The Iran–U.S./Israel Conflict One Month After Its Outbreak: The Logic of Controlled Escalation and Systemic Risk

“The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”— Sun Tzu

Abstract

The analysis highlights a strategic asymmetry between the two camps. While the United States and Israel seek to compress Iran’s strategic time through rapid degradation of its capabilities, Iran pursues a strategy of controlled attrition, aiming to expand time, increase systemic costs, and transfer pressure onto energy markets, maritime routes, and third-party actors—particularly the Gulf states. In this context, the Strait of Hormuz emerges as the real center of gravity of the conflict, transforming energy flows and global economic stability into central elements of the strategic equation.

The article further examines the growing role of artificial intelligence in accelerating decision-making cycles and reducing human control, as well as the proliferation of geopolitical myths in the information space, which shape public perception and influence strategic narratives. Together, these dynamics illustrate a shift from a balance of power to a balance of interdependent vulnerabilities.

The study concludes that the conflict is unlikely to produce a decisive military outcome in the short term. Instead, it is expected to evolve into a prolonged phase of controlled attrition, where strategic success depends less on striking capability and more on the ability to manage systemic risks, sustain political legitimacy, and avoid triggering an uncontrollable escalation.

Introduction. The Logic and History of the Conflict

The conflict between Iran, on the one hand, and the U.S.–Israel axis, on the other, has roots that go far deeper than the current military confrontation. In U.S.–Iran relations, the structural rupture begins with the historical resentment linked to the 1953 coup against Mohammad Mosaddegh, continues with the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the hostage crisis at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, and deepens through a combination of sanctions, regional competition, and the nuclear file.

In parallel, Iran–Israel relations have evolved from indirect rivalry to open strategic hostility, particularly through the expansion of Iran’s “axis of resistance”—Hezbollah, Shiite militias, and the Houthis—and through Israel’s perception that a near-nuclear Iran would represent an existential threat. The 2015 nuclear agreement temporarily halted the escalation spiral, but the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and the killing of Qassem Soleimani in 2020 pushed the conflict back toward a logic of force.

The current war began on 28 February 2026, when the United States and Israel launched large-scale strikes against Iran, following weeks of military buildup and the failure of negotiations over the nuclear program. Reuters, the Council on Foreign Relations, and official Western sources converge on the assessment that hostilities were preceded by a period of maximum pressure and repeated signals that Washington and Jerusalem would not accept Iran approaching the nuclear threshold.

Since then, the conflict has moved beyond the format of a simple air campaign and has evolved into a regional confrontation, with a global energy dimension, a nuclear stake, and systemic repercussions across maritime trade and global markets.

From a strategic standpoint, we are witnessing a clash between two fundamentally different conceptions of warfare. The United States and Israel seek to drastically reduce Iran’s freedom of maneuver through technological superiority, preemptive strikes, and systemic degradation. Iran, aware that it cannot match its adversaries’ conventional military power, seeks to transform the war into a function of cost, time, and attrition, exporting insecurity toward Israel, U.S. bases, Gulf states, and global energy flows.

It is precisely this doctrinal opposition that explains why, after one month of hostilities, the conflict has not closed, but expanded.

At this stage, it is increasingly evident that we are no longer witnessing a purely classical military confrontation, but rather an expansion of competition into the functional domains of the global system. Energy, maritime routes, and market stability are no longer merely collateral variables, but direct components of the strategic equation[2].

In this context, decisions such as the temporary suspension of strikes should not be interpreted as signs of restraint or weakness, but as deliberate instruments of escalation management in an environment defined by critical interdependencies.

Therefore, the current conflict should not be understood as a conventional struggle for military victory, but as a test of the actors’ ability to convert operational advantage into a sustainable strategic outcome.

Iran’s Strategy

Iran’s strategy, in the current context of the conflict, can be described as a combination of regime resilience, distributed retaliation, and energy coercion. Tehran operates from the premise that it cannot win through military symmetry, but it can prevent its adversary from achieving a decisive victory.

Accordingly, its primary objective is regime survival, the preservation of essential capabilities, and the elevation of the strategic cost of adversary operations to a level at which economic, political, and diplomatic pressure on Washington and Jerusalem becomes unsustainable. Official Iranian messaging consistently reinforces this line: Iran claims it is acting in self-defense, that it did not initiate the war, and that Gulf security should be ensured without foreign military presence.

Iran’s behavior toward Gulf states reflects an adaptive logic rather than a chaotic one. The apparent reduction of attacks on Qatar—following explicit warnings from Washington regarding potential strikes on Iranian energy infrastructure—combined with the maintenance or intensification of pressure on Bahrain, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, suggests that Tehran is carefully calibrating its actions. Iran does not pursue maximum escalation in all directions, but redistributes pressure where it assesses that the adversary’s response will remain limited.

Militarily, Iran’s strategy is based on layered response. It combines direct strikes using missiles and drones, attacks on energy infrastructure, pressure on the Strait of Hormuz, and the activation of proxy networks. Iran has also used the de facto closure of the Strait of Hormuz as a strategic lever, disrupting a corridor through which roughly one-fifth of global oil and LNG transit.

