Mecca Accord and the Abraham Accord: A New U.S. Strategic Detour?

Justice and peace require equality, and equality requires the acceptance of due process—whether in a democracy or an authoritarian system. What the world lacks at this stage is a politically fair process. Instead, the international system appears trapped in political deadlocks and undue processes that have accumulated in recent years, shaking not only diplomatic structures but also the pillars of the global economy. No matter the country or political system, when accountability disappears, the chances of monopoly and political division increase. Every pact and resolution tabled on the global stage then becomes another point of struggle. The world today is suffering from what may be described as a period of global economic and geopolitical recession.

What is the Mecca Accord linked with the Abraham Accord?

The idea and concept of a “Greater Israel” has long been discussed as more than merely an idea; it has been perceived by many as a strategic project whose political consequences are increasingly visible across the Middle East. Within this regional struggle, the major obstacles to such strategic projections have been Iran’s resilient response and Pakistan’s growing defence significance.

Sometimes, however, the most effective strategic response is to go back and create another route. The United States cannot always move directly when a political process becomes stuck. Therefore, a parallel security and defence structure may emerge to project a world in which American political visibility appears reduced. But does this mean that the United States has already withdrawn from South Asia under the logic of a Mecca-based security pact? Certainly not. Rather, Washington may be providing political space and indirect legitimacy for further regional developments taking place under its strategic watch.

Why doesn’t the GCC build its own force, and is reliance on Pakistan really a strategic move?

Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) may have outsmarted political challenges by pursuing new defence agreements that provide Saudi Arabia with an additional shield against the Houthis in Yemen and the strategic challenge posed by Iran. Such arrangements could also provide greater political confidence within the Kingdom.

Secondly, Saudi Arabia may not want to create an entirely new and independent military command structure. A powerful autonomous force could eventually become another political centre of power, generating conspiracy theories and fears surrounding the stability of the royal structure. A unified external security arrangement, therefore, may appear politically safer.

In this context, Pakistan’s availability of military experience and troops could create a strategic convergence: economic and strategic opportunities for Pakistan’s military leadership, represented politically by Field Marshal Asim Munir, and greater political and security confidence for MBS. But the question remains: is this truly a long-term regional security strategy, or merely a temporary arrangement created by immediate threats?

Then what does Türkiye require from the Mecca or Abraham Accord?

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has historically followed a policy that can be described through the old strategic principle: keep your friends close, but your enemies closer. Türkiye has maintained complicated political and economic relationships with Israel while publicly opposing Israel’s military actions in Gaza.

Türkiye may possess economic interests connected to the region, yet Erdoğan has faced a difficult balancing act between economic realities, NATO commitments and the political pressure created by the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza. In such circumstances, a broader regional security structure could offer Türkiye additional strategic space.

Just as Saudi Arabia may seek greater protection against Iranian pressure, Türkiye could seek strategic insulation from what it perceives as growing Israeli military and political influence in the region. This raises another important question: Has NATO failed to provide Türkiye with a sense of security?

The answer is absolutely not. NATO remains central to Türkiye’s security architecture. However, Ankara’s regional ambitions and security concerns increasingly extend beyond the traditional NATO framework. The search for additional regional partnerships, therefore, should not automatically be interpreted as a rejection of NATO but rather as strategic diversification.

What geopolitical moves are ahead?
The United States initiated the Abraham Accords as part of a wider effort to reshape political and diplomatic relationships in the Middle East. Yet the region remains trapped in unresolved conflicts, especially the Palestinian question, the Gaza crisis and the wider confrontation between Israel and Iran.

The question now is whether a future Mecca Accord could become a parallel pathway to overcome this strategic deadlock. In my view, such a framework could eventually create political space that reconnects with—or indirectly leads back towards—the objectives of the Abraham Accords.

But can a new security arrangement genuinely bring peace without addressing the fundamental questions of justice, equality and accountability? Can regional defence pacts replace a political settlement? And can the Middle East build a sustainable future while the Palestinian issue remains unresolved?

These are the questions that will determine whether the Mecca Accord becomes a genuine alternative to the Abraham Accords—or simply another American strategic stroke in a region already exhausted by geopolitical competition.

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