From the Grey Zone to the Moment of Decision
For more than three years, Sudan's war has unfolded amid a striking paradox. While UN reports, human rights organizations, and major international media outlets have consistently pointed to the existence of external support fueling the conflict, Western capitals largely refrained from naming the alleged actors directly, preferring broad diplomatic references to "external parties." That phase, however, now appears to be drawing to a close.
Recent developments in the United States Congress, the British Parliament, and discussions within the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva suggest that domestic pressure on both the U.S. and UK governments has reached an unprecedented level. Policymakers are increasingly being compelled to answer a question that can no longer be postponed: How long can strategic and commercial relations with the United Arab Emirates continue to outweigh the requirements of international law and the protection of civilians in Sudan?
In Washington, the Sudan file has moved from general political debate to the center of congressional scrutiny. During a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing last June, several senators cited intelligence assessments which, according to their statements, concluded that external support for the RSF had not ceased but had continued through various channels. The debate was not over the existence of these assessments, but rather over whether the U.S. administration was prepared to bear the political cost of taking measures against a close partner such as the UAE, including suspending arms sales or imposing additional restrictions.
Perhaps the most significant indication came with the Committee's announcement of a closed TS/SCI briefing—one of the highest levels of classified briefings available to Congress. This development reflects the extent to which the Sudan file has become directly linked to U.S. intelligence assessments and broader strategic policy considerations.
In the United Kingdom, the pressure appears even more intense. Testimony presented before Parliament by war crimes and human rights investigator Nathaniel Raymond went beyond political criticism, raising the serious allegation that the British government had received early warnings and information regarding external support networks fueling the war but, according to his testimony, it chose not to take decisive action in order to preserve their economic, security, and diplomatic ties with the UAE, at the expense of the tens of thousands of civilians who were killed by the militia's fire in El Fasher.
These assertions raise not only questions of political accountability but also broader legal and ethical concerns regarding the responsibilities of major powers to prevent mass atrocities when they possess both the information and the capacity to act.
The common thread in both Washington and London is that the debate is no longer centered on whether allegations exist, but rather on the continued reluctance to translate available information into concrete policies. Among the measures increasingly discussed are the designation of the RSF as a terrorist organization and the accountability of those found to have provided it with material or logistical support.
Recent developments at the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva have added another dimension to this debate. Reports alleging that a UAE diplomat photographed a representative of a civil society organization during informal consultations—followed by accusations of attempts to intimidate critical voices—have sparked concern within the human rights community. Although the UAE is still mired in a state of persistent denial, the controversy itself reflects the heightened sensitivity surrounding any international discussion of the UAE's alleged role in Sudan's war and the growing calls for greater transparency and accountability.
Developments on the battlefield, however, may prove even more consequential; During its recent operations in North Kordofan, particularly in Bara and Jabra Al-Sheikh, the Sudanese Armed Forces in an initial estimates, announced the capture of what they described as more hundreds tons of weapons, ammunition, advanced military equipment, dozens of armored combat vehicles, and large quantities of drones and advanced U.S. – made Kornet anti-tank guided missile .
It is likely that all of these weapons had been stockpiled and prepared for "Hour Zero"—the planned attack on the city of El Obeid. However, that plan was disrupted by the Sudanese Armed Forces' recent military breakthroughs in North Kordofan.
Military reports and video footage released by the Sudanese Armed Forces documenting these vast weapons caches and stockpiles indicated that, as in previous instances, much of this military equipment was manufactured in the United Arab Emirates.
Again, that reinforces what Sudan has consistently maintained throughout the conflict: that the war could neither have persisted nor expanded in duration and geographical scope without Abu Dhabi's continued disregard for repeated appeals from the international community and the relevant international resolutions calling for an end to such support. In fact, such findings would likely strengthen calls for more transparent international investigations into the sources of these weapons and the routes through which they reached the militia.
It is worth noting here that the recently leaked draft report of the United Nations Panel of Experts revealed the alleged involvement of the American Boeing 727 and Boeing 737 civilian cargo aircraft in transporting weapons, drones, mercenaries, and fighters to support the RS in Sudan. According to the draft report, these aircraft operated through bases in Chad and employed measures designed to avoid detection, as reported by Reuters.
All these developments also revive memories of the warnings that preceded the fall of El Geneina and later the siege of El Fasher, when the international community largely limited itself to expressions of concern while military operations continued until humanitarian catastrophe unfolded. Many now fear that continued hesitation could produce similar tragedies elsewhere unless diplomatic statements are matched by meaningful action.
This broader context also helps explain the widespread public support for the Sudanese Armed Forces;
For many Sudanese, the conflict is no longer viewed simply as a military confrontation with a rebel force. Rather, it has become a struggle to preserve the Sudanese state itself. This perception has been reinforced by the growing belief that the collapse of the national military institution would likely have meant the collapse of the state and its institutions, opening the door to scenarios similar to those witnessed in other countries where state militaries disintegrated and national territories became arenas for prolonged regional and international conflicts.
Consequently, many Sudanese view support for the army not necessarily as an endorsement of every government policy, but as support for preserving the state's existence, unity, and sovereignty, on the understanding that meaningful institutional reform can only take place within a functioning state—not amid institutional collapse or militia rule.
Today, Sudan's crisis has entered a new phase: pressure within both the United States and the United Kingdom is no longer confined to condemning violations; it increasingly focuses on questioning why Western governments continue to operate within a political grey zone when dealing with those accused of fueling the war, and on examining the extent to which strategic and economic interests have shaped their policies.
The coming weeks may therefore answer the defining question: Will these mounting pressures translate into decisive political and legal action, or will Western hesitation continue while Sudan bears the devastating cost of war?
History judges nations not only for what they did, but also for what they chose not to do when they possessed both the knowledge and the ability to prevent catastrophe.
In conclusion, despite the complexity of the current situation, there are signs that warrant cautious optimism. In recent months, the international mood toward the Sudanese crisis appears to have begun shifting gradually. After a period characterized—according to many Sudanese—by approaches that effectively placed the Sudanese state and the militia that took up arms against it on the same footing, a new approach is beginning to emerge. This approach is more consistent with the principles of international law, affirming Sudan's sovereignty and territorial integrity while rejecting any attempts to impose political or military realities outside the framework of the state.
The growing calls to uphold the Jeddah Declaration and engage seriously in implementing its provisions also reflect an increasing recognition that no credible political process can succeed without a reduction in hostilities and the creation of conditions conducive to a sustainable ceasefire.
At the same time, there is an expanding debate within policy-making circles in several Western countries regarding the impact of external support for the parties to the conflict in prolonging the war, and the importance of addressing the networks of financing, arms supplies, and logistical assistance as one of the key factors sustaining the fighting. If this growing conviction is translated into practical policies and measures consistent with international law, it could represent a genuine turning point in the course of the crisis. No diplomatic effort, regardless of how serious or well-intentioned it may be, can produce meaningful results so long as the sources of war remain unaddressed.
Accordingly, the path to peace in Sudan does not lie merely in the multiplication of international initiatives or statements, regardless of their format. Rather, it begins with creating conditions that halt the flow of arms and unlawful military support to the terrorist militia, thereby laying the foundation for a comprehensive political process based on state sovereignty, Sudan's unity and territorial integrity, and the aspirations of its people for peace, stability, and development.
Perhaps this is the moment when the international community can begin moving from managing the crisis to contributing meaningfully to its resolution. After all the immense sacrifices Sudan has endured, its people deserve a peace built on genuine political will—not merely another promise repeated in diplomatic communiqués.
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