This is not merely a military reaction, but a transformation of geography into a strategic multiplier of cost. When Tehran cannot achieve superiority on the battlefield, it seeks disproportionate effects in the economic domain, maritime transport, and global risk perception.

A second pillar of Iran’s strategy is network-based warfare. Hezbollah, Shiite militias, and other components of the “axis of resistance” are no longer merely auxiliary instruments, but operational and political force multipliers. Hezbollah has undergone restructuring under IRGC supervision, moving toward a more decentralized configuration resembling “mosaic defense,” designed to enhance survivability under Israeli strikes.

This reveals a key element of Iranian strategic thinking: instead of a hierarchy that can be easily decapitated, Tehran prefers a constellation of partially autonomous units and nodes capable of continuing operations even if the center is severely degraded.

A third pillar is nuclear ambiguity. Iran seeks to preserve the political-strategic value of its nuclear program even when infrastructure is under attack. On 2 March, the IAEA indicated that it had no evidence that Iran’s main nuclear facilities had been hit at that stage, and subsequently Rafael Grossi challenged maximalist claims that Iran had lost its enrichment capacity entirely.[3]

In other words, even if the program has been degraded, its latent deterrent value has not disappeared. For Tehran, the mere fact that the adversary cannot certify the “complete neutralization” of the nuclear file already constitutes a strategic gain.

In this sense, Iran’s strategy goes beyond the classical framework of attrition warfare and approaches what can be defined as a form of systemic disruption warfare. In the absence of conventional superiority, Tehran does not seek a classical military victory, but rather to increase the systemic cost of escalation for its adversaries.

Threats to the Strait of Hormuz, to Gulf energy infrastructure, and to global commercial flows function as instruments to constrain adversary military action. Thus, Iran does not reverse the balance of power, but succeeds in significantly reducing its opponents’ freedom of decision and maneuver.

This evolution reflects a transition from classical asymmetric resistance toward a form of indirect strategic control over the global environment. By instrumentalizing energy risk and the vulnerability of maritime routes, Iran no longer acts solely against its direct adversaries, but transfers the costs of the conflict to the broader international system.

In doing so, Tehran amplifies its strategic relevance beyond its conventional level of power, using global interdependencies as a force multiplier.

At the same time, Iran seeks to compensate for its conventional inferiority by expanding the spectrum of confrontation—from missiles and drones to cyber operations and pressure on regional energy infrastructure. This approach confirms a coherent strategy of deterrence through dispersion and the multiplication of pressure points, rather than symmetric frontal confrontation.

Domestically, Iran’s strategy also aims at regime consolidation. Although its adversaries initially appeared to rely on the hypothesis of rapid collapse or major internal fracture, assessments in the U.S. press and official Iranian messaging indicate, rather, a consolidation of the regime’s hard core, particularly around the IRGC and the security apparatus.

This highlights an important distinction between political expectation and the reality of revolutionary regimes: under bombardment, such systems may not disintegrate, but instead radicalize and close ranks.

The U.S.–Israel Strategy

Recent developments indicate that the joint U.S.–Israel strategy aims at the systemic degradation of Iran’s capacity to project power before it reaches an irreversible nuclear threshold. This approach combines precision strikes against critical infrastructure, economic pressure, and extended deterrence within a framework of gradual strategic coercion.

At the operational level, this translates into a coordinated strategy designed, in essence, to erode Iran’s systemic power before it achieves an irreversible strategic position. For Washington and Jerusalem, the stake is not limited to the nuclear program narrowly defined, but encompasses the entire capability complex that enables Tehran to project power: missiles, drones, energy infrastructure, logistical chains, the IRGC, and proxy networks.

The core formula of this strategy is offensive prevention: it is preferable to strike before the threat fully matures than to accept a strategic window in which Iran acquires immunity through nuclearization or through the consolidation of regional deterrence.[4]

Despite the evident strategic convergence, a difference in thresholds emerges between the United States and Israel in defining success. For Washington, the primary objective is risk control and the prevention of escalation with major systemic effects, including on the global economy. For Israel, however, the strategic logic is oriented toward the deepest possible and most durable reduction of Iran’s capacity for military and strategic regeneration.

This divergence does not undermine the alliance itself, but introduces a latent tension in the pace and depth of actions, with potential implications for the trajectory of the conflict.

In contrast, Iran’s strategy does not seek to prevent irreversibility, but to stretch it. The difference is not merely one of means, but of strategic paradigm: while the U.S.–Israel axis operates predominantly within a military-operational logic, Iran seeks to shift the center of gravity of the conflict into the economic, energy, and psychological domains, where its adversaries’ superiority is less decisive.

On the American side, the conflict is embedded in a logic of militarized maximum pressure. As early as 6 February, the White House reactivated the legal and political framework defining the Iranian threat, and following the outbreak of hostilities, the Trump administration presented the operation as a response to a major threat posed by Iran’s missiles, drones, and nuclear program.

Although official rhetoric and political signaling have occasionally oscillated between “eliminating the threat” and the more ambiguous notion of regime change, the underlying line has remained consistent: Iran must be pushed below the level at which it can dictate the strategic agenda in the Gulf and the Levant.

