Why Israel Is Watching Türkiye's Regional Rise with Growing Unease

As Türkiye's defence industry, diplomatic reach, and regional influence expand rapidly across the Middle East and Africa, Israeli strategists and officials are increasingly framing Ankara not merely as a rival, but as a model of the kind of assertive, self-reliant regional power Israel itself has long aspired to project even as the two countries' relationship has sunk to historic lows.

A Widening Gap in Regional Ambition
Türkiye has spent the past two decades transforming from a modest regional actor into what analysts describe as a state "shaping multiple axes of influence” militarily, economically, and diplomatically. On the military front, Ankara has moved decisively into indigenous production of fighter jets and ballistic missiles, while expanding its footprint in Syria following the fall of the Assad regime.

On the economic front, Türkiye is advancing overland trade corridors including the revival of the historic Hejaz Railway through Syria and Jordan toward Saudi Arabia that American analysts at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies have explicitly described as a bid to challenge Israel's own ambitions to serve as a regional transit hub linking Asia to the Mediterranean, a role Israel has pursued through the US-backed India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) initiative.

Trump's Public Admiration Complicates the Picture

Adding to Israeli unease is Washington's own posture. Following his meeting with an Israeli prime ministerial delegation in Florida, President Donald Trump offered extensive, admiring remarks about Erdoğan and Türkiye, describing Ankara as an "important, positive, and stabilizing actor" in the regional architecture the US is trying to build even as Trump's own administration has moved toward lifting sanctions on Türkiye and considering F-35 sales that Israel has publicly opposed as a threat to its regional air superiority. For Israeli policymakers accustomed to being Washington's primary regional partner, watching a US president speak so favorably of Ankara's role represents an uncomfortable signal about shifting American priorities.

Defence Industry as the Sharpest Point of Comparison

Perhaps nowhere is the asymmetry more keenly felt than in defence manufacturing. Türkiye's Bayraktar TB2 and Akıncı drones have proliferated across Africa and the Middle East, becoming, in the words of one Western analyst, as ubiquitous and affordable as the AK-47 once was. Turkish firms are now supplying combat drones, air defence systems, and precision missiles to rebuild Syria's post-Assad military under President Ahmad al-Sharaa a level of regional defence-export penetration that mirrors ambitions Israel has pursued for decades through its own globally respected arms industry, but which Ankara is now achieving at a scale and diplomatic ease Israel, hampered by the Gaza war's reputational costs, currently cannot match.

An Old Rivalry With Historical Irony
The unease carries historical weight. Türkiye was the first Muslim-majority country to formally recognize Israel, in 1949, and the two nations built a genuine strategic partnership through the 1990s joint air and naval exercises, intelligence sharing, and a free trade agreement that made Türkiye one of Israel's most important trading partners. That closeness has largely inverted: Ankara issued arrest warrants against Netanyahu and senior Israeli officials in November 2025 over Gaza conduct, closed its airspace to Israeli aircraft, and Erdoğan has repeatedly used confrontations with Israel from the 2009 Davos walkout to the 2010 Mavi Marmara raid to today's rhetoric to project himself as a defender of the Palestinian cause and, by extension, leader of the wider Muslim world.

Yet even amid the diplomatic rupture, bilateral trade has proven remarkably resilient rising from $1.41 billion in 2002 to $8.91 billion by 2022, according to Turkish statistics, with Turkish goods reportedly still reaching Israeli markets through indirect channels even after Erdoğan's public trade suspension announcements. That paradox fierce rhetorical hostility layered atop enduring economic pragmatism is, ironically, itself a version of the transactional statecraft Israeli strategists have long admired as effective, and are now watching Ankara deploy against them.

Mustapha Bature Sallama.
Medical/ Science Communicator,
Private Investigator, Criminal investigation and Intelligence Analysis.

International Conflict Management and Peace Building.USIP

mustysallama@gmail.com
+233-555-275-880
References
Alma Research and Education Center, "The Turkish Axis of Activity and Influence: June 2026 Monitor." https://israel-alma.org/the-turkish-axis-of-activity-and-influence-june-2026-monitor/

Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, "Turkey–Israel Relations: Strategic Context and Policy Considerations." https://jiss.org.il/en/siboni-winner-turkey-israel-relations/

Wilson Center, "Turkey-Israel Relations After October 7: Layers of Complexity and Posturing." https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/turkey-israel-relations-after-october-7-layers-complexity-and-posturing

Wikipedia, "Israel–Turkey relations." https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Israel%E2%80%93Turkey_relations

Center for Israel Education (CIE), "Explainer: Turkey-Israel Relations." https://israeled.org/explainer-turkey-israel-relations/

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