The AKSA Bribery Scandal: What Does Ghana Lose When Corruption Goes Unpunished?

The conviction of Asante Berko in the United States of America has reopened an uncomfortable question for Ghana: Will the country investigate the Ghanaian end of a corruption scandal that an American court has now substantially exposed? Ghana has witnessed many corruption scandals. Some have generated parliamentary investigations, others presidential committees; some have ended in court, while still others have quietly disappeared into the archives of public memory. The AKSA power deal must not be allowed to suffer that same fate.

The Conviction That Reopened the Case

On August 6, 2026, a federal jury in Brooklyn, New York, convicted Asante Kwaku Berko, a former Goldman Sachs investment banker, on all counts relating to a bribery and money-laundering scheme connected to the development of a power plant in Ghana. The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) stated that Berko faces up to 30 years in prison and has been remanded pending sentencing.

This is no longer merely an unproven allegation against Berko. The U.S. prosecution has resulted in a criminal conviction --- a reality that forces Ghana to confront a much bigger question: What about the Ghanaian side of the transaction?

If money was paid to Ghanaian public officials and parliamentarians to influence decisions of the state, the conviction of a foreign intermediary cannot be the end of the matter. It must be the beginning.

The Genesis: How "Dumsor" Led to AKSA

To understand the AKSA affair, one must return to Ghana’s severe power crisis of 2014–2015. The country was experiencing prolonged, daily power outages popularly known as "Dumsor." The crisis placed enormous pressure on the government to find emergency sources of electricity.

The administration of President John Dramani Mahama established a dedicated Ministry of Power and appointed Dr. Kwabena Donkor, then Member of Parliament for Pru East, as Minister. Against that urgent backdrop, the government entered into several emergency power arrangements.

One of the entities that entered the picture was the Turkish energy company Aksa Enerji Üretim A.Ş. Parliament's repository confirms the execution of an Emergency Power Agreement between the Government of Ghana and Aksa for the fast-tracked provision of up to 370 megawatts of installed capacity. The memorandum was presented to Parliament in June 2015, referred to committee, and resolved on July 17, 2015.

Aksa eventually built the plant. According to company records, the facility was completed in about nine months and commenced operations in 2017. Aksa subsequently signed a new 15-year, US-dollar-denominated electricity sales agreement with the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG) in 2022.

This is not a phantom project that existed only on paper. There was a real power plant, a real government agreement, real parliamentary approval --- and now, a real criminal conviction in the United States arising from alleged corruption surrounding the transaction. That is precisely why Ghana cannot simply look away.

Enter Asante Berko: The Scheme Exposed

At the time of the deal, Berko was an Executive Director in the investment banking division of Goldman Sachs, based in London. His responsibility was to help manage the transaction between Aksa and Ghana while assisting in securing project financing.

According to the U.S. DOJ, Berko abused that position. Prosecutors established that he and his co-conspirators agreed to pay more than $1 million in bribes to Ghanaian officials to ensure Aksa secured the project.

The evidence detailing the arrangement is striking:

• Ministry Approvals: In April 2015, Berko and his associates discussed paying $1 million to the Ghanaian Minister of Power responsible for key approvals, alongside $250,000 to the minister's senior adviser.
• Sponsored Trips: Five Ghanaian officials were taken on an all-expenses-paid trip to Turkey to inspect equipment, with each official allegedly receiving $5,000.
• Parliamentary Ratification: After Parliament ratified the agreement in July 2015, conspirators discussed further payments. In August 2015, discussions centered on $250,000 in bribe payments, including $46,000 paid directly by Berko to Members of the Ghanaian Parliament who had ratified the agreement.

This parliamentary aspect is the most explosive dimension for Ghana. Parliament is not an ordinary commercial institution; it is the constitutional body mandated to scrutinize agreements on behalf of the sovereign people. If members were bribed to approve a government agreement, the issue goes far beyond individual misconduct --- it strikes at the core integrity of the parliamentary approval process.