On the Israeli side, the strategy is one of extended preemption. Israel no longer treats only nuclear infrastructure as a legitimate target, but also the industries and supply chains that sustain missile, drone, and dual-use capabilities. Netanyahu’s statements on 19 March are revealing: he referred not only to the destruction of what remains of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic programs, but also to the dismantling of the industries that make these programs possible.

This indicates that Israel is not merely seeking delay, but the structural crippling of Iran’s material power base.

At the same time, the U.S.–Israel strategy has a clear geo-energy and geoeconomic dimension. The conflict is not fought solely over nuclear sites or military bases, but also over the future configuration of energy routes. Netanyahu explicitly articulated the idea that, after the war, oil and gas should be redirected via land corridors toward Israeli ports on the Mediterranean, bypassing chokepoints vulnerable to Iranian control.

This is not a passing remark, but signals a broader vision: transforming military victory into a structural reconfiguration of the region’s energy geography.

However, after three weeks of conflict, the limits of this strategy have begun to emerge. We observe both a degree of diplomatic isolation for Washington and differences in tempo and objectives between Trump and Netanyahu, particularly after the strike on South Pars and regarding the opening of a diplomatic “off-ramp.”

Thus, while the joint strategy remains coherent at the level of its general objective—decisively weakening Iran—it is less coherent in its final calibration: how far the war should be pushed, at what economic cost, and toward what political end state.

The central problem of this strategy is not operational effectiveness, but the absence of a clear architecture for the “day after.”

Moreover, the U.S. approach is affected by a structural dissonance between military coercion and diplomatic engagement. The rapid alternation between escalation threats and negotiation initiatives, without an explicitly defined acceptable end state, has generated not only strategic ambiguity but also a gradual erosion of credibility.

Under these conditions, pressure on Iran risks losing its coercive character and becoming, in the adversary’s perception, a predictable and manageable instrument.

Course of Military and Political-Diplomatic Actions (28 February – 28 March 2026). Prospects for Evolution

The initial phase of the conflict began on 28 February, when the United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes against Iran. The UN Security Council convened in emergency session on the same day, while the Secretary-General called for immediate de-escalation. The IAEA rapidly entered crisis monitoring mode, emphasizing the regional risks related to nuclear security.

In parallel, China called from the very first days for the immediate cessation of U.S. and Israeli military actions, signaling that major powers perceived the conflict from the outset as a systemic—not merely regional—threat.

During the first week, Iran responded with missile and drone strikes against Israel, U.S. bases, and several Gulf states, while Iranian diplomacy sought to consolidate the narrative of “unprovoked aggression” and legitimate self-defense. By 7 March, Iran’s representative at the UN was already referring to the seventh consecutive day of aggression, and around 9 March strikes were reported against Bahrain.

After this initial phase—characterized by massive strikes and concentration of fire—the conflict entered a logic of accelerated attrition, in which the cost-efficiency ratio becomes decisive. Recent assessments indicate the use of over 11,000 munitions in the first 16 days of conflict, with an estimated cost of approximately $26 billion, highlighting that immediate tactical superiority is not decisive, but rather the capacity to sustain operational tempo through the replenishment of critical stockpiles.[5]

Despite the scale of U.S. and Israeli strikes against Iran’s ballistic and industrial infrastructure, the effects achieved so far appear to be degradative rather than annihilative. The fact that Iran continues to launch successive waves of missiles suggests the existence of still-significant stockpiles, effective dispersion of capabilities, or a higher-than-expected degree of operational redundancy.

Under these conditions, a realistic assessment is not one of neutralization, but of gradual erosion of Iran’s response capacity, without reaching a decisive breaking point.

Contrary to initial expectations, military pressure has not produced significant internal destabilization in Iran. On the contrary, it has generated a consolidation effect, mobilizing the population around the political and military leadership. This dynamic confirms the limits of the assumption that military superiority can automatically induce internal political change in states under external pressure.

Recent data reinforces this trend, indicating significant internal mobilization in support of the regime and the absence of visible fractures within the politico-military elite, suggesting a high capacity to absorb strategic shock.

At the political-diplomatic level, the month of March brought the institutionalization of the international response to the maritime and energy crisis. On 11 March, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2817, condemning Iranian attacks on regional neighbors. On 19 March, a broad group of states—including Romania—signed a joint declaration on freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and expressed willingness to contribute to ensuring safe passage.

On 21 March, the G7 also announced its readiness to adopt measures to protect global energy supply and maritime routes. These developments indicate that the war has moved beyond a strictly military phase toward the strategic management of a global public good: the security of energy flows.

Diplomatically, the United States transmitted to Iran, via regional intermediaries, a 15-point plan for ending the conflict, including maximalist demands regarding the nuclear program, ballistic capabilities, and the abandonment of support for proxy actors. Tehran’s rejection, coupled with equally extensive counter-conditions, confirms that—despite indirect contacts—there are currently no real premises for a negotiated cessation of hostilities.

