Did America want Russia to win the war in Ukraine? And is Russia now a friend of the United States?
Nearly four and a half years into Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, two questions have moved from the margins of debate into its centre: did Washington ever want Moscow to prevail, and does the current period of engagement amount to friendship between the two powers? Neither question has a settled answer, nor reasonable analysts land in very different places depending on how they read the same set of facts.
The case that U.S. policy has tilted toward Russia's terms
Critics of the Trump administration's approach point to the substance of the peace framework Washington has pushed since taking office. An initial 28-point plan leaked in November 2025 reportedly included Russia's maximum demands, Ukraine ceding the portion of Donbas it still controls, shrinking its armed forces, and permanently renouncing NATO membership.
Vice President JD Vance has described the core of the negotiation in terms that centre on which Russian-occupied or Russian-desired territories Kyiv would formally cede, a framing critics say pre-concedes Moscow's central war aim rather than seeking its reversal.
Trump has also publicly blamed Zelensky, at various points, for the war's continuation and pressed Kyiv toward a settlement on a fixed timetable, actions read by skeptics as evidence that Washington values ending the war more than it values Ukraine's territorial integrity, and that this amounts to a tilt toward the outcome Russia has fought for since 2022.
The case that U.S. policy has aimed at peace, not a Russian victory
The administration's own framing rejects that reading. Trump has stated plainly that Ukraine did not start the war and that Russia bears responsibility for ending it, and has described the pursuit of a settlement as pressure applied to both sides rather than a concession to one.
A revised 20-point plan that emerged after Ukrainian and European pushback reportedly added European security guarantees for Kyiv, backed by the United States, suggesting the administration has been responsive to concerns that its initial framework leaned too far toward Moscow. Trilateral talks, led on the American side by envoys including Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, have produced at least one prisoner exchange even without a final settlement, evidence, in this reading, of genuine mediation rather than a scripted handover of Ukrainian territory.
On this account, wanting the war to end quickly is not the same as wanting Russia to win it; it reflects a transactional foreign policy instinct that prioritizes a negotiated stop to the killing over an outcome favorable to either side.
Is Russia a "friend" of America?
The friendship question turns on definitions. Structurally, very little has changed: U.S. and European sanctions regimes imposed after 2022 remain in place, NATO's eastern posture has not been dismantled, and Washington has continued, however inconsistently, to supply and coordinate with Ukraine's war effort even while pushing negotiations.
By that measure, Russia remains, formally, a strategic adversary rather than a partner. What has shifted is tone and personal diplomacy: a direct, sustained negotiating channel between Trump and Putin, repeated public statements from Trump defending or downplaying Russian conduct during the negotiations, and a general softening of the confrontational rhetoric that defined the Biden administration's approach.
Whether that shift constitutes friendship, a pragmatic reset, or simply a negotiating posture aimed at extracting a deal is itself a matter of interpretation rather than settled fact, and it is likely to remain contested until, and unless, a final settlement clarifies what each side actually got.
What to watch
The honest answer, on the evidence available, is that neither claim, that Washington wanted Moscow to win outright, or that the two countries have become friends in any durable sense, is fully supported by the record.
What is verifiable is that U.S. policy since early 2026 has pushed hard and repeatedly for a negotiated settlement on a compressed timeline, that the terms discussed have required more from Ukraine than from Russia at several points in the process, and that the underlying structures of confrontation, sanctions, NATO posture, intelligence competition, remain largely intact. The final shape of any settlement, and what it costs each side, will do more to answer both questions than any single statement from Washington or Moscow has so far.
Mustapha Bature Sallama.
Medical/ Science Communicator,
Private Investigator, Criminal investigation and Intelligence Analysis.
International Conflict Management and Peace Building.USIP
mustysallama@gmail.com
+233-555-275-880
References
GlobalSecurity.org https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/ukraine/2026/07/ukraine-260708-sputnik01.htm
Foreign Affairs https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/flawed-formula-peace-ukraine
Foreign Policy https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/02/23/us-russia-ukraine-trump-putin-negotiations-four-years-peace-deal/
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