Burundi and Mali regimes use a common tactic to stay in power: blame an external enemy

Burundi's president Évariste Ndayishimiye made an official “friendship and working” visit to Ouagadougou, the capital of Burkina Faso, in April 2026. At the time, Ndayishimiye was the rotating chair of the African Union.

The visit aimed to reopen dialogue between the continental body and the Alliance of Sahel States. The alliance brings together Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. It is currently chaired by Mali's leader, Ibrahim Traoré.

The three states withdrew from African Union bodies in January 2025.

During his visit, the Burundian president praised Burkina Faso's efforts to restore and stablise the country. This is despite the country being governed by a military junta whose leader has publicly said democracy is not a priority.

Behind Ndayishimiye's diplomatic rhetoric lies a form of solidarity between authoritarian regimes that reject constitutional constraints.

My doctoral research examined international sanctions imposed by the European Union and regional organisations, and how authoritarian regimes in fragile states adapt to them. Using Burundi as the main case study, I also examined other sanctioned countries, including Mali and Niger.

Burundi and the Sahelian states have taken similar paths.

Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have been subject to sanctions by the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas) and the European Union. This followed military coups in Mali (2020 and 2021), Burkina Faso (2022) and Niger (2023).

Burundi faced sanctions by the EU and the United States in 2016. This was in response to Pierre Nkurunziza's decision to seek a third term, which was deemed unconstitutional.

Some political developments are best understood by looking at what's similar in different contexts.

Burundi and Mali illustrate this well. They are separated by thousands of kilometres and operate in different geopolitical environments. Yet, both reveal how authoritarian governments adapt to external pressure.

Creating the enemy

In both Burundi and Mali, identifying an enemy – whether internal or external – is central to political legitimacy. It also strengthens internal unity by creating a sense of shared threat that can be revived whenever political circumstances require it.

The enemy may be portrayed as a former colonial power, a regional rival or a vague security threat.

In Mali, this dynamic was clear in 2022. The authorities capitalised on the “rally-around-the-flag” effect. This happens when people confronted with a real or perceived external threat unite behind their leaders. It strengthens the government's legitimacy and political standing.

Following the May 2021 coup, Mali's military-led transitional government was expanded to include civilian figures. This broadened the regime's support base and helped generate popular backing.

Tens of thousands of Malians gathered in January 2022 to protest against economic and diplomatic sanctions. They accused Ecowas and France of interfering in the country's internal affairs.

In Burundi, Belgium has become the main external target of anger among supporters of the ruling party.

The former colonial power is blamed for fuelling the country's ethnic divisions. It is accused of colluding with Rwanda in an attempt to destabilise the current regime. The Burundian government also portrays Brussels as the force behind EU sanctions.

This narrative allows both regimes to deflect international criticism by presenting themselves as resisting former colonisers.

Choosing a regional adversary

At the regional level, each regime has chosen an adversary.

In Mali, Algeria is accused of harbouring opposition figures like Imam Mahmoud Dicko, and of colluding with terrorist groups active in northern Mali.

Relations got worse when Mali closed its airspace to Algeria in April 2025. This was reopened in July 2026.

In Burundi, the regional adversary is Paul Kagame's Rwanda. Ndayishimiye has described Rwanda as a “bad neighbour”. He accused Kigali of harbouring those behind the failed 2015 coup attempt.

Burundian authorities also claim that Rwanda supports RED-Tabara, a rebel group seeking to unseat the Burundian government.

On the back of these claims, Burundi closed its border with Rwanda in January 2024. Between August 2022 and December 2025, Burundi deployed troops against the M23 rebel movement, which operates in the Democratic Republic of Congo and is supported by Kigali.

These regional adversaries are powerful political resources. They help sustain a constant sense of siege, which is essential for regimes that rely on external threats as their main source of political survival.

The security paradox

Despite the similarities between Mali and Burundi, differences exist.

In Mali, the threat appears more pressing due to attacks in April 2026 carried out by jihadist groups. These helped reinforce the credibility of the regime's security narrative.

This difference in the nature of the threat has produced distinct strategies of political legitimation. Mali's junta leader, Assimi Goïta, has effectively freed himself from electoral constraints. In July 2025, the National Transition Council granted him a renewable five-year term without elections or term limits.

This means the junta no longer needs to seek approval through elections. Instead, it presents itself as the only force capable of addressing deadly rebel attacks.

Although Mali's economy has proved resilient, it remains vulnerable to recurring power cuts and the gradual decline in development and humanitarian aid.

In Burundi, by contrast, the ruling party has already nominated Ndayishimiye as its candidate for the 2027 election. Elections remain a necessary step.

The government's emphasis on security, therefore, serves a different purpose. It helps prepare the political ground for elections while shifting attention away from an economy weakened by fuel and foreign currency shortages since 2015.

Burundi is among the world's poorest countries. Constantly constructing external enemies and shifting blame abroad may also serve a deeper purpose. According to French political scientist Jean-François Bayart, this strategy also helps conceal the internal system of corruption and patronage that sustains authoritarian regimes.

What the Mali-Burundi comparison reveals is the resilience of a shared political logic: regimes that have turned external enemies from a political burden into a source of legitimacy.

Alène Ngarura Kaneza does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.

By Alène Ngarura Kaneza, doctorante, Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB)

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