Operationally, the most dangerous escalation has occurred around energy infrastructure. On 19 March, Israel struck South Pars, Iran’s main gas field, while Iranian retaliation targeted energy and transport infrastructure across the Gulf, including Ras Laffan in Qatar.

During the same period, Netanyahu acknowledged that Trump had requested Israel to refrain from further strikes on gas infrastructure, indicating that Washington was beginning to feel the economic and political pressure generated by rising energy prices. From that moment onward, the conflict explicitly assumed the character of a regional energy war with global effects.[6]

On 21–22 March, the situation entered an even more volatile phase. Iran maintained pressure on Israel and the Gulf region, while Washington shifted to an ultimatum-based approach: Trump threatened to strike Iran’s electrical infrastructure if the Strait of Hormuz was not reopened within 48 hours.

At the same time, there are indications that the war has begun to partially exceed the political control of the White House, as Iran continues to generate major disruptions in the energy market, NATO allies have been reluctant to fully engage in securing the strait, and additional U.S. troops are preparing for deployment. At this stage, the campaign no longer resembles a limited operation; it increasingly takes on the character of an attrition conflict without a clear strategic exit.

In the final days of the analyzed period, the conflict entered a phase of accelerated regionalization, through the direct involvement of proxy actors beyond the initial theater. For the first time since the outbreak of the war, the Houthi movement in Yemen launched attacks against Israel, marking the extension of the confrontation into the Red Sea basin and amplifying the risk of simultaneous disruption of two critical axes of global trade: Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb.

Regarding the Strait of Hormuz, Iran appears to have shifted from generic threats to selective coercion. There is, at least for now, no formal closure of the strait, but rather the emergence of a regime of partial control—through limited mining, the imposition of tolerated routes, and, according to some reports, the collection of informal fees for safe transit.[7]

Such an approach allows Tehran to avoid the political and military costs of a total blockade while simultaneously signaling that freedom of navigation can no longer be considered guaranteed.

At the maritime level, the use of mines and attacks on commercial vessels have contributed to transforming the Strait of Hormuz into a high-risk operational environment. This development does not affect only the direct participants in the conflict, but introduces an additional layer of uncertainty for global trade, through rising insurance costs, rerouting of shipments, and reduced predictability of energy flows.

In parallel, the conflict has begun to directly affect global logistics infrastructure, including attacks on vessels and port installations beyond the Persian Gulf. This expansion of the operational spectrum toward critical nodes of maritime trade indicates a deliberate strategy of amplifying systemic pressure on the global economy.

An additional escalation factor—still at the level of operational option—is the possibility of direct actions against Kharg Island, Iran’s main oil export terminal. The control or neutralization of this node would severely impact Iran’s export capacity, but would also entail major escalation risks, including retaliatory strikes on Gulf energy infrastructure and a sharp increase in oil prices.

For this reason, any potential operation against Kharg must be viewed not merely as a military objective, but as a strategic inflection point capable of transforming the conflict into a major global energy crisis.

In this context of energy escalation and strategic uncertainty, Washington has begun to explicitly expand its operational options in theater, shifting from a predominantly air-based posture toward a multidomain one.

Following the initial weeks of confrontation—marked by intensive precision strikes against Iranian military and energy infrastructure, including strategically significant targets such as oil export terminals—the U.S. military architecture in the region has begun to undergo significant reconfiguration.

The deployment of additional expeditionary forces—including elements of the 82nd Airborne Division and Marine Expeditionary Units—cannot be interpreted solely as a defensive or deterrent measure.

Rather, this move reflects a shift in paradigm: from a predominantly air campaign toward a multidomain intervention posture, capable of rapidly integrating limited air, naval, and ground operations. The nature of these forces—mobile, autonomous, capable of rapid insertion and targeted action—suggests preparation for a wide spectrum of scenarios, ranging from raids against critical targets to operations securing sensitive installations.

A particularly significant element at this stage is the explicit introduction into U.S. strategic discourse of the possibility of intervening to secure Iranian nuclear materials. Even as an option rather than a decision, this indicates a conceptual escalation of the conflict.

It implies not only striking targets, but also the physical control of strategically important locations—inevitably involving a ground presence, even if limited in time and scope.

In this context, the U.S. military posture in the region is no longer designed solely to strike, but to operate in depth under conditions of high uncertainty, with the need for rapid response to unpredictable developments. It represents an “expansion of the operational menu,” allowing political decision-makers to choose among multiple levels of involvement without committing from the outset to a large-scale war.

However, this flexibility comes with a major strategic cost. The simultaneous presence in theater of air, naval, and ground capabilities, in direct proximity to Iranian forces and their regional allies, exponentially increases the risk of incidents—and, implicitly, of uncontrolled escalation.

In an already highly tense operational environment, where Iran demonstrates the capacity to strike indirectly or asymmetrically, including through proxies, any tactical action may generate disproportionate strategic effects.

Thus, the conflict is entering a phase characterized by strategic ambiguity: on the one hand, the United States and Israel appear to pursue limited objectives—degrading Iranian capabilities and maintaining control over escalation—yet on the other hand, the military instruments deployed exceed what is strictly necessary for those objectives and create the conditions for rapid expansion of the conflict.

