Ghana's Judicial Appointments: UK Comparison

Anyone will be absolutely right to point out that Ghana’s process of appointing judges of the judiciary is a systemic failure, not merely a partisan one. The latter has often be the case.

The debate often gets trapped in a cycle of pointing fingers—accusing President John Mahama of packing the courts with NDC loyalists, while ignoring that former President Nana Akufo-Addo (Wofa Kwaku Willie) similarly maximized the vast patronage powers granted by the 1992 Constitution.

The root problem is the "imperial presidency" engineered into the 1992 Constitution, which systematically blurs the separation of powers and leaves independent institutions vulnerable to executive capture.

Let’s delve into Ghana's politicized system compares to the technocratic model of the UK, where Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia currently stands on this, and how a Technocratic Social Developmentism (TSD) approach could actually fix it.

Supreme Court Appointments: UK vs. Ghana

The fundamental difference between the United Kingdom and Ghana lies in who controls the gatekeeping. The UK has intentionally stripped the Executive of selection power, whereas Ghana’s Executive effectively controls the entire pipeline.

Where does Dr. Bawumia stand on this?

As the NPP flagbearer and leader of the opposition in 2026, Dr. Mahamudu Bawumia has been vocal about judicial reform, but his focus has primarily been on efficiency and infrastructure rather than structural depoliticization.

Recently, Bawumia strongly urged President Mahama not to assent to the new Tribunals Bill, arguing that creating a "second system of justice" is the wrong approach to fixing congested courts. Instead, Bawumia’s stated solutions include:

1. Digitization: Expanding the e-justice systems, virtual courts, and his "LEADing Justice" initiative to speed up case tracking.
2. Expansion: Building more courtrooms and appointing more judges to clear backlogs.

The Critique: While digitization improves efficiency, Bawumia’s call to "appoint more judges" actually leans into the very constitutional flaw that allows executive abuse—the uncapped bench. He has not made the reduction of the President’s Article 144 appointment powers a central pillar of his platform, meaning his current proposals treat the symptoms (delay and congestion) rather than the disease (executive capture).

A TSD Analysis: Fixing Ghana’s Good Governance Matrix

Through the lens of Technocratic Social Developmentism (TSD)—which advocates for insulating critical state institutions from political patronage to foster data-driven, meritocratic, and pragmatic social development—Ghana's judicial architecture is fundamentally misaligned. A young democracy aiming for an emerging economy requires a judiciary that investors and citizens trust implicitly, untainted by election cycles.

Major Challenges

1. The Patronage Ripple Effect: The President's power to appoint over 4,000 public officials, including local government heads, agency boards, and constitutional bodies, creates a culture where institutional loyalty is owed to the Executive, not the state.
2. Compromised Gatekeepers: The Council of State and the Judicial Council are supposed to act as checks on the President. However, because the President appoints key members of these bodies, the "advice" they offer is rarely independent.
3. The Uncapped Bench: The failure to constitutionally limit the number of Supreme Court justices allows any sitting President to theoretically manufacture a majority by simply adding more judges.

TSD Recommendations Going Forward

To achieve a "Social Pragmatism" good governance matrix, the system itself must be structurally reformed to remove the political premium on winning the presidency:

1. Establish an Independent Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC):
   • Ghana must amend the constitution to remove the President as the primary initiator of judicial appointments.
   • A new JAC should be composed predominantly of senior legal professionals, academics, and technocrats—not presidential appointees. This body should advertise vacancies, conduct merit-based interviews, and present a single binding choice to the President.
2. Cap the Supreme Court:
   • Introduce a strict constitutional ceiling on the number of Supreme Court Justices (e.g., 15). This immediately halts the weaponization of the bench size by successive governments.
3. Decouple the Executive from the Legislature:
   • Repeal Article 78, which requires the President to appoint a majority of Ministers from Parliament. This would free Parliament to independently vet judicial nominees without the ruling party MPs acting as rubber stamps to protect their ministerial jobs.

Until the 1992 Constitution is comprehensively reformed to dismantle the excessive executive powers—no matter who sits in the Jubilee House—the judiciary will remain a theater for political chess rather than a blind arbiter of technocratic justice.

Yk Ansah-Yeboah
CED of CPAG

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