"Holy Rain" and the Mechanics of Concealment

The case becomes even more revealing when examining how these payments were concealed. The DOJ demonstrated that Berko used his personal email rather than his corporate Goldman Sachs account to coordinate bribe payments. He lied to internal compliance teams and utilized shell companies, sham invoices, nominee account holders, and cash withdrawals to launder funds. Goldman Sachs eventually withdrew from the transaction over corruption concerns.

The conspirators referred to the pending bribe payments using the coded phrase "holy rain." The language is surreal. Funds intended to corrupt public decision-making were couched in religious terminology. But there is nothing holy about money used to buy public decisions.

The Unanswered Question: Who Received the Money?

The U.S. jury has convicted Berko, but an American verdict does not name every Ghanaian individual who received these illicit funds. That remains a task for Ghanaian investigators.

The alleged $46,000 payment to lawmakers requires immediate scrutiny. A publicly circulating list identifies the 18 Members of Parliament who served on the Mines and Energy Committee during the 2015 parliamentary session:

1. Alhaji Amadu Bukari Sorogo (Chairman)
2. Adam Mutawakilu (Vice Chairman)
3. Mahama Naser Toure
4. Gershon K.B. Gbediame
5. Salifu Ameen
6. Kwadwo Emmanuel Agyekum
7. Michael Coffie Boampong
8. Cletus Apul Avoka
9. Alhaji Mohammed-Muntaka Mubarak
10. Mathias Kwame Ntow
11. Kobina Tahir Hammond (Ranking Member)
12. Edward M. Ennin (Deputy Ranking Member)
13. Dr. Stephen Nana Ato Arthur
14. Isaac Kwame Asiamah
15. William Owuraku Aidoo
16. Mustapha Ussif
17. Benjamin Kofi Ayeh
18. Joseph Cudjoe

A Crucial Distinction: Inclusion on this roster does not denote guilt or establish that any individual accepted a bribe. There must be no trial by media, no political witch-hunt, and no presumption that committee membership equals participation in corruption.

However, there is equally no justification for ignoring the record. If U.S. court documents demonstrate that $46,000 was distributed to committee members who ratified the deal, Ghana has every right to ask: Who received the money, and how was it distributed?

The Partisan Shield: NDC vs. NPP
Whenever major corruption allegations surface in Ghana, public discourse quickly degenerates into partisan calculations: Does the accused belong to the NDC or the NPP? The AKSA affair cannot be reduced to partisan politics. One of the greatest vulnerabilities in Ghanaian governance is the tendency for major political parties to act aggressively in opposition and grow defensive in government. This dynamic is how impunity survives.

If an NDC administration signed an agreement in 2015 and corruption occurred around that agreement, those responsible must answer regardless of political affiliation. The same standard must apply to an NPP administration.

Corruption has no political party. A bribe does not become clean because the recipient belongs to one's preferred party, nor does it become more corrupt because it involves a political opponent. If Ghana is serious about fighting corruption, the partisan shield must be dismantled.

What Does Ghana Lose When Corruption Goes Unpunished?

When public contracts are compromised by illicit payments, the financial loss extends beyond the bribe amounts:

• Direct Public Funds: Terms are distorted to accommodate illicit margins, inflating costs borne by taxpayers.
• Value for Money: Commercial decisions are influenced by private kickbacks rather than technical expertise and economic viability.
• Institutional Credibility: Public confidence erodes when Parliament, ministries, and regulatory bodies are suspected of trading national interests for personal gain.
• Investor Confidence: Reputable international investors seek clear rules and fair competition. When contracts depend on illicit connections, honest capital is driven away while corrupt intermediaries thrive.
• Public Trust: Citizens are asked to pay taxes and endure economic hardship. When public scandals yield no consequences, citizens reasonably conclude that the system is structured to benefit the politically connected.
• Opportunity Cost: Every cedi lost to inflated or corrupt arrangements is a cedi unavailable for schools, hospitals, roads, pensions, or grid stability.

Evaluating the Contract vs. the Corruption

A corruption allegation does not automatically mean that the underlying project was unnecessary. Ghana faced a severe power crisis, and the Aksa plant was constructed and integrated into the national grid.

Therefore, the core issue is not whether Ghana needed additional electricity capacity. The relevant questions are:

• Was Aksa selected through a competitive, transparent tender?
• Were the pricing structures and technical specifications fair and reasonable?
• Were contractual risks properly allocated in Ghana's interest?
• Did bribe payments influence the terms, pricing, or expedited parliamentary approval of the agreement?

