Losing the Coast: Kenya’s Secessionist Dilemma

In many ways, Kenya is still feeling the effects of the post-election violence from the 2007 presidential election; tourism rates have yet to fully recover, the economy remains in a weakened state, and ethnic/tribal tensions continue to flare up. This has caused many observers, both within and outside Kenya, to fear that there may be a repeat of the violence seen in 2007 ahead of the upcoming presidential election, scheduled for early 2013. In fact, we might be seeing a small glimpse of this in the recent unrest in the Rift Valley, in which dozens of homes and crops were destroyed, at least 5 people were killed, and many more made homeless. But recently, there has been a new element added to this already dangerous tinderbox, that of secession. The Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) is a relatively new organization that is calling for the secession of the Coast Province and for a boycott of the upcoming elections. Though officially banned by the Kenyan government (this ban was just overturned on July 25th, 2012), the MRC has been gaining an increasingly large following and with its message of self-determination and independence has, thus far, proved appealing to the disinherited people of the Coast.

Though the MRC's early days are still somewhat murky, it is known that the organization was established in 1999 to address the perceived economic and political discrimination of the coastal peoples. Central to these claims of discrimination was, and still is, the issue of land ownership. While land issues are not simply limited to the Coast (in fact, they are the cause behind many ethnic/tribal conflicts in Kenya), the coastal peoples have been affected in a somewhat disproportionate manner. Following Kenya's independence, many wealthy and well-connected individuals began purchasing large tracts of land in the Coast Province for future development projects. However, the land that was purchased was not simply empty space; much of it was inhabited by the native coastal peoples, some of which had lived on the land for many generations. But because most of these people were poor and uneducated they were neither able to register themselves as land owners or afford the legal fees to contest the land holdings. As a result, many coastal people found themselves designated as squatters on their own land. Another problem that arose from land ownership was the influx of money out of the Coast Province. Many of the landowners were from other parts of Kenya, commonly referred to as "up-country people” by the inhabitants of the Coast, and generally speaking would take their profits and invest them in other areas. So, even as the Coast Province became a major contributor to the Kenyan economy (mainly through tourism and agriculture), it remained one of the poorest and least developed of the provinces in the country.

Partly due to these factors, as well as increased feelings of marginalization and neglect, violence broke out in the Coast Province in mid-1997. Armed groups, primarily from the Digo community, that claimed to be protecting the land rights of the local population were formed; they soon began to target up-country migrants who they blamed for the economic marginalization and poor conditions of the coastal peoples. In the ensuing violence, dozens of up-country people were killed and thousands more were forced to flee the province. Government reaction was slow (some claim political motives for perpetuating the violence), but it did eventually come and while the situation was resolved, meaningful reform on the very issues that had caused the violence did not occur.

As mentioned above, the MRC was formed in 1999, but in reality it remained a relatively isolated and obscure organization until 2008 when it began to publicly call for the secession of the Coast and the establishment of an independent state. Around this time, the MRC also began a grassroots campaign to educate the people of the Coast about a treaty between the British government and the Sultan of Zanzibar that they claim justifies their calls for independence.

This claim is not entirely without warrant; for most of its recorded history the Coast with its capitol city of Mombasa was under the control of Zanzibar, itself a colony of the Sultanate of Oman. The Omanis had wrested control of Mombasa and its surrounding territory, referred to as Zanj (meaning "Land of the Blacks") by Arab traders and travelers, from the Portuguese after a two-year siege of Fort Jesus in 1698. Shortly thereafter, the Omanis, with the help of other local African states (notably the Somali Ajuuraan Sultanate), were able to force the Portuguese out of most of their remaining holdings in East Africa. The Sultan of Oman now had effective control of territory stretching from Mombasa and southern Somalia down to what is now Mozambique and the Comoros archipelago. In time, Oman's African colonies became increasingly important and profitable. Merchants from all over the Indian Ocean came to trade in exotic goods such as dyes, ivory, shells, timber, fruits, and slaves. Mombasa remained in the hands of the Omanis except for a brief period when Portuguese rule was restored in the mid-1700s. However, Omani authority soon began to wane and in 1824 a British protectorate status was given to Mombasa. The city and the surrounding region then entered a period in which the British exercised effective rule, while the territory was still officially under the sovereignty of the Sultan of Zanzibar. At the time of Kenya's independence, Mombasa and the coastal strip were incorporated into the newly independent state.

However, this is the point where contention arises. Some members of the MRC claim that a separate treaty, in addition to the one that merged the Coast with Kenya, was signed by Kenyan Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta and his Zanzibar counterpart Mohamed Shante. They claim that rather than simply merging with Kenya, a 50-year lease agreement (which ends in 2013 according to the MRC) was signed and that after this lease is up the Coast will essentially become independent, unless it chooses to stay part of Kenya. The government as well, as some local historians based in Nairobi, have countered this claim saying that the treaty is simply a forgery and that there is no historical evidence for the 50-year lease agreement. Other prominent individuals in the Coast Province, some of who are affiliated with the MRC, have taken a different stance, saying that the Coast is now legally part of Kenya; however, various safeguards for preserving local traditions, culture, law, and other aspects of society were agreed to between the British and Kenyans. These individuals point to the British representative, Sir James Robertson, who reportedly after spending some time in the Coast emphasized that various institutions of the local people should be legally safeguarded if the Coast was to be merged with Kenya. To this end, many in the Coast (both MRC and otherwise) say the Kenyan government has not honored its agreements.

In 2008, the Kenyan government banned the MRC and listed it as an “organized criminal group”. In response, the MRC went to court in 2010 to contest the ban; they made little headway and the case has been adjourned on multiple occasions (that is until July 25th, when the ban was officially overturned). All the while, members of MRC claim that they continue to face harassment and intimidation from the government and the media. For its part, the government has taken a much harder stance with the MRC recently; arresting some of its members for administering oaths and allegedly conducting illegal military training sessions in the Mulungu Nipa forest outside Mombasa. Some Kenyan officials also claim that the MRC has or is developing ties with the Somali based terrorist organization, al Shabaab. The MRC has denied this, but there is growing evidence that shows that al Shabaab has been targeting young, unemployed men in Coast Province (as well as in other parts of Kenya) for recruitment. However, it still remains to be seen what, if any, influence al Shabaab has over the MRC. In addition, the exact nature of al Shabaab's recruiting cells in Kenya and other parts of the Swahili Coast is a subject about which much remains to be investigated.

With Kenya's 2013 presidential election looming in the horizon, it is likely that the national government will take precautionary measures to protect against a repeat of the violence seen in 2007. To a degree, this will mean working with groups the government might not have otherwise sought to develop relations with, possibly including the MRC. Prime Minister Raila Odinga has hinted that the government would be open to holding talks with MRC on resolving issues such as land ownership and poverty, but only under the condition that the organization renounces their secessionist ambitions. Direct talks between the Kenyan government and the MRC look more likely than at any point in recent memory; especially, after the Kenyan High Court decided to lift the government issued ban on the organization (which was met with much jubilation on the streets of Mombasa). And in reality, this might be the best option for improving the economic and political conditions of the Coast. Under Kenya's new constitution, which was ratified in 2010 but is still not fully implemented, the country's soon to be 47 counties will have national representation in parliament, the Senate, a greater degree of self-rule, and regional authority. Then again, independence would give the people of the Coast (who do have a distinct history and culture) true control over their own affairs. Either way, this is an issue that deserves discussion because it has the possibility of not only effecting Kenyan politics and affairs, but those of East Africa as a whole.

   Comments0