In essence, we are not witnessing the explicit preparation of a total war, but the deliberate construction of a scalable intervention[8] capability.

Conclusions

Beyond its military and industrial dimension, the conflict also reveals a politico-strategic failure: the intervention has not produced a decisive weakening of Iran, but has instead contributed to the consolidation of the regime and to the expansion of the conflict logic at the regional level. In this sense, the use of military force, in the absence of a coherent political strategy, risks generating effects contrary to the declared objectives.[9]

The Iran–U.S./Israel conflict of 2026 is not a simple episode of reciprocal strikes, but a structural crisis of the regional order and of global energy security. It concentrates within a single theater three major dossiers: the nuclear dossier, the energy routes dossier, and the dossier of competition over the political configuration of the Middle East. For this reason, its impact goes far beyond the strictly military balance between the combatants. The conflict does not produce, at least at this stage, a strategic decision, but rather a redistribution of risks and costs at the global level and a progressive shift of the confrontation into the sphere of competition for control over systemic variables—energy, maritime transport, and economic stability.

A second conclusion is that the two camps are fighting according to different logics. The United States and Israel seek to compress Iran’s strategic time, that is, to rapidly neutralize its options. Iran seeks to extend the strategic time of its adversaries, exporting costs toward energy markets, the Gulf states, and Western public opinion. At this moment, the military superiority of the U.S.–Israel axis is evident, but the political advantage of the final outcome remains open. Under these conditions, the result of the conflict will not be determined exclusively by the balance of military forces, but by the capacity of each side to influence global systemic costs and to sustain or erode the strategic will of the adversary.

The third conclusion is that the Strait of Hormuz has become the real center of gravity of the war[10]. As long as Iran can disrupt this artery, it retains a disproportionate strategic leverage. Therefore, the current conflict is no longer only about Natanz, missiles, or the IRGC; it is also about controlling the global cost of energy, transport, and confidence in the international maritime order.

A relevant element of the conflict is the progressive transfer of costs toward regional actors that did not initiate the confrontation, especially the Gulf states. These become, paradoxically, bearers of significant economic, energy, and security costs, without possessing control over the strategic decisions that generate the conflict. From this perspective, the war can no longer be understood exclusively as a bilateral confrontation, but as a mechanism for the redistribution of risks and costs at the regional and global level.

Finally, the most probable short-term evolution is neither genuine peace nor the total victory of one of the parties, but a prolonged phase of controlled attrition, with episodes of escalation around energy infrastructure, the Lebanese front, and sensitive sites in Iran. A durable exit would simultaneously require three elements which, for the time being, do not exist: a credible mechanism for limiting the Iranian nuclear dossier, a regional security formula acceptable to the Gulf states, and a clear U.S.–Israeli understanding regarding the threshold at which the cost of war exceeds its strategic benefit. Until then, the conflict will remain not only a military confrontation, but also a major test of the limits of power in a world undergoing an accelerated process of rebalancing.

In essence, the current conflict reflects a profound mutation in the nature of contemporary confrontations. We are no longer witnessing predominantly a balance of power defined by military capabilities, but rather the emergence of a balance of interdependent vulnerabilities. Each relevant actor possesses the capacity to generate disproportionate effects on the global system, which limits the escalation options of all. In this new context, freedom of action is no longer determined exclusively by military superiority, but also by the capacity to manage or to avoid systemic shocks.

At the same time, the functional expansion of the conflict—to Lebanon, Iraq, and the Gulf space—indicates an advanced operational regionalization, in which front lines become increasingly diffuse and indirect actors acquire a growing role. Under these conditions, even if there are signals regarding possible diplomatic probing, the conflict does not appear to be heading toward a rapid closure, but rather toward a continuation within the logic of attrition, in which neither side possesses, at least at this moment, the capacity to impose a decisive outcome.

The current conflict reveals a double structural limitation of Western power: on the one hand, the difficulty of sustaining industrially a high-intensity war, and on the other, the inability to convert military superiority into durable political outcomes. Under these conditions, strategic success is no longer determined exclusively by striking capability, but by the ability to simultaneously manage material attrition and the political legitimacy of action.

In this logic, it becomes increasingly evident that conventional military superiority no longer guarantees control over the strategic outcome, and the conflict tends to transform into an equation of resilience and of the capacity to shape the cost for the adversary, rather than one of direct dominance. Even if the United States and Israel hold the operational initiative and the capability to deliver strikes with significant effects on Iranian infrastructure and capabilities, it remains uncertain to what extent these advantages can be converted into a stable and durable strategic outcome. Iran does not need a conventional victory in order to avoid defeat; it is sufficient for it to preserve its retaliatory capacity, maintain pressure on the sensitive nodes of the global economy, especially around the Strait of Hormuz, and transform the conflict into one of strategic attrition. Under these conditions, the risk for the U.S.–Israel camp is not so much that of military defeat, but that of the inability to achieve a clear political victory in a conflict that tends to prolong itself and generate increasingly cumulative costs.

