Hormuz Alarming Paradox : Iran’s Strategic Leverage Under Pressure

Recent statistics and political statements increasingly indicate that Iran’s vulnerability around the Strait of Hormuz has begun to lose some of its strategic strength. The real wildcard for Tehran was its ability to maintain control over the table while using a blockade-and-reconciliation strategy to keep its opponents on the back foot. If Donald Trump, on the other hand, has declared Hormuz a strategic asset for the United States, the possibility of Iran’s control over the waterway becoming a bargaining stake cannot simply be dismissed.

The question now is how much heat and pressure is building inside the Iranian camp. Can Abbas Araghchi’s team, operating under an extreme sense of responsibility, uphold its position? Recent developments suggest that differences of opinion following changes within the IRGC command structure are gradually widening, creating an increasingly complicated political environment. Political commentators have highlighted President Masoud Pezeshkian’s unusually blunt position: “The war must end at some point.” His argument is that Iran should end the conflict while Tehran still believes it is negotiating from a position of strength, rather than waiting until that position deteriorates further.

That statement clearly points to the economic pressure being pursued against Iran. Another warning from Tehran is even more alarming. Iranian central bank governor Abdolnaser Hemmati recently appeared on television to warn about mounting economic pressures. He said Iran was facing several major challenges simultaneously, including maximum sanctions, blockade, restrictions on oil exports and a budget imbalance, all of which were placing severe pressure on the economy. He also cited a conversation with a neighbouring country, reportedly Pakistan, whose officials indicated that if even a fraction of Iran’s current economic difficulties were imposed on their own country, maintaining governance would become extremely difficult.

What lessons will the GCC draw from this moment, and what is the likely trajectory if the current pressure continues? If alternative pipelines and transit routes function effectively, they could provide the Gulf states with a crucial safety valve. They can no longer rely on diplomatic understandings alone. The priority is to ensure that energy exports remain resilient even if Hormuz becomes politically or militarily contested.

Plans are already being developed across the region to reduce dependence on the strait over the next one to four years. One assessment suggests that Saudi Arabia’s reliance on Hormuz could fall from around 70 per cent to 15 per cent, while the UAE’s could decline from 50 per cent to 15 per cent. Iraq’s dependence could fall from almost 100 per cent to 30 per cent. Kuwait and Qatar could reduce their reliance to less than half, while Bahrain could lower its dependence from almost 100 per cent to 15 per cent. Oman, meanwhile, could emerge as a major coastal oil-transfer hub for the entire region.

But the crucial question remains: can these alternative transit routes be developed as quickly, cheaply and safely as they appear on paper? Infrastructure is not merely about pipelines; it requires financing, security, political coordination, shipping capacity and years of operational reliability. If these projects succeed, however, the strategic value of Hormuz could be substantially reduced within three years and potentially diminished even further over six. The narrow horseshoe-shaped waterway would remain geographically important, but its role as the centre of Iranian strategic leverage could gradually evaporate.

The latest shipping data underline the pressure. According to figures compiled by the ship tracker Kpler, only 112 oil and gas tankers passed through Hormuz between 1 and 19 August. Around 79 per cent used unconfirmed routes, 19 per cent followed Iran’s preferred northern route and only 2 per cent used the Omani route. Some vessels using unconfirmed routes may have switched off their transponders or travelled under protection along the Omani side.

Those concerned about the loss of strategic leverage will inevitably attach importance to the separate visits to Tehran by Oman’s Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi and Pakistan’s army chief, Asim Munir. Both could play an important role in negotiating conditions for reopening the strait and reviving diplomatic arrangements that had previously been set aside.

The Trump administration’s messaging also suggests an effort to break the deadlock, but this remains a difficult nut to crack. Washington may also be exaggerating the effectiveness of its workarounds. US Energy Secretary Chris Wright claimed on 18 August that the US Navy had assisted in transferring more than 15 million barrels of oil and other products and that average daily transfers through Hormuz had exceeded eight million barrels. Yet even that figure remains less than half the pre-war average, while several shipping-data trackers put actual flows closer to six million barrels a day.

This is the Hormuz alarm paradox. In a geopolitical dilemma, a strategic tool that is constantly flaunted can eventually become its own enemy because it encourages others to invest in reducing their vulnerability. Iran’s policy question, therefore, must change from “How can we make passage difficult?” to “How can we make passage so safe and stable that everyone needs Iran to help maintain that order?” That shift—from disruption to indispensability—may ultimately prove to be Tehran’s most sustainable strategic option

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