These questions can be answered through objective documentation and systematic review.

The Role of Law Enforcement and Anti-Corruption Agencies

Ghana does not lack the legal mandates or statutory bodies required to investigate these matters:

• Economic and Organized Crime Office (EOCO): Mandated to investigate financial loss to the state, money laundering, and serious economic offenses, with explicit powers to cooperate with international agencies.
• Police Criminal Investigation Department (CID): Equipped to conduct criminal intelligence gathering and forensic investigation.
• Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP): Explicitly tasked with investigating and prosecuting corruption-related offenses, recovering proceeds of crime, and facilitating cross-border evidence gathering.

The U.S. Department of Justice’s August 6 statement acknowledged assistance from international partners, including the United Kingdom, INTERPOL, and the U.S. Embassy in London. It did not mention Ghanaian law enforcement agencies.

While Ghana did not initiate the prosecution that convicted Berko, its investigative bodies are now presented with a clear evidentiary trail. Silence from domestic institutions is unacceptable; agency inaction only deepens public skepticism.

Ten Steps Ghana Must Take Immediately

To address the Ghanaian dimension of the AKSA deal, state authorities should take ten concrete steps:

1. Formal Request for Evidence: Investigative authorities should formally request the full trial record and evidentiary material from the U.S. Department of Justice via mutual legal assistance channels.
2. Identify Intermediaries: Formally identify all Ghanaian public officials and private entities referenced in the U.S. court documents.
3. Interviews without Presumption of Guilt: Invite the 18 members of the 2015 Mines and Energy Committee for factual interviews to establish how the ratification process unfolded.
4. Publish Records: Parliament should publish the complete 2015 committee report and relevant Hansard transcripts online for public review.
5. Investigate the Turkey Delegation: Identify and interview the five officials who traveled to Turkey regarding the purpose, funding, and outcome of their trip.
6. Identify Named Associates: Clarify the identities and roles of individuals referenced in U.S. evidence, including those noted as "MoP Girls."
7. Examine Ministerial Payments: Fully investigate the alleged $1 million payment intended for the former Ministry of Power leadership and the $250,000 intended for the senior adviser.
8. Follow the Financial Trail: Trace bank accounts, wire transfers, and currency exchanges connected to the named intermediaries and entities.
9. Contractual and Value Review: Conduct an independent value-for-money assessment on any ongoing operational or financial obligations under the Aksa agreement.
10. Prosecute on Merit: Where credible evidence demonstrates criminal liability, initiate prosecution without regard to political status or influence.

Addressing High-Profile Appointments

The U.S. prosecution noted discussions regarding a $1 million payment to the former Minister of Power responsible for key approvals in 2015, a position held at the time by Dr. Kwabena Donkor.

An allegation in foreign court proceedings does not constitute a legal finding of guilt against Dr. Donkor. However, because public office demands high standards of accountability, it creates a legitimate question for public discussion, particularly given his subsequent appointment as Board Chairman of Ghana Amalgamated Trust PLC (GAT).

Public transparency requires clarity. The government should be prepared to outline what due diligence was performed prior to high-level public appointments, and individuals named in international court records should be afforded a clear platform to respond publicly to the claims.

My Thoughts: Owning the Solution
The ultimate issue extends beyond Asante Berko. A foreign national has been convicted in an American court, but the underlying vulnerability rests in the system that allowed an illicit payment network to operate around major state contracts.

The United States investigated the foreign financial trail, British authorities executed the arrest, and a U.S. jury rendered a conviction. Ghana must now demonstrate that accountability does not stop at its borders.

Ghana does not lack anti-corruption laws, specialized agencies, or constitutional mechanisms. What is required is the political will to allow these institutions to function independently. When foreign courts expose corruption involving Ghanaian public affairs, the nation should not merely applaud foreign authorities, it must take ownership of the facts, investigate the domestic actors, and enforce the law.

FUSEINI ABDULAI BRAIMAH
+233208282575 / +233550558008
afusb55@gmail.com

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