At the same time, the increasingly deep integration of artificial intelligence into the conduct of military operations contributes to accelerating the conflict and reducing human control over critical decisions, amplifying the risk of escalation that is difficult to manage (see Annex 2).

The Iran–U.S./Israel conflict is not, in essence, a war for military victory, but a test of the actors’ capacity to manage the critical interdependencies of the global system without triggering a systemic rupture.

In this context, the classical criteria of victory must be reconsidered.

In this type of conflict, victory no longer belongs to the actor that strikes decisively, but to the one that understands where it must stop before the system becomes uncontrollable.

After one month of hostilities, it becomes evident that not even military superiority can produce decisive strategic results in the absence of control over systemic variables.

In this war, it is not the one who strikes harder who wins, but the one who understands earlier how far it can strike without triggering a global crisis that it can no longer control.

References

• International Energy Agency (IEA), Oil Market Report, February–March 2026 editions.
• Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Backgrounder: The Strait of Hormuz and Global Energy Security, updated 2025–2026.
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), official statements regarding the status of Iran’s nuclear program, March 2026.
• Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Iran’s Military Strategy and Regional Capabilities, updates 2025–2026.
• International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2025.
• Macdonald Amoah, Morgan D. Bazilian, Jahara Matisek, “Over 11,000 Munitions in 16 Days of the Iran War: ‘Command of the Reload’ Governs Endurance”, Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), March 24, 2026.
• Reuters, coverage on the Iran–Israel–U.S. conflict, February–March 2026.
• “How America’s War on Iran Backfired”, Foreign Affairs, March 2026.
• U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), World Oil Transit Chokepoints: Strait of Hormuz, updated editions.

Annex 1. Assessment of losses, destruction and costs of the Iran–U.S./Israel conflict
(28 March 2026)

Based on publicly available data up to the completion of this material, a provisional assessment—though not yet a “definitive” balance—is presented below. In this conflict, figures regarding casualties, material damage and economic costs remain fluid, and some states have an interest in minimizing or exaggerating them. As a result, I have chosen to separate them into: human losses, material destruction, direct military cost and systemic economic cost.

In addition, the conflict has generated major disruptions to global maritime trade, simultaneously affecting energy flows from the Persian Gulf and alternative routes in the Red Sea, thereby amplifying the systemic economic dimension of the confrontation.

For Iran, the losses are by far the highest. Reuters cites HRANA with 3,220 deaths as of 20 March, of which 1,398 civilians, including at least 210 children; Iranian state media provide a lower figure of 1,270, while Iran’s ambassador to the UN stated on 6 March that there were at least 1,332 dead, which clearly shows that the exact toll is contested. In addition, Reuters noted that it was unclear whether these figures include at least 104 Iranian military personnel whom Tehran said were killed in the attack on an Iranian warship near Sri Lanka. Unofficial estimates emerging after 24–26 March indicate a possible تجاوز of the 3,500–3,800 total casualties threshold, without consolidated independent confirmation, which maintains the fluid nature of the balance.

Regarding destruction in Iran, the picture is severe: The Washington Post reported that the United States and Israel carried out more than 15,000–18,000 strikes on Iranian infrastructure and leadership, while a study cited by The Guardian estimated that in the first 14 days alone around 20,000 civilian buildings were destroyed and massive fires broke out at oil storage facilities. Subsequent assessments suggest an expansion of the area of urban destruction, without an official aggregated recalculation, indicating a trend of increasing material damage. Reuters also confirmed strikes on energy infrastructure at South Pars/Asaluyeh, while the IAEA stated at the beginning of the conflict that it had no indications that the main nuclear facilities had been hit at that stage, suggesting that the major publicly confirmed damage is primarily in the military, energy, logistical and urban domains, rather than in a fully verified nuclear sense.

As a cost estimate for Iran, the assessment can be divided into two levels. The direct military and infrastructural cost already appears to be in the tens of billions of dollars, and if we include the destruction or repair of energy infrastructure, buildings, bases, command networks and the loss of economic activity, a prudent range at this moment would be USD 50–90 billion, with a real possibility of exceeding this if the war continues for another two to three weeks. This is an analytical estimate, not an official balance, but it is consistent with the scale of the strikes, the reported damage at South Pars and the large-scale destruction of the built environment.

For Israel, human losses are much lower than for Iran, but not negligible. Reuters reported 15 Israeli civilians killed, plus 2 soldiers killed in southern Lebanon and 4 Palestinian women killed in the West Bank in an Iranian attack. Meanwhile, new Iranian strikes on southern Israel have also produced nearly 100 wounded in a single day, according to recent reports, indicating an increase in the human and psychological cost even if the death toll remains relatively limited compared to Iran. Data from recent days also indicate an increase in the frequency of strikes on the south and pressure on air defense systems, which amplifies daily operational costs.

Regarding destruction in Israel, the most clearly documented target is the energy sector in Haifa. Reuters reported the strike on the refinery and associated infrastructure, with local fires, damage to electrical systems and temporary power outages, but without massive destruction of essential capacities and without casualties in that episode. In other words, Iran has demonstrated that it can strike Israeli strategic infrastructure, but the publicly confirmed damage so far is real, yet limited at the systemic level.

