom House and the Center for Systemic Peace. But today, only 11 are on this path, and some remain on the brink of democratic retreat.

The recent succession of coups - including in Mali in August 2020 and May 2021, and in Chad in April 2021 - has worrying implications for stability in a region already under the yoke of growing threats to its security. If the coup becomes a viable way to take power, who will stop others from stepping into the breach?

Recognizing military coups is to normalize these illegal seizures of power. Suddenly, they destroy the rights of and the protections of citizens are dissolved. Sovereign decisions are reduced to the whims of the members of a junta and the men in uniform who made their rise to power possible. The pustschste can do what he wants. The Guinean junta's request to freeze the central bank's state accounts in order to “secure state assets” is a perfect illustration of this.

In Africa, military coups have a sad reputation for their effects on the well-being of citizens. Guinea is a textbook case. After taking power in a coup in 1984, Colonel Lansana Conté's regime was characterized by two decades of repressive governance, human rights abuses and mismanagement.

In 2008, the coup d'état launched by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara after Conté's death plunged Guinea further into instability. In 2009, during a demonstration against the Camara regime held at the National Stadium in Conakry, security forces massacred at least 150 people and raped dozens of women, an event for which they remain infamous.

These experiences with military governance have left Guineans traumatized, impoverished and economically isolated.

It is therefore clear that the coup d'état in Guinea must be defeated. The question is what is the best way to do it. Any recognition of the coup would risk encouraging future military interventions.

So far, the condemnation of this coup has been unanimous. In addition, ECOWAS and the African Union suspended Guinea and imposed sanctions on the junta.

This is a good first step. But it must be followed by other concrete actions which will deny any recognition to the junta. The delegation sent by ECOWAS to Conakry must call for a rapid return to constitutional order and a civil political transition that will restore democratic governance.

Nonetheless, returning his chair to President Alpha Condé would not only fail to achieve this goal, it would also sweep under the rug the questionable manner in which he had remained in power.

Condé's authoritarian shift

The presidency of Alpha Condé has distinguished itself for its authoritarian abuses, in particular the arrest of opposition leaders, violations of press freedom, the ban on demonstrations and the bringing into line of the judicial system and the electoral commission. But his most controversial maneuver was the constitutional fiddling that allowed him to run for a third term. Indeed, the 2010 constitution formally prohibited the president from serving more than two terms.

The 2020 presidential campaign was characterized by the usual authoritarian strategies: violence against the opposition and the banning of their meetings, and the muzzling of the media. The official results gave Conde 59% of the vote and the majority even in the regions normally won over to the opposition.

These results sparked protests, arrests, a crackdown on the opposition that resulted in the deaths of more than 20 people. The opposition lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court, which was controlled by people loyal to the president, obviously validated the official results. These blatant violations of the electoral process have prompted some of his critics to call them a "creeping blow".

But ECOWAS, the African Union and the international community have only offered moderate criticism and have contented themselves with recalling the need to respect the new constitution of 2020.

Condé's claims that he is the legitimate president are therefore unfounded. Giving him his chair would not be enough to put Guinea back on the path to democracy and would even risk fueling instability.

Pathways to the return of democracy

Guinea could take several paths to return to the constitutional order. These options go beyond accepting Condé's downfall as a fait accompli and would improve democratic governance, while allowing new elections to be held.

The first option would see Condé regain his seat, with the condition that the United Nations organize new elections within six months. This approach would see the junta back down, while acknowledging the contested nature of Condé's presidential term.

This option is inspired by recent events in Malawi and Kenya where courts have invalidated the results of fraudulent elections and ordered a new presidential election. Given the politicization of the courts now suspended in Guinea, such a decision should perhaps emanate from the ECOWAS Court of Justice which would take into account the evidence of the parallel counting of votes collected by the opposition.

A second possibility would see ECOWAS invalidate Guinea's 2020 constitutional referendum. This option would nullify the basis on which Condé ran for a third term and align with the commitments of the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari strongly advocated recourse to the provisions of article 45 of the protocol which would determine this option.

In the absence of any recognition from the international community and financial institutions, the junta would be forced to give way to an interim civilian government. This one would organize new elections, according to the constitution of 2010 and without the participation of Alpha Condé.

A third option would be to return Conde to his chair, who, in the service of peace and stability, would resign, allowing him to save face and restore the constitution. In return for his release, he would also be protected from future legal proceedings. According to article 55 of the 2020 constitution, the President of the National Assembly would be endowed with executive authority and would organize new elections within 90 days.

All these scenarios do not envisage any role for the army. Any recognition of this blow would only encourage others. The so-called military-led transitions in Mali and Chad continue at a snail's pace, demonstrating the unwillingness of military leaders to relinquish power.

Constitutional order as a priority

The lack of support from ECOWAS and the international community for the democratic process is at the origin of the unfortunate situation in which the country finds itself today. Paradoxically, this means that ECOWAS finds itself in the difficult position of having to negotiate with a junta to put Guinea back on the path to democracy.

ECOWAS should remember this lesson whenever future incumbent presidents attempt to bypass term limits and organize fraudulent elections. Acting to prevent unconstitutional seizures of power in all forms, be it military coups or rampant coups, must be a priority for ECOWAS.

Bending to such shenanigans, in this case justified by the so-called general interest and stability, only sows the seeds of future instability.

This article first appeared in The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. You can read the original here.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

By Joseph Siegle, Director of Research, Africa Center for Strategic Studies And

Daniel Eizenga, Research Fellow, Africa Center for Strategic Studies