State Police and the risk to National Unity

Last week, the Nigerian Senate passed a constitutional amendment bill seeking to establish state police across the country. With the passage of the bill in the Red Chamber, it is now clear that the creation of state police—a highly contentious issue that has been debated for decades—may soon become a reality.

Apparently, both the executive and legislative arms of government support the establishment of state police, despite concerns that Nigeria’s current political and social realities make the institution vulnerable to abuse and could worsen insecurity rather than solve it.

Perhaps this explains why many Nigerians view the proposal with scepticism. The Inspector-General of Police (IGP), Kayode Egbetokun, has warned that state governors could abuse the system by turning local police forces into private militias, thereby encouraging human rights violations and election manipulation. Prominent human rights lawyer, Femi Falana, has also argued that state police will not effectively address insecurity unless the government tackles the underlying problems of poverty, unemployment, and inadequate social welfare. Likewise, the African Democratic Congress (ADC) has openly rejected the proposal, viewing the federal government’s push for state police as politically motivated.

One of the major concerns surrounding state police is the possibility of governors using the institution as a private army. The exercise of gubernatorial powers in many states is already troubling. A governor who controls the recruitment, promotion, deployment, and funding of a state police force could easily use it to harass political opponents, intimidate journalists and activists, suppress legitimate protests, and influence elections through arrests and intimidation.

If some governors have been accused of using local vigilantes, traditional institutions, and state resources for political purposes, what guarantees exist that they will not misuse state police?

Some states are already burdened by ethnic and religious divisions. These realities make state police particularly risky. The tensions witnessed in Plateau, Benue, Taraba, Kaduna, and parts of southern Nigeria are cases in point. Suspicion between so-called host communities and Hausa migrant populations, especially in the context of the settler-indigene conflicts in Plateau State, illustrates how minority groups can face discrimination at the state level. A state police force recruited predominantly from a single ethnic or religious group could therefore become a threat to minorities living within that state.

Government should strive to create an environment in which a Fulani herder, an Igbo trader, a Yoruba resident, a Tiv farmer, or a Hausa businessman receives equal protection under the law regardless of where they live. State police appears inconsistent with this shared principle of brotherhood, equal citizenship, and peaceful coexistence.

We must understand that Nigeria’s primary problem is not necessarily the absence of security agencies but the weakness of institutions. The country already possesses numerous security, intelligence, and paramilitary organisations, including the Nigeria Police Force, the Department of State Services, the National Intelligence Agency, the Defence Intelligence Agency, the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, the Nigeria Immigration Service, the Nigeria Customs Service, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission, the Federal Road Safety Corps, the Nigerian Correctional Service, and the Federal Fire Service, among others.

In addition to these federal institutions, local security support mechanisms such as the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), vigilante groups, hunters’ associations, forest guards, and community watch groups already operate in several parts of the country.

Rather than complicating the security architecture by establishing what many experts consider a constitutionally risky policing structure, the administration of Bola Ahmed Tinubu should prioritise strengthening coordination among existing agencies. This can be achieved through improved intelligence sharing, modernisation of equipment, better welfare packages for personnel, investment in surveillance technology, stronger border security, and comprehensive reforms of the criminal justice system.

Funding is another powerful argument against state police. At a time when many states struggle to pay salaries, financing the recruitment, training, equipment, operations, and pensions of a state police force would be an enormous burden. What happens when armed officers are not paid regularly? A poorly funded police force could become vulnerable to corruption, political manipulation, and criminal infiltration.

If local government elections conducted by many State Independent Electoral Commissions—where the governor’s party often wins nearly all available seats—are anything to go by, then gubernatorial control of state police could deepen political intimidation and electoral violence.

There are also important historical lessons to learn from Nigeria’s First Republic. During that period, security institutions controlled by regional political authorities were sometimes used as instruments of political persecution rather than impartial law enforcement. The infamous Operation Wetie crisis in the old Western Region remains a notable example. The government of Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola was accused by opponents of using regional security structures to intimidate and persecute political rivals. The resulting instability contributed significantly to the collapse of the First Republic.

Nigeria has been navigating delicate political, ethnic, and religious fault lines since its creation. Instead of promoting unity, state police could further complicate these fragile relationships by creating new disputes between states and communities. It could also embolden ethnic agitators and self-appointed champions who seek to define who belongs and who does not belong in particular regions. Such developments could provoke retaliatory actions and increase inter-ethnic tensions, thereby threatening national cohesion.

While the creation of state police is being presented as a solution to Nigeria’s worsening insecurity, the government appears to be overlooking a fundamental reality: placing coercive policing powers under highly partisan local political authorities risks creating a far more dangerous problem—the politicisation of law enforcement, ethnic discrimination, and the emergence of security forces that serve governors rather than citizens.

Until Nigeria builds stronger democratic institutions, establishes effective independent oversight mechanisms, and creates robust safeguards against abuse, state police may pose a greater threat to national unity and civil liberties than the insecurity it seeks to address.

Saleh Bature is a freelance journalist. He wrote the article from Kano-Nigeria. He can be reached at baturesuba@yahoo.co.uk.

   Comments0