As a cost estimate for Israel, the direct cost of damage on Israeli territory appears, at this stage, to be in the range of hundreds of millions up to approximately USD 1–3 billion, depending on the cost of mobilization, interceptions and economic disruptions. If we add the costs of offensive operations and air defense, the total burden borne by the Israeli state in the first month can more realistically be placed in the range of USD 4–10 billion. However, this moves into the realm of strategic estimation, as no aggregated official Israeli balance has yet been published.

For the United States, Reuters indicated 13 American soldiers killed, and AP reported over 230 wounded. This is still a modest human cost by the standards of classical wars, but politically significant, as it occurs in a conflict without a clear legislative mandate and with fragile public support.

In addition, the operational cost for the United States is amplified by the accelerated deployment of forces and the high consumption of precision munitions, raising issues of industrial sustainability if the conflict is prolonged.

Regarding material damage for the United States, the picture is less transparent. There are sources indicating limited damage to U.S. military infrastructure in the region, but these cannot be considered fully validated. More relevant is the fact that the Pentagon is requesting a supplemental budget of approximately USD 200 billion, while other sources indicate that already in early March the direct operational cost had exceeded USD 11 billion. This suggests that for Washington the main issue is not physical damage, but the operational and industrial cost of the war.

As a cost estimate for the United States, the direct operational cost of the first month appears likely in the range of USD 12–25 billion, while the full cost, including stock replenishment and force rotations, may quickly rise toward USD 60–220 billion. The high rate of consumption of precision munitions and air operations indicates increasing pressure on U.S. stockpiles, giving practical relevance to the concept of “command of the reload,” namely the industrial capacity to sustain operational continuity.

For the Gulf states, the damage is already serious and, paradoxically, they appear among the major losers of the conflict, despite not having initiated it. Reuters documented strikes and disruptions in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Oman, including ports, airports, oil installations and logistical infrastructure.

Regarding human losses in the Gulf, Reuters reported as of 20 March: 8 dead in the UAE, 6 in Kuwait, 3 in Oman, 2 in Saudi Arabia and 2 in Bahrain. In Bahrain, a Reuters investigation showed that the explosion in Mahazza, which resulted in 32 civilian injuries and damage to homes, was likely caused by a Patriot interceptor operated by the United States, illustrating the complexity of the conflict’s collateral effects.

Regarding economic and energy destruction in the Gulf, the largest confirmed blow is in Qatar: Iranian attacks have taken out approximately 17% of the country’s LNG export capacity for 3–5 years, and the CEO of QatarEnergy estimated losses of around USD 20 billion annually. The impact on LNG exports introduces a global multiplier effect through rising prices and the reconfiguration of energy flows. Other incidents include the shutdown of the Habshan gas facility in the UAE, refinery fires in Kuwait and damage to energy infrastructure in Bahrain and Qatar.

As a cost estimate for the Gulf states, a prudent assessment for the initial phase of the conflict is in the range of USD 30–60 billion, a significant portion of which falls on Qatar. If disruptions continue, the cumulative cost may increase substantially.

If we aggregate the two camps, the balance appears as follows: Iran records the highest human losses and territorial destruction, with a direct cost estimated at USD 50–90 billion and rising. In the U.S.–Israel camp and regional partners, human losses are lower, but economic and operational costs are very high, likely at this stage around USD 50–120+ billion. If the United States continues to expand its military effort and replenish stockpiles, the total cost may exceed USD 220 billion.

The analysis of munitions consumption and industrial replenishment capacity highlights the fact that contemporary warfare is increasingly governed by the logic of logistical sustainability. Data from the current conflict indicate an extremely high rate of consumption of high-performance munitions, transforming the capacity to replenish stockpiles into a decisive factor of strategic success.

A general strategic conclusion is that Iran is losing more in physical and human terms, while its adversaries are increasingly losing in economic, energy and political terms. If the war continues, the destruction of Iran will grow linearly, but the cost for the other side may grow exponentially through energy, markets, munitions reserves and internal coalition tensions. This is, at this moment, the key to the conflict.

Annex 2. Artificial intelligence and the transformation of the Iran–U.S./Israel conflict

The integration of artificial intelligence into the conflict between Iran and the United States/Israel marks a significant stage in the evolution of how military operations are conducted, without, however, representing an absolute starting point. The large-scale use of AI had already been demonstrated in the war in Ukraine, but the current conflict indicates a distinct trend: the transition from the limited use of technology to its systemic integration into the decision-making and operational process.

A first major effect of this evolution is the acceleration of the decision-making cycle. Through the use of algorithms capable of processing in real time very large volumes of data from multiple sources—satellite imagery, intercepts, sensors and open-source data —artificial intelligence significantly reduces the interval between target identification and strike execution. This compression of the operational chain (“kill chain”) fundamentally transforms the pace of the conflict, favoring actors capable of rapidly integrating data and immediately translating it into military action.

In this context, the process of target selection and prioritization is increasingly assisted by artificial intelligence-based systems. These systems not only identify potential objectives, but also assess their operational relevance, propose sequencing of strikes and contribute to post-action effects analysis. Although the formal decision remains at the human level, the role of algorithms in filtering options and shaping the decision-making framework is growing, leading to a form of co-production of military decision-making.

The use of drones and semi-autonomous systems represents another essential vector of this transformation. Unmanned aerial platforms are increasingly equipped with AI-assisted recognition systems capable of identifying targets, navigating in contested environments and, in certain cases, executing attacks with a high degree of autonomy. This evolution contributes to increased operational flexibility and the expansion of strike capability, including under conditions of high risk for human personnel.

In parallel, artificial intelligence plays an increasingly important role in the information domain. The generation and distribution of manipulated content—including synthetic images and videos —enable the shaping of public perceptions and the influencing of narratives associated with the conflict. In an information-saturated environment, where rapid verification of authenticity becomes difficult, AI contributes to blurring the distinction between reality and constructed content, amplifying the cognitive dimension of warfare.

At the same time, the integration of AI into operations raises a number of strategic risks. The possibility of identification errors, combined with the high speed of the decision-making cycle, can lead to disproportionate strikes or incidents affecting civilian populations. More importantly, the partial delegation of decision-making processes to algorithms reduces the degree of human control over the use of force, introducing an additional element of uncertainty into escalation dynamics.

Overall, the use of artificial intelligence in the Iran–U.S./Israel conflict does not eliminate the fundamentally unpredictable nature of war, but accelerates it. If the Ukrainian experience demonstrated the effectiveness of AI as an operational tool, the current conflict highlights the trend toward its integration into decision-making mechanisms, with direct implications for the pace, intensity and control of military actions.

The integration of artificial intelligence therefore does not lead to a more controllable war, but to a faster and more difficult-to-manage one, in which advantage is no longer determined exclusively by military capability, but also by the algorithmic speed of processing and using information.

Annex 3. Circulating geopolitical myths in the Iran–U.S./Israel conflict

The conflict between Iran and the U.S.–Israel axis is not unfolding exclusively in the military and diplomatic domains, but also within a highly dense informational environment, characterized by the rapid proliferation of simplified, distorted or entirely false narratives. In the digital age, these “geopolitical myths” become an integral part of the conflict, influencing public perception and, indirectly, political decision-making.

Recent studies and media assessments indicate that the current war is accompanied by an unprecedented intensification of disinformation, including through the use of AI-generated content, coordinated accounts and visual manipulation. In this context, several of the most widespread geopolitical myths—algorithmically amplified and circulated in real time—can be identified.

1. “The war is a step toward an imminent global conflict”

This myth is based on the automatic extrapolation of regional escalation into a global war.

Reality:
Although the conflict has expansion potential, all major actors (the United States, China, Russia) have so far demonstrated a clear interest in avoiding direct confrontation. Escalation is controlled, not left to chance.

2. “Iran is on the verge of militarily defeating the United States and Israel”

This type of narrative is frequently amplified in the online environment, including through manipulated videos or exaggerations regarding Iranian operational success.

Reality:
Iran neither seeks nor can achieve a classical military victory. Its strategy is one of attrition and cost imposition, not conventional dominance.

3. “The United States and Israel are pursuing a major territorial reconfiguration of the region”

This myth frequently appears in the form of theories about projects such as “Greater Israel” or the systematic redrawing of borders.

Reality:
There is no evidence of a coherent operational doctrine of regional territorial expansion. The primary objective is the neutralization of threats, not territorial occupation.

4. “The Strait of Hormuz can be completely and for a sustained period closed”

This narrative assumes Iran’s capacity to totally and sustainably block one of the world’s most important energy arteries.

Reality:
Iran can exert selective coercion and disruption, but a total and prolonged blockade would trigger major military responses and prohibitive costs even for Tehran.

5. “The war will inevitably lead to the collapse of the Iranian regime”

This hypothesis frequently appears in Western discourse and in superficial analysis.

Reality:
Historical experience shows that regimes under external pressure often consolidate internally rather than collapse. Current developments confirm this trend.

6. “Everything circulating online reflects reality on the ground”

This is perhaps the most dangerous myth.
Reality:
The current conflict is characterized by an increasing divergence between operational reality and its online representation, with some assessments even referring to a “parallel war of perceptions.” Artificially generated content, out-of-context imagery and coordinated campaigns transform the information space into an extension of the battlefield.

7. “There is a coherent and inevitable plan explaining all developments”

This myth appears in multiple conspiratorial variants.

Reality:
The conflict is the result of a complex interaction between divergent interests, structural constraints and adaptive decisions. There is no single, linear and predetermined trajectory of evolution.

Conclusion

In the current context, the ability to distinguish between reality, interpretation and narrative becomes not merely an analytical exercise, but an essential condition for understanding the conflict.

About the author:
Corneliu Pivariu is a highly decorated two-star general of the Romanian army (Rtd). He has founded and led one of the most influential magazines on geopolitics and international relations in Eastern Europe, the bilingual journal Geostrategic Pulse, for two decades. General Pivariu is a member of IFIMES Advisory Board.

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